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From 1889-1924 Walter Clark served on the North Carolina Supreme Court.  
Clark, the son of a wealthy slaveholding eastern North Carolina family, emerged as a 
force for progressive change in North Carolina law and politics.  During Justice Clark’s 
tenure on the North Carolina Supreme Court (Associate Justice, 1889-1902; Chief Justice 
1903-1924) he forged a progressive jurisprudence that defied the traditional perception of 
the judiciary as a conservative bulwark against reform and instead promoted labor rights, 
women’s rights, and public regulation.  Clark’s often controversial judicial decisions and 
political positions led to conflict with the state’s railroad interests, textile mills, and even 
the wealthy Duke family. While Clark’s activism often pushed the limits of acceptable 
political engagement by a sitting Supreme Court justice, he was continuously reelected to 
the North Carolina Supreme Court up until his death in 1924. 
Clark’s judicial and political career provides insight into progressive politics in 
North Carolina history.  Early twentieth century progressives in North Carolina enacted 
moderate reforms in education, child labor, women’s rights, and utility regulation through 
the legislature.  Yet Chief Justice Clark offers us a popular political figure whose views 
pushed for much greater reform.  Clark, through legal and political means, influenced 
Supreme Court opinions and legislation that protected North Carolina’s laborers from 
workplace injury, limited child labor in the industrial workplace, expanded property and 
voting rights to women in North Carolina, and pushed for active public regulation of 
private utility companies.  These changes can be attributed to the unique way in which 
 
 
Clark used the usually conservative courts as a means of influencing the legislature 
toward embracing progressive change.  Although in the age of segregation and 
disfranchisement, Clark’s progressivism did not extend to black citizens, and his support 
of white supremacy may be one reason why his other egalitarian reforms have gone 
unappreciated.  While Clark did not live to see many of the transformations of law and 
politics he hoped to see enacted, his influence can be seen in many progressive changes 
in North Carolina both during and after his life.     
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
He found the law dear, and left it cheap; found it a sealed book—left it a 
living letter; found it a patrimony for the rich—left it the inheritance of the 
poor; found it a two edged sword of craft and oppression—left it the staff 
of honesty and shield of innocence. 
— Henry Broughman, British Reformer1 
 
 
In the spring of 1903, William Jennings Bryan posed the question, “What do you 
say to Judge Walter Clark, of North Carolina?”2  Bryan was advancing Clark’s name for 
consideration for the Democratic presidential nomination—Bryan was sitting out the 
1904 election after two consecutive losses.  Several weeks before Bryan’s statement, The 
Commoner had lauded Clark as “one of the leading democrats of the south, a lawyer of 
great ability and a jurist with the (sic) record of long years of able conscientious 
service.”3  The New York Evening Post, a Republican newspaper, published an 
incredulous editorial, that “ninety-nine-one-hundredths of the party would [say] ‘Never 
heard of the man.’”4  The Post’s exaggerated response, given their past articles about
                                                          
1 From Henry Brougham’s six-hour speech in the House of Commons on February 7, 1828, urging the 
English Monarch to enact legal reforms similar to Napoleon’s Civil Code.  Kieran Dolin, Fiction and the Law: 
Legal Discourse in Victorian and Modernist Literature (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 79. 
 
2 “The Democratic Dilemma,” Washington Post, May 23, 1903; “Nebraskan Favors North Carolinan [sic] 
for the Nomination,” San Francisco Call, May 20, 1903; “Clark Bryan’s Choice,” Minneapolis Journal, May 
20, 1903. 
        
3 “Judge Walter Clark,” Lincoln (Nebraska) Commoner, May 1, 1903.  
 
4 “The Democratic Dilemma,” Washington Post, May 23, 1903.   
2 
 
 
Justice Clark, is echoed by twentieth-century historiography.  Clark’s legacy as a 
southern reformer during the long Progressive Era has slumbered with only brief 
interruptions since his death in 1924.  This dissertation poses Bryan’s question to a 
different audience—historians and legal scholars.  
Within North Carolina politics Walter Clark rose to fame and prominence as the 
son of a prominent antebellum planter and as a distinguished Confederate Civil War 
veteran.5  His work collecting and editing sixteen volumes of the State Records of North 
Carolina and the definitive five-volume Histories of the Several Regiments and 
Battalions from North Carolina in the Great War 1861-‘65 (both labors completed 
without monetary compensation) around the turn of the century left both his 
contemporary North Carolinians and modern historians and genealogists in his debt.6  His 
antebellum and Confederate bona fides granted Clark considerable leeway from orthodox 
Democratic politics of the Gilded Age and Progressive Era to advocate unorthodox 
reforms locally and nationally—although it did not protect him from occasionally being 
labeled a Populist, radical, or, worse still, socialist.7  Clark’s successful legal practice and 
                                                          
5 Aubrey L. Brooks, Walter Clark: Fighting Judge (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1944), 25-
26; 1860 U.S. Census, Halifax County, North Carolina, population schedule, Western District, p. 45, 
dwelling 463, Family 425, David and Anna Clark; digital image, Ancestry.com, accessed February 26, 2015, 
http:// ancestry.com; 1860 U.S. Census-Slave Schedules, Halifax County, North Carolina, Western district, 
pp. 51-54, David Clark, digital image, Ancestry.com, accessed on February 26, 2015, http://ancestry.com. 
 
6 Brooks, Fighting Judge, 239. 
 
7 For claims Clark was an ambitious Populist and radical, see Some Campaign Letters about Walter Clark, 
Pamphlet, dated 1902, accessed April 16, 2012, http://archive.org/details/somecampaignlett00nort. For 
claims that Clark was a socialist, see “Culture and Socialism,” Edison (Washington) Industrial Freedom, 
May 21, 1898; Rome G. Brown, Addresses, Discussions, Etc. (Minneapolis: Self-published, 1917), 20, 73, 
accessed December 21, 2014, https://books.google.com/books?id=WQ40AQAAMAAJ.   
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run as the owner of the Raleigh News during the 1870s and early 1880s was followed by 
a superior court appointment in 1886.  After three years of service on the superior court, 
Clark, a lifelong Democrat, was nominated by the Democratic governor Daniel Fowle to 
fill a vacancy on the North Carolina Supreme Court in 1889.8  Clark would remain on the 
court, winning five subsequent judicial elections, until his death in 1924.  During his 
thirty-four year tenure on the North Carolina Supreme Court, Clark authored 3,235 
opinions—among the most ever written by any sitting state or federal appellate judge.9          
In addition to Justice Clark’s reputation as a state Supreme Court justice, by 1904 
Justice Clark had gained a national reputation as a political and legal reformer.  At the 
1896 Democratic National Convention he received the support of fifty Democratic 
delegates for Vice President as a southern Progressive alternative to northern banker 
Arthur Sewall.10  Indeed, Clark had built up a national reputation as a Progressive 
reformer with articles in several leading legal journals, The American Law Review, The 
Michigan Law Review, and The Green Bag; and in middle-class reformist journals, The 
Arena, Harper’s, and The Independent.  In these national forums Clark consistently 
argued for a progressive program of reforms that would bring the telegraph, telephone, 
and railroad under government ownership; democratize the national government with the 
                                                          
8 Brooks, Fighting Judge, 51, 54, 59. 
 
9 Ibid., 265. These sorts of claims are hard to ascertain given that there is no existing tally of opinions for 
state appellate court judges, however, previous scholars have made similar claims about other prominent 
appellate judges.  For example, Leonard Levy wrote in his 1957 monograph on Massachusetts judge 
Lemuel Shaw that Shaw wrote “2,200 opinions, probably a record number.” See Leonard Levy, Law of the 
Commonwealth and Chief Justice Shaw (New York: Oxford University Press, 1957), 3. 
 
10 Official Proceedings of the Democratic National Convention Held in Chicago, Ill., (Logansport, Indiana: 
Wilson, Humphreys, and Co., 1896), 339, 350, 352, 353.   
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election of post-masters, Senators, and federal judges (including the United States 
Supreme Court) and the elimination of the Presidential veto and judicial review; and the 
need to reform, or abandon, the antiquated system of common law jurisprudence 
embraced by American courts and taught in law schools.11  All of these reforms were 
meant to provide “the masses” with greater access to the economic benefits of 
modernization, a more direct role in government, and to break the power of political 
machines and the infamous trusts.   
Clark frequently challenged the conservative jurisprudence of state and national 
supreme courts with attacks on judicial review, common law, and even the Magna 
Carta.12  It was within the muddled and disputed intellectual territory of early twentieth-
century judicial standards that Clark’s Progressive jurisprudence formed.  His 
Progressive jurisprudence consisted of: a deference toward legislative will; a direct attack 
on common law traditions used to narrow or nullify legal actions brought by women, 
children, and workers; a strong theme of corporate accountability for usury, utility rates, 
workplace accidents, and even the enforcement of segregation by railroad corporations; 
                                                          
11 For an almost complete listing of Clark’s publications, see Brooks, Fighting Judge, 257-265. For an 
example of Clark’s writings on government ownership of communication and transportation networks, 
see Walter Clark, “The Telegraph and the Telephone Properly Parts of the Post Office System,” Arena 5 
(March 1892): 464-471. For an example of Clark’s articles on the democratization of the national 
government, see Walter Clark, “The Election of Postmasters by the People,” Arena 10 (June 1894): 68-75; 
Walter Clark, “The Election of Senators and the President by Popular Vote, and the Veto,” Arena 10 
(September 1894): 453-461; and Walter Clark, “Revision of the Constitution,” Arena 19 (February 1898): 
187-198. For Clark’s articles on reforming, or abandoning, the common law, see Walter Clark, “The 
Progress of the Law,” The American Law Review 31 (May-June 1897): 410-414; Walter Clark, “Law and 
Human Progress,” Arena 29 (March 1903): 225-242. 
  
12 Walter Clark, “Some Myths of the Law,” Michigan Law Review 13 (1914-1915): 26-32, republished in the 
Congressional Record, 64th Cong., 1st Sess., Senate Doc. No. 308.   
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the expansion of state police powers from policing stores hours to mandatory vaccination; 
and lastly, the adaptation of new legal methods from sociological jurisprudence to the 
admissibility of photographic evidence in court. 
During Clark’s thirty-five year tenure on the North Carolina Supreme Court he 
forged a Progressive jurisprudence whose central commitment was to “the public 
welfare.”13  This meant taking into consideration the married woman in her economic 
“shackles”; “the Joneses who pay the freight” in railroad rate cases; the “little sufferers” 
in child labor cases; “the casualties” of the railroads and the “needy employee seeking 
bread to maintain himself and family” in the cotton mills in personal injury cases; and 
“men in the humbler walks of life” in the case of enforcing Jim Crow laws on the state’s 
railroads.14  To achieve these ends Clark at times advocated judicial restraint and at 
others pushed ahead of the legislature; at times he overruled, and strongly condemned, 
common law precedent and at other times imported common law doctrines to aid 
plaintiffs in recovery; he looked backward to the Lost Cause to better understand the 
casualties suffered by the nation’s “vast army of soldiers of toil”; he heavily referenced 
the increasing number of statistics collected by labor and railroad commissions (in the 
United States and abroad) to support his opinions; and a common thread of Jacksonian 
                                                          
13 Brooks, Fighting Judge, 144. 
 
14 Ibid., 95; Sallie Pettit, Administratrix v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company, 156 N.C. 119, 136 (1911) 
(Clark, C.J., dissenting); S. H. Troxler v. Southern Railway Company, 124 N.C. 189, 192 (1899); Pressly v. 
Yarn Mills, 138 N.C. 410, 424 (1905) (Clark, C.J., concurring); W. M. Merritt v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad, 
152 N.C. 281, 284 (1910) (Clark, C.J., dissenting). 
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fear of, and contempt for, concentrations of power beyond the reach of the people 
underlined his opinions in personal injury, segregation, and telegraph cases.15  
Unlike most of his judicial contemporaries, Clark continued to advocate 
Progressive reform measures during his tenure on the court.  He spent a considerable 
amount of his time playing the role of political gadfly, testifying before Congress, touring 
the lecture circuit, and writing over sixty articles for law reviews and Progressive 
magazines.  In the quiet of his study he received letters from (and composed letters to) 
prominent national Populist and Progressive leaders: William Jennings Bryan, Robert La 
Follette, Theodore Roosevelt, Upton Sinclair, and many others.16  Clark’s addresses, 
articles, letters, opinions, and testimony provide a useful, and largely neglected, tool to 
evaluate his judicial opinions as well as the role of southern courts generally in 
responding to popular calls for reforms in child labor laws, workplace safety measures, 
women’s rights, and many other liberal reforms advocated by Populists and Progressive 
politicians of the era. 
Jurisprudence in the Long Progressive Era: Barbarians at the Gate 
During Clark’s career on the bench, the nation’s courts struggled with the tension 
between classical legal thought and legal realism.  Classical legal thought left too little 
room for evidence and argument beyond the accumulated weight of judicial decisions; 
however, judges could not help but sympathize when the law required what seemed an 
                                                          
15 Walter Clark, “The Rights of the Workers,” American Federationist 21 (November 1914): 977.     
 
16 Brooks, Fighting Judge, 204. 
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unjust outcome. Yet, many judges hid behind formalism.  It was an era when the 
justification for judicial power rested on jurists claim that they could not make law—“the 
judge was an instrument, a vessel” for interpreting Constitutional, statutory, and common 
law.17  As legal scholar Lawrence Friedman described the formalism of the era, it was 
“less a way of thinking than a way of disguising thought.”18  The judges who introduced 
labor injunctions, substantive due process, and other such legal mechanisms made law; 
they simply refused to acknowledge it.   
Nineteenth-century American courts jealously guarded the field of legal tradition 
and interpretation, ever wary of encroachments by reformist legislatures at the state and 
federal level.19  In a series of infamous cases—Lochner v. New York, Pollock v. Farmer’s 
Loan & Trust Co., Smyth v. Ames, United States v. E.C. Knight, and Hammer v. 
Dagenhart—the United States Supreme Court employed conservative legal doctrines 
rooted in common law jurisprudence to overturn state and federal statutes that provided 
for social welfare and expanded state power.20  In a similar fashion North Carolina’s 
Supreme Court shared fears of legislative meddling in “the unwritten law” (common law 
jurisprudence), and consequently, its majorities sometimes overturned or narrowed (and 
                                                          
17 Lawrence M. Friedman, “American Legal History: Past and Present,” Journal of Legal Education 34, no. 4 
(December 1984): 287. 
 
18 Lawrence Friedmen, A History of American Law (New York: Touchstone, 2007), 384. 
    
19 For a contrary view, see Michael J. Phillips, “The Progressiveness of the Lochner Court,” Denver 
University Law Review 75, no. 2 (1998): 453. 
      
20 See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895); 
Smith v. Ames, 171 U.S. 361 (1898); U.S. v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 
U.S. 251 (1918).   
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its minorities issued strong dissents against) statutory laws related to officeholding by 
women, women’s property rights, liability for injuries in the workplace and on public 
transportation, and other pieces of social welfare legislation.  Moreover, in areas where 
statutory law was absent, the North Carolina Supreme Court proved reluctant to move on 
from common law positions that English courts had given up half a century earlier—and 
in at least one case a position the common law courts of England never even held.21   
 Despite the break from British governance via the Declaration of Independence, 
the new states often held onto, and indeed lauded, the English common law tradition. At 
the time it served as the basis for the rights professed by the rebellious colonists—a 
revolutionary tradition in a world defined by monarchy.  And in an era when 
governments played a smaller role, the common law, in the words of Chief Justice Story, 
filled up “every interstice, and occupie[d] every wide space which the statute law cannot 
occupy.”22  Yet by the second half of the nineteenth century the common law had 
transformed from revolutionary to reactionary doctrine.23  A new generation of legal 
scholars increasingly questioned its antiquated origins and usefulness in an industrial age.  
Lionized Progressive Supreme Court Justice Oliver W. Holmes spoke of the legal 
profession’s tendency for “blind imitation of the past,” and Harvard Law School dean 
                                                          
21 See Small v. Morrison, 185 N.C. 577, 584 (1923). For a discussion of the vitality of the parent-child 
immunity doctrine, see Elizabeth Ashley Baker, “Closing One Door on the Parent-Child Immunity Doctrine: 
Legislature Rejects the Decision of Coffey v. Coffey,” Campbell Law Review 13, no. 1 (January 1990): 105, 
107. 
  
22 Kunal M. Parker, Common Law, History, and Democracy in America, 1790-1900: Legal Thought before 
Modernism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 1-3. 
 
23 Ibid.; Friedmen, A History of American Law, 271-272. 
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Roscoe Pound criticized it as “a jurisprudence…[clothed] in the rags of a past century.”24  
Chief Justice Clark went beyond these criticisms of the common law.  Clark’s political 
foes declared that the Chief Justice “held [Lords Blackstone and Coke] in derision and 
utter contempt,” while his allies lauded Clark’s judicial modernism: “to him the common 
law is obsolete [and] inapplicable to our day or any modern civilization.”25  Neither side 
exaggerated much.  Clark’s list of adjectives for the common law was long and 
overwhelmingly negative: “cruel,” “barbaric,” a “jumble of absurdities,” while common 
law judges of the often idealized English past were described as “prejudiced,” “boozy,” 
and “incompetent.”26  
Judges like Clark and Holmes strained against mental and stylistic restrictions as 
imposed by common law practice.  Jurists like Holmes would retrospectively be labelled 
Realists by the legal scholars of the New Deal era.  They were often defined as men who 
had a “conception of a law in flux, of moving law, and of judicial creation of law.”27  For 
these judges law became a means to an end (the creation of more equitable judicial 
outcomes) and not an end unto itself (the distillation and formulation of universal 
principles of law).  Early twentieth-century legal scholar Karl Llewellyn once remarked 
                                                          
24 Roscoe Pound, “Law in the Books and Law in Action,” 43. 
 
25 W.T. Shaw, “Is [the] Chief Justice Being Vamped?” Carolina Magazine, n.d., Miscellaneous Materials, 
1836-1925, Walter Clark Papers, State Archives of North Carolina [hereafter SANC]. 
 
26 Walter Clark, “Some Myths of the Law,” Michigan Law Review 13 (November 1914): 26-32, republished 
in the Congressional Record, 64th Congress, 1st Session, Senate Doc. No. 308. 
   
27 Karl N. Llewellyn, “Some Realism About Realism—Responding to Dean Pound,” in American Legal 
Realism, ed. Morton Horowitz and Thomas Reed (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 72-73.  
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when discussing the emergence of Realism within the legal community that Supreme 
Court Justice Oliver W. Holmes’s “mind had travelled most of the road two generations 
back.”28   
Clark makes for an interesting contrast to Holmes, despite their shared legal 
philosophy.  While Justices Holmes and Clark were contemporaries and Clark’s decisions 
often mirrored the Realism of Holmes, Clark differed considerably from the iconic justice 
in several regards that highlight Clark’s distinctive Progressive jurisprudence.  Whereas 
Holmes was noted for his detachment (indeed, he “remained aloof from or contemptuous 
of the great struggles of the day”), Clark was often attacked for “trailing the judicial 
ermine” by engaging in the reformist politics of the Progressive Era.29  Moreover, in the 
ongoing legal struggle between what Justice Cardozo called “competing claims of 
stability and progress” that often divided Formalists and Realists, Clark took a Whiggish 
view of history as inevitably moving toward greater political democratization and 
economic equality.  Yet, the path to the Progressive changes Clark envisioned was one 
that courts all too often blocked via formalistic reasoning and activist application of 
common law doctrines to virtually nullify Progressive statutes. 
 
 
                                                          
28 Karl Llewellyn, “Holmes,” Columbia Law Review 35, no. 4 (1935): 488.  
 
29 G. Edward White, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes: Law and the Inner Self (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1993), 320; Robert Winston, Review of Walter Clark: Fighting Judge, by Aubrey Brooks, North 
Carolina Law Review 22 (1943-1944): 183. 
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The Significance of Justice Clark 
By the end of his life, Clark had established an impressive national reputation and 
seemed poised to be remembered as a leading jurist of his day.  In the 1940s Aubrey 
Brooks noted that there existed a “general and wide interest shown in Clark’s life.”30  The 
publication of Brooks’s Walter Clark: Fighting Judge and Brooks’s and Lefler’s The 
Papers of Walter Clark was greeted positively by reviewers in historical journals and law 
reviews alike.31  Virginius Dabney, Pulitzer Prize-winning progressive southern 
journalist, writing in his New York Times review of Fighting Judge, heralded Clark as 
“one of the most daring thinkers and most progressive jurists in America.”32  Dabney, and 
several other reviewers, listed Clark alongside Justices Brandeis and Holmes as a judge 
willing to overturn precedent and one open to “extra-legal reports, statements, and 
statistics.”33  To some reviewers Clark was “the jurist of the Populist movement,” while 
others classified him as a prototype New Deal activist and “warrior for liberalism.”34  
                                                          
30 Aubrey L. Brooks and Hugh T. Lefler, eds., The Papers of Walter Clark, Vol. II (Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina Press, 1950), vii [hereafter PWC]. 
 
31 Virginius Dabney, “Fighting Colonel—and Liberal Judge,” New York Times, March 19, 1944, BR28; 
Christopher Crittenden, Review of Walter Clark: Fighting Judge, by Aubrey Brooks, Journal of Southern 
History 10, no. 3 (August 1944): 369-370; Malcolm Young, Review of Walter Clark: Fighting Judge, by 
Aubrey Brooks, University of Chicago Law Review 12, no. 3 (April 1945): 306-308; Walton Hamilton, 
Review of Walter Clark: Fighting Judge, by Aubrey Brooks, The American Historical Review 50, no. 2 
(January 1945): 355-357; Archibald Henderson, Review of Walter Clark: Fighting Judge, by Aubrey Brooks, 
Mississippi Valley Historical Review 31, no. 1 (June 1944): 137-138; Review of The Papers of Walter Clark, 
1857-1901, by ed. Aubrey Brooks and Hugh Lefler, Michigan Law Review 46, no. 7 (May 1948): 1009. 
 
32 Dabney, “Fighting Colonel—and Liberal Judge,” New York Times, March 19, 1944. 
  
33 Ibid.; Malcolm Young, Review of Walter Clark: Fighting Judge, 306; Walton Hamilton, Review of Walter 
Clark: Fighting Judge, 356. 
 
34 Walton Hamilton, Review of Walter Clark: Fighting Judge, 355; Malcolm Young, Review of Walter Clark: 
Fighting Judge, 307. 
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Leading national reformers such as Carrie Chapman Catt, Robert M. La Follette, Samuel 
Gompers, and Upton Sinclair sought Clark’s legal advice and support.35  One reviewer 
put it best when he acknowledged that the often controversial Clark was, to both his 
supporters and adversaries, a man they “could not ignore.”36   
Unfortunately, the positive reception of Clark’s judicial legacy was followed by 
his conspicuous absence from both legal histories and general academic histories of the 
Progressive Era and the New South.  As World War II and the New Deal faded into the 
past—to join the Populist Party of the 1890s in the mists of history—an America less 
afflicted with industrial accidents, less beholden to railroad trusts (because of the 
ubiquitous automobile), and increasingly suspicious of the southern racial order found 
little to interest them in a pro-labor, anti-trust, pro-segregation southern jurist.  Although 
Clark’s multi-volume State Records of North Carolina was frequently cited, the man 
himself faded from the historical picture in uncharacteristic silence.           
Aside from a brief reference to Clark in Woodward’s Origins of the New South, 
and occasional references in the footnotes of Charles Aycock’s and Hoke Smith’s 
biographies, Clark’s legacy slumbered until the publication of Willis Whichard’s 1985 
North Carolina Law Review article, “A Place for Walter Clark in the American Judicial 
Tradition.”37  Since the publication of Whichard’s article Clark’s legacy as a reformer, 
                                                          
35 Brooks, Fighting Judge, 168, 206, 251-252.  
 
36 Christopher Crittenden, Review of Walter Clark: Fighting Judge, 369. 
 
37 C. Vann Woodward, Origins of the New South, 1877-1913 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University 
Press, 1951), 469; Oliver H. Orr, Charles Brantley Aycock (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 
13 
 
 
especially with regard to his call for the popular election of the judiciary, has received 
some attention from scholars, yet he remains on the periphery of the historiography of the 
Progressive Era—both in North Carolina and in the nation.38  There is little difference 
between the New York Evening Post and the last nearly hundred years of historiography 
in their respective responses to Bryan’s important question.  
Why has Clark been so neglected by scholars over the last ninety years?  
Returning to the comparison between Justice Walter Clark and Justice Oliver W. Holmes, 
Jr. may provide some insight.  Holmes is arguably the most well-known jurist in the 
history of the American judiciary and is widely recognized by many prominent legal 
scholars as “the most illustrious figure in the history of American law.”39  His legacy has 
spawned several biographies and countless law review articles.40  The similarities 
between Clark and Holmes are abundant.  Both men were children of considerable wealth 
and aristocratic lineage.  Holmes descended from Boston elites and Clark from a family 
                                                          
1961), 290; Dewey Grantham, Hoke Smith and the Politics of the New South (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State 
University Press, 1967), 227. 
 
38 Dewey Grantham, Southern Progressivism: The Reconciliation of Progress and Tradition (Knoxville: 
University of Tennessee Press, 1983), 77, 78, 144; Willis Whichard, “A Place for Walter Clark in the 
American Judicial Tradition,” North Carolina Law Review 63 (1985): 287-337. 
 
39 Fred Shapiro, “The Most-Cited Legal Scholars,” Journal of Legal Studies 29, no. 1 (January 2000): 424; 
Richard Posner, The Essential Holmes: Selections from the letters, Speeches, Judicial Opinions, and Other 
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of wealthy plantation owners going back several generations. 41  Their respective fathers 
were influential figures.42  Holmes’s father was at first a noted medical doctor and 
Harvard lecturer and later a respected and nationally known literary figure; Clark’s father 
was one of eastern North Carolina’s largest planters and operated a steamship line that 
transported agricultural goods from Virginia and North Carolina to New York and the 
Caribbean.43  By the time of the 1860 census Clark’s father’s property was listed at a 
value in excess of $350,000.44  Their fathers’ positions within their respective 
communities brought both men considerable opportunities in life, including the 
opportunity to attend college and study law—Harvard and the University of North 
Carolina, respectively.  When the Civil War began both men enthusiastically answered 
the call to serve.  A twenty-year-old Holmes joined the well-known Harvard Regiment, 
and Clark (then a fourteen-year-old cadet at Tew’s Military Academy) joined the 
Twenty-Second North Carolina Regiment.45  Both men served on the front lines of the 
conflict and even came within about one hundred yards of one another at the Battle of 
Antietam, where both were wounded on that bloodiest day of the Civil War.46   
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Soon after the war’s conclusion both men entered into the legal profession, and in 
the latter portion of the nineteenth century, they climbed the ladder of judicial office from 
superior court to their respective states’ Supreme Court.  By 1902 both men had reached 
the apex of their judicial careers, Holmes receiving an appointment to the United States 
Supreme Court and Clark winning an election to the Chief Justiceship of the North 
Carolina Supreme Court.  Because of several near-misses at a United States Supreme 
Court appointment during the Wilson Administration and a failed 1912 United States 
Senate campaign, Walter Clark would continue to serve on the North Carolina Supreme 
Court bench until his death in 1924.  Holmes would continue on the United States 
Supreme Court almost a decade longer, until in 1932, citing his advanced age, Holmes 
stepped down from the bench into retirement.47  Finally, and posthumously, both men 
were lauded as leading Progressive jurists who embraced judicial modernism, rejected 
outdated Formalism, and paved the way for subsequent Progressive reforms.48   
 While the influential Supreme Court Justice Holmes has been the subject of much 
scholarly attention, Clark is one of many State Supreme Court justices whose name has 
faded into the past.  The historiography naturally possesses a federal court bias that 
diminishes the importance of state courts and the justices who served on them. 
Unfortunately, the focus on federal courts distorts the actual influence state courts often 
have, not only within their own states, but on federal jurisprudence and that of other 
states facing similar judicial issues. Second, legal history remains significantly biased 
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toward northern courts and justices, especially in dealing with issues not involving race 
and black rights.  Third, historians of New South and progressivism have tended to focus 
almost exclusively on the legislative branch and paid little attention to the role of state 
and federal courts in the numerous reform movements that were operative during the 
Progressive Era.   
 State courts are worthy of greater scholarly attention.  Yet many historians have 
assigned much greater importance to the federal judiciary and largely ignored state court 
systems as the chief residence of lackluster judicial talent—the minor leagues of the 
federal judiciary.  State and federal courts were not always treated this way.  In 1795 
Chief Justice John Jay resigned his position on the Supreme Court for the more 
prestigious office of Governor of New York.  The Marshall Court’s expansion of judicial 
authority in Marbury was significant but was not employed by the court until its now 
infamous ruling in the Dred Scott case.49  By the eve of the Civil War the United States 
Supreme Court had come a long way from when Marshall ascended to the bench of a 
court that met in the basement of the Capitol Building, but the federal courts as a whole 
remained underfunded, understaffed, and the weakest of the three branches of American 
government.  In the latter half of the nineteenth century the situation changed 
considerably as the Reconstruction Amendments along with the Removal Act of 1875—
meant to protect the rights of beleaguered freedmen in the former Confederate states—
drastically expanded the powers of the federal government and particularly the federal 
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court system.  While the United States Supreme Court whittled away at the ability of 
African Americans to effectively sue to enforce their rights, rapidly expanding 
corporations found shelter under the Fourteenth Amendment.  Yet federal courts were 
expensive and often distant institutions (both geographically and culturally) with limited 
jurisdiction.  Consequently, the bulk of cases that affected the day-to-day lives of citizens 
(their debts, contracts, injuries, and divorces) worked their way through the various state 
court systems.         
 Yet state court decisions have been all too often ignored by historians, as state 
court judges have disappeared in the shadow of Marshall, Harlan, Holmes, Brandeis, et 
al.  Lawrence Friedman described the 1880s as a period when ambitious lawyers filled 
State Supreme Courts and “few were educated gentlemen like John Marshall; few had a 
sense of style and Noblesse Oblige.”50  By that time, Friedman lamented, “The golden 
age of state judges had ended.”51  Indeed, despite all his wit and talent, without his tenure 
on the United States Supreme Court Oliver Wendell Holmes’s twenty years on the 
Massachusetts State Supreme Court would have gained him only a small portion of his 
present fame.52  However, the judicial talents of state Supreme Court justices were not 
always viewed so unfavorably.  When Roscoe Pound, one of the leading legal scholars of 
the early twentieth century, compiled a list of the top ten judges in American history in 
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1936, only four of them had served on the federal judiciary.53  To be certain, the balance 
in prominence and importance between federal and state judicial systems and jurists was 
changing in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century during Clark’s tenure on the 
North Carolina Supreme Court, but the general public one hundred years ago did not 
share our modern obsession with the federal judiciary.    
 Second, southern courts have carried the mantle of sluggards in the Progressive 
march toward modernization.54  Nowhere is this view more obvious than in legal history.  
A quarter century ago legal scholar Lawrence Friedman noted that southern legal 
history—with the exception of slavery—was “badly neglected.”55  It was a field left 
unplowed, no doubt because few expected it to yield a significant crop.  Prodigious legal 
scholar Paul Finkelman expressed similar sentiments a year later in the North Carolina 
Law Review, noting the almost exclusive focus of legal history on the North.56  Despite 
considerable progress in the field of southern legal history, Finkelman’s concern for the 
lack of a scholarly biography of a single significant southern state judge remains true 
twenty-five years later.57  Even Finkelman’s suggestion of a biography of noted North 
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Carolina jurist Thomas Ruffin remains unheeded.  Only southern judges who went on to 
serve on the United States Supreme Court—Justices Marshall Harlan and Louis 
Brandeis—have attracted the attention of historians and become the subject of 
biographies.58     
 Third, most works on the New South and Progressive Era focus heavily on the 
actions of state legislatures.  Whether Link’s The Paradox of Southern Progressivism, 
Ayers’ Promise of the New South, or any of a host of scholarly works on the New South 
or southern progressivism, state courts take a backseat to the legislative branch when it 
comes to political reform.59  Many scholars lack of attention to southern courts makes 
sense to a certain degree since the strictures of common law and precedent often render 
the courts the most conservative branch of government.  Nevertheless, despite the courts’ 
inherent conservativism they were not entirely unresponsive to reformist appeals. Courts 
could, and sometimes did, enact reforms even as state legislators, beholden to powerful 
interests, remained unresponsive to the popular will.  For reasons discussed below, such 
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action is often unsettling or contradictory to the expectations of many historians and 
therefore goes unnoticed or unrecorded.  If the historians’ goal is to, as Ayers noted in 
Promise of the New South, measure the impact of industry in terms of people’s 
experience, court records are invaluable.  Yet despite the easy availability of state 
Supreme Court decisions and case files, historians often spend far more time digging 
through legislative records.60  
To make matters worse, the courts most often enter the stage only to act as the 
nefarious antagonist, ever hostile to populist and progressive reforms intended to benefit 
farmers and industrial laborers.  Lochner, Pollock, E.C. Knight et al. cast a long shadow 
that allowed Progressives to paint the federal (and to a lesser extent states’) judicial 
system(s) as obstructionist anti-democratic forces, a rhetorical lambasting that Justice 
Clark embraced.  Not only was that image of federal courts exaggerated, such criticisms 
lent credence to a shifting public focus from state to federal courts.61  Beginning in the 
late nineteenth century a formerly distant federal court system whose operations seemed 
to have little impact on the day-to-day lives of most Americans began to represent, to 
many reformers, the chief obstacle to improving the material conditions of farmers, 
workers, and the nation as a whole.  Meanwhile, state courts continued to represent the 
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best chance injured passengers, laborers, and bystanders had to secure justice for their 
injuries. 
Consequently, this dissertation looks to the North Carolina courts during the long 
Progressive Era and examines how the actions of its justices advanced or hindered 
progressive change in statutory and common law of the state.  This basis in case law of 
workplace accidents, women’s property rights, and segregation allows a history, focused 
around the life and career of a prominent Supreme Court Justice, to remain connected to 
the lives of everyday North Carolinians whose cases appeared before the state’s courts 
and whose lawsuits outcomes were influenced by the holdings of the state’s Supreme 
Court.   
Moreover, in studying the judicial career of Justice Walter Clark we can better 
understand the ways in which his roles as politician and jurist interacted.  Clark’s legacy 
challenges the traditional view of the nineteenth-century judge as an apolitical creature.  
Later chapters in this dissertation explore the connection between Clark’s decisions on 
women’s property rights and their connections to his advocacy of women’s suffrage; 
workplace injury law and anti-trust activism; and legal interpretation of property in 
political office with beliefs about majoritarian (white) democracy.          
The next two chapters lay the groundwork for understanding the common themes 
that tie together Justice Clark’s political and legal thought on an array of issues.  Chapter 
2 describes the formative influences on Clark, from his youth as a member of the 
slaveowning aristocracy of North Carolina to his service in the Confederacy and his 
decision to follow a career in the law in the postwar South.  Chapter 3 provides an 
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overview of Clark’s legal and political views.  It touches upon each of the major themes 
of Clark’s legal and political career and provides the context for the more detailed 
chapters that follow. Each of the following chapters will pick up one of the major themes 
of his complex career and explore it in greater detail.  Although not strictly chronological, 
these chapters begin with his Clark’s original conflict with the powerful Duke family and 
trace how his judicial career unfolded, following several threads from the 1890s until his 
death in 1924.   
Chapter 4 examines Clark’s original conflict with the Duke family over the future 
of Trinity College.  Clark’s battle of wills with Dr. John C. Kilgo over funding for Trinity 
College would prove one of Clark’s worst political miscalculations.  Clark sought to cut-
off the development of Tobacco Trust influence over Trinity, which he believed 
threatened to spread anti-silver and pro-monopoly sentiments among the state’s college 
students.  Yet, Clark did not foresee the negative impact of the development of the 
Simmons machine that would be a thorn in his side, and an obstacle for progressive 
reforms, for the first quarter of the twentieth century. Chapter 5 examines the judiciary’s 
role in the aftermath of the White Supremacy Campaign and how Clark played a crucial 
role in entrenching the power of a Democratic majority that often opposed the 
progressive measures Clark sought to implement.  Chapter 6 covers Clark’s support of 
women’s suffrage in North Carolina and nationally.  Clark was one of the earliest male 
proponents of women’s suffrage in North Carolina, and certainly the most prominent as 
the state’s Chief Justice.  His arguments for suffrage often turned anti-suffrage arguments 
about race, womanhood, and the antebellum past into arguments for enfranchisement.  
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Moreover, Clark’s conversion to women’s suffrage is examined as an outgrowth of his 
frustration with women’s legal disabilities and the North Carolina Supreme Court’s habit 
of placing obstacles in the way of women’s legal rights and responsibilities.  Chapter 7 
concludes with Clark’s struggle over water power and the state’s public energy policy.  
Once again Clark found himself opposing the Duke family.  In this instance Clark’s plans 
for a state-run monopoly on public waters and energy generated therefrom conflicted 
with J. B. Duke’s plans for an energy monopoly operating in a laissez-faire energy 
market.  Once again Clark’s decisions on energy regulation as a jurist would overlap 
with, and blur the lines between, his advocacy of progressive measures like public 
ownership. 
 While there is not a specific chapter devoted to race or the Jim Crow system in 
this dissertation, issues of race appear in each chapter and their discussion seemed best 
left within the specific context of the legal cases and political causes wherein they arose.  
In Chapter 4 racial arguments were used by Clark’s opponents to attack the idea of free 
tuition at Chapel Hill.  In Chapter 5 Clark’s conspicuous silence during the White 
Supremacy Campaign and his role in the impeachment of Fusion judges, that Democrats 
worried might overthrow the state’s disfranchisement amendment, raise important 
questions about Democratic Party political strategy in 1898 and 1900.  Chapter 6 
examines Clark’s arguments for women’s suffrage which were rooted in white 
supremacy and meant to advance white women’s voting rights while maintaining black 
disfranchisement.   
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Clark suffered from the same limitations as many white southerners when it came 
to the nexus between traditional racial beliefs and progressive reforms that culminated in 
the growth of Jim Crow in the American South in the latter half of the nineteenth century.  
Justice Clark, whose racial views were deeply influenced by his youth on his father’s 
large plantation in eastern North Carolina, reflected the patrician paternalism of many in 
the antebellum planter class.62  His life after the war, and until his death, included the 
administration of his family’s plantations where some 125 or so primarily black tenant 
farmers lived and labored.63  His worldview presumed white supremacy, and 
consequently, he rarely felt it necessary to defend or even mention it.  He rarely engaged 
in the race baiting demagoguery of men like Furnifold Simmons, Alfred Waddell, or any 
of a host of politicians whose appeals to racism often dominated their rhetoric.  And 
unlike in the legislature where segregation imposed a color line, the results of Justice 
Clark’s decisions on subjects such as child labor, workplace injuries, and married 
women’s property rights did not explicitly limit their application to whites.  While 
Clark’s progressivism might have followed Woodward’s description of progressivism as 
“for white men only,” the impact of his decisions could not be so easily limited. 64 The 
only areas which must be excepted are criminal law and transportation segregation—
discussed in Chapters 3 and 5.  Clark’s support of segregation, and his muted critique of 
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lynching, remained rooted not only in a paternalist worldview toward blacks but also in 
his belief that common white men should not be excluded from the privileges of 
citizenship, the protections of the law, and the ability to rely upon the courts to enact 
punishments expressing the community’s will. 
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CHAPTER II 
ROOTS OF A PATRICIAN RADICAL 
 
 
Our people are being robbed by wholesale.  They do not receive the just 
rewards of their labor.  They are being pauperized and kept in want, while 
a few men by trick and combinations are gathering to themselves the 
earnings of a continent.  Search all history, and you will find no age when 
the robbery of the just earnings of the masses was more systematic, more 
shameless and less resisted than today.  There was never a time when the 
worship of great riches, however badly acquired, was more open than 
now.  
—Walter Clark1 
 
 
Walter Clark was born on August 19, 1846, at Prospect Hill Plantation in Halifax 
County. Clark’s first cries echoed through the halls of a plantation mansion that 
represented the riches and lavish lifestyle of the plantation South.  Hand-carved 
hardwood mantels, doorways, and stairways (imported at considerable expense from 
England) and ornate floor-to-ceiling paneling decorated each room, from the bedrooms to 
the large ballroom, in a conspicuous display of wealth that gave Clark’s entry onto the 
world stage the auspicious beginning attendant to the birth of a son of the planter class.  
Shortly after his birth, Clark’s parents, David and Anna Clark, removed to their Ventosa 
Plantation—over five thousand acres of prime cotton-producing land along the Roanoke 
River.  The size and scope of the plantation was noted by a visitor who remembered
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watching from the front porch at Ventosa “seventy plows drawn by seventy mules driven 
by seventy slaves.”2 The numbers no doubt were poetically rounded for effect, but 
theystill accurately captured the size and scope of the Clark’s Ventosa Plantation—one of 
at least two plantations owned by Clark’s father David.  Ventosa Plantation was home to 
almost two hundred enslaved laborers; over half of a dozen of whom were the same age 
as Clark at the time of the 1850 census—although their births occurred in less auspicious 
circumstances and surroundings.3   
Clark’s origins amongst the conservative elite of North Carolina’s planter class, 
combined with his actions on the court as a progressive reformer, presents two important 
historical questions.  First, how did a son of the wealthy antebellum ruling class become 
the “knight errant” of progressive causes, tilting his lance at the wealthy giants of the 
railroads, telegraph, and cigarette trusts?  How could a man nurtured and raised amidst a 
plantation system that extracted “the just rewards of labor” from the enslaved possess 
such sensitivity to the plight of the working class during the Gilded Age and Progressive 
Era?  Second, how could Clark fail to notice the obvious historical example of slavery 
when he “search[ed] all history” and failed to find an example of “the robbery of just 
earnings of the masses…[as] systematic…[and] shameless” when seeking a correlation 
between the Robber Barons of the great trusts of the late nineteenth century?4  In 
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retrospect the relationship is clear enough, but nevertheless it eluded a man as well read 
and socially responsible as Clark.  Understanding the origins and limits to Clark’s often 
radical progressive vision provides important revelations about the limits of reform 
movements in the Progressive Era South.   
A Planter’s Son 
Clark’s earliest years paralleled those of many other planter youths.  Foremost 
among those similarities was the relation between Clark’s family and their enslaved 
laborers.  At the Clark family’s principal residence, Ventosa Plantation, approximately 
two hundred slaves lived in two villages located roughly a mile from the main house.5  
Given the significant size of the enslaved population there was a great diversity of age 
and occupation among the enslaved.  The 1860 census recorded 192 slaves on the 
Ventosa Plantation alone.  The slave population was heavily weighted toward younger 
workers with over half of the Clark’s slaves being twenty years old or younger.  Clark’s 
biographer and friend, Aubrey Brooks, claimed that at the Clark’s plantations slaves were 
“well fed, well clothed, and kindly treated” and that “families were not separated, and 
there is no evidence of miscegenation.”  Perhaps Brooks was correct as a large minority 
of slaves on the Clark plantation were over the age of fifty, which may indicate sufficient 
medical care.  And only three were listed as “Mulatto” by census takers in 1860, which 
may indicate the non-existence, or low levels, of sexual exploitation.6   
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The rural nature of plantation life kept young Clark removed from white 
playmates, and, as was the case with many planter children, “his playmates…were mostly 
Negro boys of his own age and older.”7  Brooks understood the unfamiliarity of his 
audience in the 1940s (accustomed to segregation) with this sort of interracial play.  
Consequently, he noted with apparent frustration that “one who has never shared such an 
experience cannot possibly understand the thrill and joy of a white boy privileged to play, 
hunt, and swim with Negro urchins who obeyed and adored him and called him 
‘Master.’”8  The degree to which Clark’s playmates were “obedient” to him and “adored” 
him is no doubt overstated in Brook’s nostalgia for an Old South he was born too late to 
partake in.  Indeed, others who reflected on Clark’s life shared Brooks’s nostalgia for the 
bygone Neverland of the Old South, where “upon the vast plantations…of his 
ancestors…, [Clark grew up] amid surroundings now gone [i.e. slavery]…which tended 
to develop qualities of leadership and habit of command from infancy.”9  
Outside of his relations during childhood recreation, Clark’s experiences reified 
his status as “master” in the midst of his father’s many slaves.  The Clark family’s time 
was divided between his father’s two main plantations—Ventosa and Airlie.  The 
majority of the year was spent at Ventosa, the family’s primary residence, until the 
summer months when the family fled the onslaught of mosquitoes (and malaria) to the 
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relative safety of their Airlie Plantation.  On the annual fifty mile, two day trek David 
Clark’s prized horses pulled a small host of carriages while a “large retinue of trained 
servants” followed close behind on foot.10  From the window of one of his family’s 
carriages Clark could not have helped but notice the distinctions of his family’s position 
contrasted with that of its slaves who trailed behind on foot.   
 As many of the progeny of the planter class, Clark’s parents put a great deal of 
emphasis upon his education.  Until the age of eight young Walter Clark studied under 
the efforts of a governess.  Yet after his eighth birthday Clark was sent away to Vine Hill 
Academy.11  By his eleventh birthday his father sent him to Ridgeway Academy where 
his school master delighted in his “studiousness” and “love of study.”12  His letters 
home—most often written to his mother—reflect an interest in current events and his 
studies.  Indeed Clark claimed to overcome his youthful homesickness “by studying 
hard.”  His studies resulted in an exceptional performance in earning the highest marks in 
all his subjects ranging from Greek to Algebra.  By his fourteenth birthday Walter was 
ready to move on to the next level of his education.  Walter desired to attend the 
Hillsborough Military Academy, but his Principal, R. H. Graves, at the Belmont Select 
School was less than enthusiastic.  Graves expressed his concerns to Clark’s father that 
“Walter’s connection with a Military School will not add to his classical knowledge 
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and…the mental food will bear too small a proportion to the physical exercise.”13  Instead 
Graves suggested to Clark’s father that Clark continue his studies at the school until he 
was sixteen and then that he attend collegiate studies at the University of Virginia.14  
David Clark disregarded Graves’s advice and enrolled his son at the Hillsborough 
Military Academy (otherwise known as Tew’s Academy) the same year.15   
Colonel Tew, founder of the academy in the early 1850s, established the school to 
recreate his own experiences as a cadet at West Point.  From its opening Tew’s Academy 
attracted the children of North Carolina’s leading planter families—among them Walter 
Clark.  The short and slender Clark took well to military drill and discipline, so well, in 
fact, that after a little less than a year at Tew’s, Clark was chosen from among the cadets 
to train North Carolina’s first batch of wartime recruits that would become the Twenty-
Second North Carolina Regiment.16  Clark would leave his regiment in February 1863 
and take up his college studies at the University of North Carolina.  He graduated within 
a year as the highest ranked student in his class.  He then went on to study law under 
Judge Battle at the same university.17  Clark found law interesting but doubted he had a 
career in it.  Clark jokingly told his father about his future ambitions, “I have no idea of 
entering any profession except the army, but don’t you think I am doing well enough to 
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read Law, as the only possible disadvantage that could arise would be that I might injure 
my eyes.”18   
Clark frequently exchanged letters with his mother Anna.  Anna Clark was the 
daughter of the wealthy, plantation owning Thorne family.  Raised at her family’s 
Prospect Hill plantation, educated in an exclusive finishing school in New York, she was 
an intelligent woman and a loving mother.  Clark, a dutiful son, often worried of 
disappointing his mother, yet sometimes strained at her religious and social expectations.  
The correspondence between Clark and his mother was wide-ranging and covered 
numerous topics.  Of course many of Clark’s mother’s letters included the usual concerns 
of a mother for her child: that he should wear a hat to avoid getting freckles; that he 
should remember to brush his teeth; that he should eat his vegetables; and that he should 
remember to write his siblings.19  Moreover, their letters covered many topics related to 
plantation management: his father’s planting of a twelve hundred tree apple orchard; the 
successful employment of qualified overseers; his father’s experiment with the purchase 
of two thousand pounds of American guano; and the often tardy journeys of his father’s 
steam ships and barges that carried local goods to Richmond, Baltimore, and the 
Caribbean.20           
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Perhaps the most common topic of their letters was religion.  Anna Clark often 
reminded Clark of his religious obligations.21  She wrote her son, “I think of & pray much 
for you, my dear boy, & commit you into the hands of that Great & Good being…pray to 
him my child to you & guide you each day, yes, every hour.”  Clark, his mother’s 
favorite, eagerly sought her approval: “I read three chapters in my Bible regularly every 
day and five or ten every Sunday like you requested me to do; I go to Sunday School and 
Church.”22  Yet her injunctions to the young boy continued.  On the eve of the fateful 
1860 election she admonished Walter, “Never neglect getting on your knees, in humble 
submission to your maker…& read your Bible every day…never, do you swerve from 
your duty to your God…you must try to be a good example for others & not be led off by 
wild & wicked boys.”23  Similar admonishments would continue as Mrs. Clark and her 
son continued their correspondence throughout Clark’s service in the Confederate Army.  
Clark’s parents instilled in him a strong Protestant strand of temperance that saw his 
friends acknowledge that they could not remember a single instance of Clark’s having 
uttered a curse word, sipping an alcoholic beverage, or wasting a single minute of his 
time in idleness.  Indeed, Clark’s piety would provide a strong edge of efficiency and 
morality to Clark’s latter participation and advocacy of progressive causes.24    
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“Much to Fear”: A Union Divided 
 The first news of an impending secession reached Clark in Hillsborough on 
November 2, 1860.  His father conveyed to young Walter the opinion of a friend who had 
recently returned from New York that the Republicans were rapidly losing ground in the 
state to John Bell’s Constitutional Union ticket.25  That hopefulness had started to 
evaporate by November 7 when Anna Clark wrote to her son that “it is generally 
thought…that Lincoln is elected, & if so, we have much to fear.”26  The news set Tew’s 
Academy at Hillsborough stirring with a mix of anxiousness and excitement.  The 
academy attracted students from across the South, and the South Carolina contingent was 
particularly aroused to the potential for civil war.  Clark reported to his mother that 
“some of our cadets have joined the army at Charleston (in vacation) [yet] there are still a 
good many South Carolina cadets.”  The cadets regularly conveyed new information to 
their fellows about Fort Sumter and other prominent issues of the crisis as it occurred.27 
 Meanwhile, Clark’s mother relayed information to Clark about his father’s 
Unionist activities.  David Clark spurned multiple requests that he run as a Unionist for 
the first attempt at a North Carolina Secession Convention and maintained his customary 
refusal to run for office and even refused to vote for or against secession or in electing 
convention delegates despite his objections to secession.28  But as the Secession 
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Convention neared held David Clark no longer maintained his lifelong avoidance of 
political office.  This time Clark served on a committee of three that approved a pro-
secession resolution.  One hundred Halifax County residents gathered together in 
Clarksville, Halifax County (named after the Clark family), where David Clark joined 
William R. Smith and Dr. William R. Wood in accepting a resolution from Richard 
Smith that called for “the Governor to convene the Legislature forthwith” to call for a 
Secession Convention.29  The committee “reported them to the meeting without 
amendments, and they were unanimously adopted.”30  In the wake of the Confederate 
attack on Fort Sumter Clark’s unionism waned, and he joined the tide moving toward 
secession.  Moreover, David Clark entered the quasi-political contest for the office of 
brigadier general in the state militia. Yet the elder Clark’s heart was not entirely in the 
race, as Anna told her son “his object is not to gain office for himself, but to defeat some 
who are not fit for it & get efficient men to take it.”31  Although the elder Clark had 
opposed the war initially, he was determined that the war, if it must be fought, should be 
fought well. 
 By May 20, 1861, North Carolina was no longer part of the Union, and by July 1 
a fourteen-year-old Walter Clark took up the position of Drill Master to the volunteers 
assembled at Camp Ellis, outside of Raleigh.  The slight, slender, and youthful Clark no 
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doubt contrasted considerably against the mass of volunteers described by one source as 
“husky mountaineers… all much older than Walter.”32 This distinction was not lost on 
the volunteers who took to calling their diminutive drill instructor “Little Clark.”  (Clark, 
a great admirer of Napoleon, no doubt found the nickname flattering since Napoleon’s 
nickname had been “little colonel”).  The volunteers were soon organized into the 
Twenty-Second North Carolina Regiment.  In late September Clark was relieved of his 
duty as Drill Master in the Twenty-Second and sent to report to the Adjutant General in 
Raleigh.  Soon thereafter he was appointed to the Thirty-Fifth Regiment at Camp 
Mangum where, due to promotion of the existing adjutant, Clark acted as Adjutant of the 
regiment.  However, the position was temporary and Clark lamented, “If I was only 2 or 
3 years older...I could get the Adjutancy of the Post with all ease.”33  Stationed at New 
Bern the regiment saw little action and Clark resigned and returned to Tew’s to pursue 
his studies until the summer of 1862 when he rejoined the Thirty-Fifth Regiment as first 
lieutenant and also adjutant to Colonel Matthew W. Ransom.  This time there would be 
plenty of action and no need to return to his studies at Tew’s.34  
 Soon after Clark’s arrival for his second tour of duty his regiment marched 
northward to join Lee’s Maryland campaign.  From there the regiment saw heavy action; 
first at the capture of Harper’s Ferry and then, after a double-quick march, at Antietam 
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the day of the bloody battle.  At Antietam Clark saw “the dead and wounded lay[ing] 
thick” upon the ground of the West Woods. He wrote his mother several days later and 
told her of “noticing the poor Yankee wretches…lying about in heaps…mutilated in 
every form.”  The piles of dead were so great that Clark had to “jump [his] horse over 
piles of the slain.”35  Fredericksburg followed on the heels of Antietam in December of 
1862.  Badly depleted from the previous engagements Clark’s regiment was ordered back 
to North Carolina.  Seeing little prospect for military engagement in North Carolina at the 
time Clark resigned his commission and enrolled at the University of North Carolina at 
Chapel Hill.  He studied there from February 1863 through June 1864 and graduated with 
an education (but not degree) in languages (Greek and French), economics, and the law.  
After graduation he returned to the North Carolina troops as a member of the Junior 
Reserves, a troop of “picked men and picked officers” from North Carolina’s influential 
families.36  Clark spent the remainder of the war with the Junior Reserves sometimes 
skirmishing against Union troops, but most often struggling with the drudgeries of life 
away from the front.37  Finally, on May 2, 1865, Confederate forces under Johnston 
surrendered.  Clark, whose regiment served under Johnston, was paroled and free to 
begin the trek home from Bennett Place (Durham County, North Carolina) to his family’s 
Ventosa Plantation in Halifax County.38     
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Clark’s service during the war gave no indication of his future success in the field 
of law and politics.  Young Walter was ambitious and set upon the idea of a military 
career.  Clark expended great effort in climbing the ranks from his initial assignment as a 
drill-master.  He often despaired that his youth and inexperience would hinder his 
achieving a desired rank and command.  In November 1861 Clark lamented to his mother 
that, “If I was only 2 or 3 years older...I could get the Adjutancy of the Post with all 
ease.”39  Clark would not only achieve the position of adjutant a year later but he would 
also be awarded in 1864 the rank of lieutenant colonel.  However, this rank would be 
stripped by a local general who desired to fill the office of colonel with his chosen man.40  
The field officers resigned and Clark was elected to the rank of Major—which he 
retained throughout the remained of the war.  Even this was not without an element of 
drama that frustrated Clark’s ambition.  Clark sarcastically complained to his mother that 
“Gen’l Holmes was much opposed to my election—I was too young.  He doubtless 
thought 65 the right age to qualify a man for my position, tho’ it doesn’t seem to fit him 
for Lt. Genl by the way.”41   
Blocked in his attempts to rise through the ranks of the North Carolina Troops, in 
1864 Clark turned his attentions toward a commission in the Confederate Army.  Despite 
his mother’s repeated entreaties to return home, Clark wrote, “I am anxious to get a 
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position on the Staff of some Gen’l in the Army of No. Va. I shall have the chance of 
promotion there.”42  To support his efforts for a Confederate commission Clark enlisted 
the aid of Confederate Congressional Rep. A. W. Venable, Confederate Sen. William T. 
Dortch, former Gov. Thomas Bragg, Sen. William A. Graham, and even the North 
Carolina State Legislature; all wrote letters to Confederate President Jefferson Davis on 
Clark’s behalf.43  The letters bore two common elements (most likely since they were 
based upon Clark’s own written entreaties for the commission).  First, they all mentioned 
Clark’s family’s position in North Carolina society.  Senator Dortch referred to Clark’s 
“position in society”; Gov. Bragg referred to Clark’s father as “an Extensive Roanoke 
Planter….and one of our best & most respected citizens”; and the North Carolina 
Legislature’s recommendation effusively praised Clark as a “member of one of the most 
widely extended and influential families in the State.”  Second, they recognized Clark’s 
bravery on the battlefield and his commitment to a military life.  Representative 
Venable’s recommendation spoke of Clark as an example of “the gallantry of our [North 
Carolina’s] youth” and his “gallantry on the battlefront at Sharpsburg”; Sen. Dortch also 
spoke of Clark’s “gallantry” during the Maryland campaign and praised Clark’s entry 
into military service despite being young enough to avoid such; Gov. Bragg similarly 
commented on Clark’s “marked & distinguished gallantry”; and the North Carolina State 
Legislature’s recommendation echoed that of Gov. Bragg.  All of the above mentioned 
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references acknowledged in relatively similar language Clark’s “desire to make arms his 
profession.”44 
Yet Clark’s desire conflicted with the expectations of his family.  As their oldest 
(and only surviving) son, Walter was expected to inherit and manage his family’s 
ancestral plantations in Halifax County.  It was an expectation at odds with Clark’s own 
vision for his future, a future full of adventure and free of the complicated nature of 
plantation management.  Clark concealed his ambitions from his parents on all occasions 
save for one.  In late 1864 Clark’s mother wrote to Clark regarding recent rumors of 
Clark’s courting a young woman while in the field.  Clark, an independent-minded 
teenager, bucked against this expression of parental authority.  In refuting the claims 
regarding his amorous relationship with a local woman from a family of lesser social 
standing, Clark responded harshly to his mother, “I have another aim in life than ‘to live 
as my sires have lived, and die as they have died.’”45  He had no intention of managing a 
plantation (or even a farm) and claimed that “with the profession I have chosen it is not 
probable that I shall own any land beyond my sabre’s length.”  Walter then proceeded to 
make clear a grandiose vision of his future: 
 
It is my intention, and has been, should our young Confederacy go down 
in the billows which threaten to engulf it (which Heaven forbid) to collect 
a band of the brave around me and in a brighter clime and more unclouded 
skies seek that which Fortune denies me on my native shores. Maximillian 
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of Mexico will not refuse a brave man’s sword and I trust I know how to 
wear one.…These are my sentiments.  Known to none, suspected by 
few.46 
 
 
It was a rebellious streak in Clark that would continue to develop.  Although Clark would 
never serve as a soldier in another war, he would embrace the role of a metaphorical 
soldier in progressive political causes.  The sentiments expressed above are the first sign 
of the view Clark would eventually form of himself as an honorable, self-denying, lone 
warrior (or part of a small minority) fighting against the odds.  Some of his attitude may 
also be attributed to his mother’s repeated injunctions to Clark to be “indifferent to 
ridicule, when in the pursuit of right.”47  It also expresses Clark’s ambition that would 
reassert itself through his life as he sought out, unsuccessfully, a seat in the U.S. Senate, a 
chair on the United States Supreme Court, and even the Vice-Presidential nomination on 
a ticket with William Jennings Bryan.48 
This dispute with his mother also showed Walter’s first attempt to downplay his 
ancestry and to criticize ideas of “natural aristocracy” that would later become a large 
part of his political thought.49  Clark’s mother’s claim that “M” (the young woman) was 
not of “our stock of folks” was sharply addressed by Clark.  “The only difference I have 
heard as yet between ‘my stock of folks’ & M’s is that my father’s father brought money 
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and respectability into our family while I believe he can only trace his as far back as his 
father.”50  Clark would later expand on his ideas about the aristocracy, ideas that formed 
in the final years of the war and would evolve into an attack upon both the antebellum 
aristocracy and the postbellum robber barons. 
 Clark’s commitment to military life was not merely rhetorical or poetic.  Despite 
his frequent sickness, and even more frequent entreaties from his mother to return home, 
Clark remained in the field.  Even his departure to university was only intended to better 
his chances at an officership in the regular army, not an avoidance or departure from 
service.51  Later in the war, when his bothers had passed away and his father was called 
away to service as a Brigadier General and Walter was eligible for an exemption to take 
over management of his father’s plantation, he steadfastly refused to return home “while 
a banner floats to tell where Freedom and freedom’s sons still support her cause.”52       
Post War Obligations and Expectations 
In April and May of 1865 that banner sank as Confederate armies surrendered one 
after another.  After Johnston’s surrender Walter was paroled and began a 150 mile 
horseback ride from High Point, through Hillsborough, the home of Tew’s Academy, to 
Ventosa Plantation in Halifax County.53  Clark must have despaired at the scene that 
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welcomed him.  His family was no longer there, having fled to their Airlie plantation.   
Indeed, the plantation mansion and even the outlying buildings (save the slave quarters) 
were also absent.  The buildings had been burned to the ground.  In addition, the family’s 
gardens and fields were overgrown with weeds, and the family’s enslaved workers were 
reported to be “wandering aimlessly about.”  Much of what Clark had known had been 
destroyed in the final months of the war.54   
To make matters worse, Clark’s father’s health was ruined by the war.  During the 
war David Clark had struggled to maintain his plantations, aid his neighbors, and fulfill 
his duty as Brigadier General of North Carolina’s State Troops in the northeastern portion 
of the state.  The burden wreaked havoc upon his already fragile health.  By the end of 
the war he was unable to manage his plantation and the responsibility that Walter sought 
to evade fell squarely upon his shoulders.55  A responsibility young Walter felt keenly as 
it was essential for the support of his father, mother, and over half-a-dozen sisters who 
depended on the income from the family’s plantations.  Moreover, any desire Clark may 
have possessed to follow through on the dreams of glorious combat in Mexico came to an 
end with the capture and execution of Emperor Maximilian of Mexico in 1867.  
According to Clark’s longtime friend, and later political enemy, Robert Winston, Walter 
spent the time after the surrender “regretting the fate which brought him into the world 
too late to have been a major general, and asking himself ‘what next?’”56 
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Clark took his new responsibilities seriously.  Walter put aside his dreams of 
military glory and settled into the banalities of plantation management and developing a 
career in the law.  A diary he kept from 1866–1868 shows Walter assuming almost the 
entirety of managing his father’s five thousand acres worth of plantations.  He hired and 
fired overseers for his family’s plantations.  He bargained with, sought after, and signed 
contracts with free black laborers.  He traveled frequently between plantations to oversee 
their operations.  This new life was not without its own dangers.  One time his hands 
were badly injured mending a broken cotton gin; another time he nearly drowned trying 
to cross a river to visit Ventosa.  Yet, even these many responsibilities did not occupy all 
of Clark’s time.57 
During the first couple of years after the conclusion of the Civil War Clark 
pursued education and politics with zeal.  First he set about improving his legal 
credentials.  He headed to New York in August 1866 to study law and business.  He 
thought the experience would give him a new perspective and that he might “see how the 
Yankees do it.”58  He spent the months of August and September enrolled at Bryan, 
Stratton, & Co. Commercial College and under-studying at a sizeable New York law 
firm.  After a brief return home to check on his plantations Walter traveled to 
Washington, D.C. and then on to New York to study law at Columbia University for a 
law course that ran from October through December.  He left Washington D.C. in 
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December 1866 with a diploma from the commercial college and a better understanding 
of the law.  His trip to D.C. even included a visit to the offices of Thaddeus Stevens.59  It 
was the first example of Clark’s willingness to talk (and work) with political adversaries 
most Democrats found repugnant, a trait that would become a theme in Clark’s political 
career.  Much later in his career he would confidentially cooperate with Republican Gov. 
Daniel Russell and Populist Sen. Marion Butler—both men reviled and hated by North 
Carolina’s Democratic Party—during the Fusion Era and in the wake of White 
Supremacy Campaign.60             
Shortly after Confederate surrender, and his parole, Clark took up the habit of 
writing newspaper editorials to influence the political and economic direction of 
postbellum North Carolina.  Between November 30, 1865 and December 12, 1865 Walter 
submitted three articles on the issue of labor, one each, to The Daily Sentinel, The 
Standard, and the Daily Progress.  Each article is different but follows the same general 
argument: each acknowledges that the end of slavery is a positive good; each praises the 
natural bounties of the state of North Carolina; each ascribes to a belief that free black 
labor is unreliable for exploiting the state’s natural wealth; and each calls for a solution in 
the form of opening up the state to white immigrant labor.61  The call for reliance on 
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white labor in the wake of the Thirteenth Amendment was not novel or radical.  Yet, 
Walter’s articles do contain three radical sentiments: that slavery was an incubus better 
off dead, that the free black population must disappear, and that the government should 
influence the redistribution of undeveloped land.   
Clark quickly and definitively heaped scorn upon the still warm corpse of the 
slave system.  Slavery was not only an economically but also an intellectually stultifying 
system.  Clark lamented that during the antebellum period “the brain was cudgelled [sic] 
and reason was put to the rack to convince our people that the prosperity of the South 
depended upon its further maintenance.”62 Clark’s editorials portrayed slavery as an 
“incubus,” a “black pall,” “an apple of discord”; for Clark its abolition was a “mercy in 
disguise.”  The state was now free, according to Clark, to pursue its course towards 
economic independence without slavery standing in the way of progress.63 
In calling for the utilization of white labor, Clark disparaged free black labor.  His 
positive statements regarding white labor were coupled with vague claims not only that 
the free black population could not be trusted but also that black laborers must “like the 
red man of the forest…‘read his destiny in the setting sun.’”64  With slavery gone Clark 
matter-of-factly stated, “The negro has fulfilled his mission.  He must now pass from the 
stage.”65  Free blacks represented “the dead body of slavery” that must be disposed of to 
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solve the “perplexing questions of negro suffrage and negro equality forever.”  Moreover, 
other statements echoed a common belief in the South that blacks could not survive in a 
white society without the paternalist “protection” of their slave masters: “The negro 
cannot live among us in the present state of things.  The proclamation of his freedom was 
the death knell of his race.”66  The fields of North Carolina were to be tilled, occupied, 
and tread by the feet of white immigrants.  For Clark that was the only option to 
reinvigorate the state’s agricultural and industrial commerce.           
 Clark also called for a tax-based remedy to land ownership issues.  A 
redistribution of land made possible by onerous taxes would encourage the sale of 
undeveloped land.  Clark called for the legislature to “lay a heavy tax on all unimproved 
lands,” a plan just short of land redistribution.67  Clark’s intent was twofold.  First, such a 
tax would redress past grievances and inequalities of the antebellum system that had 
driven away the state’s white population to seek cheaper land elsewhere.  Second, the 
reform would set the state on a future course of small and medium-sized land holdings; 
either the current owner must “make [the land] productive of some good to the country at 
large, or part with them to those who will.”68  If employers and the legislature followed 
Clark’s advice, he expected these changes would bring a deluge of white immigrants 
from both within and without the United States.  In Clark’s vision of white labor working 
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North Carolina fields, we find the first expressions of his later support for labor in the 
Progressive Era:    
 
The South has to start anew.  The labor of years has been destroyed in as 
many months.  The industrial system has been completely prostrated, and 
until it is renovated we cannot hope for stability of our remaining 
institutions or the security of our lives and property, much less the 
prosperity of a country.  A blow aimed at the labor of a country is a stroke 
at its very vitals.—Render labor uncertain and you unhinge the very fabric 
of society and unsettle the edifice of good Government.  Fill your villages, 
your towns and your workshops with a hardworking, intelligent 
population, un-embittered by distinction of race, and you place the 
prosperity of this state beyond the reach of envy or the votes of a Black 
Republican Congress.69 
 
While the “Black Republican Congress” would come to an end with the demise of 
Reconstruction in 1877, Clark’s views of labor would remain and evolve.  From the idea 
that the nation needed a white working class that was united, intelligent, and an essential 
base for all “good government” sprang Clark’s agitation for various labor issues during 
his lifetime, ranging from equal pay to improved factory conditions to protect workers.70 
 The controversial nature of these sentiments, alongside the handicap of his youth, 
led Clark to sign each of these letters with a pseudonym.  Each letter was signed with a 
different pseudonym that carried separate, meaningful implications.  The first letter in the 
Daily Sentinel was signed “Camillus,” most likely a reference to the patrician Roman 
designated the “Second founder of Rome” for saving the Republic from Gaelic 
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invaders.71  The second letter in The Standard was signed “Ossian,” most likely a 
reference to the mythical third century Scottish poet and his work Fingal (which 
translates as “white stranger”).72  The third letter in the Daily Progress was signed 
“L’Orient,” most likely a reference to the flagship of Napoleon’s naval fleet.73        
 Several years later, under the pseudonym of “Notes by the Way,” Clark again 
published an attack upon the old political system and the current politics of the state.  The 
Roanoke News published twenty-six articles from Clark in the summer of 1871.74  Clark 
wrote the articles as part of a nationwide trip that took him over ten thousand miles from 
North Carolina to San Francisco and back.  In one of these articles Clark advanced his 
criticisms of the Old and New South further.  Without even the customary and 
perfunctory claims of abolitionist responsibility, Clark assailed the southern politicians, 
“who, seeing they could no longer rule in Washington, like gamblers, risked all on the 
throw of the die” to “agitate” for the Civil War.  Clark continued: 
 
The politicians, the leaders, knew the odds we had to face.  The masses of 
the people did not know and they do not today.  Honor to the soldiery of 
the South, whose gallantry bore up a sinking cause on the points of their 
bayonets for two long years after that cause had been lost by the want of 
statesmanship at Richmond, honor to the heroism and devotion of our 
beautiful women, honor to the integrity and patriotism of our Southern 
masses, but may history pursue with an eternal infamy the impracticable 
who precipitated a struggle which they knew at the time to be hopeless, 
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and protracted the struggle for months after it was evident that all hope of 
success by arms had passed.75           
 
But the failure of the Confederate leadership and the antebellum aristocracy’s errors did 
not end with the surrender at Appomattox, according to Clark.  These men, and if not 
them their sentiments, continued on in the men Clark referred to as “Bourbons…[who] 
‘have learned nothing and…have forgotten nothing.’”76  Commenting on the recent failed 
attempt to amend the state’s constitution, Clark refused to accept his contemporaries’ 
race baiting: 
 
The defeat of the Convention at the late election was not due to the negro 
vote, but to the dislike of the people to these “men of reaction.”  With a 
forty-thousand white majority in the State, the defeat could not be due to 
the negro vote…These men [Conservative Democrats] too ill-disguised 
the fact that they hoped in the movement a restoration of the old order of 
things (excepting, of course, slavery, which was dead beyond hope of 
reaction).  The people were not ready for ….There were two classes, 
whose power is every day becoming more felt in the State…i.e., the 
poorer classes, who have never willingly followed the leadership of these 
men, and the young men who are naturally unwilling to entrust the control 
of their State again to the hands of [the same] men.77  
 
Despite Clark’s decidedly negative sentiments about the free black population 
several years earlier, now he viewed these claims as a distraction from a larger issue—the 
conflict between those who pined for an antebellum social and political order and those 
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who recognized the growing political power of the poor and middle-class.  Moreover, in 
his references to the poorer classes, we see the roots of the patrician radical who 
minimizes his family’s planter past to appeal to “the poorer classes who…never willingly 
followed the leadership” of the planter class.78  Not wanting to be too closely associated 
with the antebellum aristocracy, it was at this time in his life that Clark dropped his 
middle name, McKenzie, as it “smack[ed] of Scotch aristocracy, and became plain 
Walter Clark.”79   
 Contrary to Clark’s dislike of aristocracy and his desire to avoid its appearance, 
he remained a well-connected member of the ruling class.  In 1871 he began courting 
Susan Graham.  Susan’s father was William A. Graham, whose had served as North 
Carolina State Senator and Governor, U.S. Representative, U.S. Senator, Secretary of the 
Navy in the Fillmore administration, Confederate Senator, and Vice-President on the 
Whig’s 1854 ticket alongside Winfield Scott.80  William Graham was as close to royalty 
as one could come in republican North Carolina. Indicative of the paradoxical nature of 
Clark, and southern progressivism in general, that mixed elements of old world and new, 
was Clark’s courtship of Susan Clark.  Susan was Graham’s only daughter out of ten 
children and he took an active interest in her education.  Susan Graham was a fairly 
cosmopolitan young woman.  She frequently accompanied her father as he traveled the 
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country.  He arranged for her education at Nash-Kollock Female School in Hillsborough 
(a school that attracted the daughters of many old plantation families) and, showing 
promise in French, she attended Madame Roustan’s French School in New York City.81  
Several decades later she worked with her husband to translate and publish Constant’s 
Recollections of the Private Life of Napoleon.82  It was an effort that combined Clark’s 
two great loves, his admiration for Napoleon as the “armed apostle of Democracy” and 
long hours translating alongside his beloved wife Susan.83  
For their first public outing, Clark traveled 150 miles to Hillsborough to meet 
Susan at a jousting tournament where each participant was “panoplied in striking attire to 
represent some ancient knight-errant.”84  Clark’s love for “Susie” led him to stay with her 
so late on visits that he wrote in his journal of “catching midnight freight trains” to get 
back home.85  The knight-errant and the locomotive, a theme and an industry, seem 
ideally suited to represent Clark’s reform impulses throughout his life.  One can be seen 
as a symbol for his advocacy of progressive reforms and the other representing an 
industry that would oppose those same efforts. 
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Clark in Private Practice: 1875-1885 
Following a three-year courtship, Susan Graham and Walter Clark married and 
began their life together in a modest house in Raleigh.  Clark’s life became a whirlwind 
of activity that revolved around his legal practice, management of his family’s 
plantations, and state Democratic Party politics.  Over the course of the next decade, 
1875-1885, Clark began work on the sixteen-volume series, the State Records of North 
Carolina; wrote two well-researched and annotated legal guides to court procedures; 
served on the Democratic State Executive Committee; served as an active lay member of 
the Methodist Church; and managed his family’s plantations, both personally and through 
overseers.86  It was a list of responsibilities that created an exhausting day-to-day routine.  
Clark managed his busy routine by avoiding all distractions.  Brooks described him as a 
man without a single hobby.  He never drank, smoked, or gambled—a combination that 
helped many other men pass idle hours.87  For Clark, his personal habits were matters of 
antebellum honor, religious concerns about idleness, and a reflection of the progressive 
desire for efficiency.  The Methodist upbringing provided by his mother instilled in him a 
strain of the Protestant work ethic that abhorred idle time.88  He prided himself on his 
efficiency and modernity.  When Aubrey Brooks writes about Clark purchasing “the first 
typewriter that was ever owned in Raleigh”—whether such claim is true—it is no great 
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leap to envision Clark as he bragged about such to Brooks during their friendship.89  
Clark’s combination of efficiency and Methodist morality drove him to work at all hours 
during the week, save Sundays.  It was also frustrating to his political and ideological 
opponents.  As one of Clark’s adversaries once said, “The trouble with him is that he 
hasn’t the virtue of a single damned vice.”90   
 A couple elements of Clark’s life are relevant to understanding Clark as a jurist 
and progressive reformer.  First, he established relationships with the very industries and 
people that he would later loudly criticize—railroads, the Dukes, and the Democratic 
political machine.  Second, Clark established himself as an advocate for educational 
funding and an anti-corruption reformer.  
Clark’s battles with the railroads were complicated by Clark’s early legal career 
and personal relationships during this period.  Indeed, Clark’s relationship with Colonel 
A.B. Andrews, a man whose name would come to represent railroad rule in North 
Carolina, went back to the Civil War.  And their association went beyond that of fellow 
Confederate soldiers, as Clark served as a groomsman at Andrews’s 1869 wedding to 
Julia Johnston.91  Andrews, already at twenty-six years of age a superintendent of the 
Raleigh and Gaston Railroad, offered to send Clark “free Passes from Endfield to 
Charlotte & return.”92  By the following year, 1870, Clark would have his own free 
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passes to travel, as he was chosen to be director of the Raleigh and Gaston Railroad.93  
By 1873 Clark was both director and general counsel to both the Raleigh and Gaston 
Railroad and the Raleigh and Augusta Railroad.94  It was a career trajectory that mirrored 
many young lawyers in the state, as railroad work was reliable and well paid.95   
Despite Clark’s reputation as an advocate for greater liability of railroads for 
personal injury claims, he dutifully defended the railroads in nearly a decade as director 
and legal counsel for multiple railroads.  In December 1883, John L. Robinson, President 
of the Seaboard and Roanoke Railroad Company, wrote to Clark about his role in 
personal damages cases: “The company has been served [well] by you, and has never 
seen so much interest manifested by any of our attorneys as you have manifested in these 
cases.”96  It is safe to assume Clark was not being congratulated for allowing plaintiffs 
large settlements.  Clark preserved little of his correspondence from this period and never 
spoke of his time as a railroad attorney.97  Yet, his many pronouncements later in life 
about the ability of defense counsel for railroads to delay and otherwise frustrate justice 
may have been born from personal experience.98    
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Clark’s role as an owner, and contributor to, the Raleigh News often led him into 
divisive political issues, chief among them the funding of railroad development within 
the state.  In 1879 the New York Times ran a story attacking the sitting Democratic 
governor, Thomas Jarvis, for organizing a political ring to guarantee his reelection, in 
league with James L. Robinson—former Speaker of the North Carolina House and sitting 
Lt. Governor.99  The article included accusations of a corrupt ring run by Jarvis and 
Robinson to displace certain office-holders for their personal benefit.  A subsequent 
article published the following month alleged further corruption by Robinson, and others, 
in withdrawing excess mileage reimbursements from the treasury.100  Robinson rested the 
blame squarely at the feet of Walter Clark and the Raleigh News, a charge he later 
retracted after Clark denied involvement.  Robinson counter-charged that a prominent 
newspaper, with the legislators in attendance and the Times presuming he meant Clark 
and the News, had menaced and threatened members of the General Assembly.101  The 
charge itself seemed retaliatory, as it related to alleged threats made two months earlier, 
that despite their nefarious nature, remained unreported until the Times article.102   
The incident itself was an outgrowth of a related intraparty squabble in a state that 
had often found itself divided along regional lines.  The alleged Jarvis-Robinson ring 
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involved a compromise between Currituck County native Jarvis and Macon County 
native Robinson.  One aspect of this interregional alliance was the completion of a 
Western North Carolina Railroad that stretched to Asheville and beyond.  It was the 
financial incentive for western representatives to give their collective assent to the loss of 
local, county-level control sought by Easterners who wanted to eliminate black and 
Republican officeholders as a result of their “redemption” of the state’s political 
machinery.103  Yet by the end of the 1870s the railroad was literally bogged down in the 
mud of the Blue Ridge Mountains.  Clark’s editorial in the Raleigh News openly attacked 
the railroad and the underlying bargain that created it: 
 
The soil of “‘mud cut” is necessarily sacred.  It is consecrated by the sweat 
and toil of hundreds of thousands of North Carolinians whose hard 
earnings are poured in there to cut a wide pathway to wealth for a few and 
to make foundation for the political promotion of the compact, well-
defined, inner circle. It is sacred moreover because it will be the burying 
place of many aspiring politicians.104 
 
Here was an early example of Clark’s attacks on governmental corruption and 
benefits for the privileged few purchased at the price of the laboring majority’s toil, 
which Clark would employ over the next forty years against the plutocracy.  Moreover, 
Clark criticized the Democratic Party in ways usually reserved to discuss allegedly 
extravagant and wasteful Republican rule during Reconstruction.  While some Democrats 
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sought to suppress the issue as it exposed the hypocrisy of charges of Republican misrule 
and Democratic Party stewardship, Clark pressed on with public attacks.105 
 In February 1880 the North Carolina legislature called a special meeting to 
discuss ending funding for, and possibly selling, the Western North Carolina Railroad. 
Clark published a “People’s Platform for the Extra Session,” which once again criticized 
the $300,000 “annual burden of that R.R. on the taxpayers.”106  He called for the 
immediate repeal of the “Mudcut” Railroad, sale of the railroad at a fair price to a private 
purchaser, and use of the money saved to sign the School Bill (previously rejected) to 
“give the children of the poor a chance.”107  Moreover, Clark proved deaf to those who 
worried about intraparty divisions.  In a Raleigh News editorial signed “A. Taxpayer,” he 
mocked those politicians who attacked the party loyalty of railroad opponents as 
believing in “’the right divine to rule’ of ‘mud cut.’”108 
By the time the special session had finished, not only had appropriations been 
repealed but the railroad had also been sold.109  A major victory for Clark, he was now 
publicly associated with the sale of an unpopular and expensive railroad.  Yet, as with 
many of Clark’s other victories, this one came with mixed results.  While the taxpayers of 
North Carolina were saved a considerable sum annually in tax payments, the sale proved 
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more complicated than expected.  Irish entrepreneur, William J. Best, purchased the 
Western Railroad, along with a handful of other financiers.110  Only a few months later 
Best’s fellow investors reneged and left Best insufficiently financed to meet the 
requirements of the contract to develop the Railroad.  With the railroad’s sale falling 
apart, Gov. Thomas Jarvis sent Col. A. B. Andrews, an advisor and superintendent of 
several of the state’s divided railroad interests, to meet with Best.111  Andrews arranged 
backing through the financers of the Richmond and Danville Railroad but acquired an 
equal control of the Western Railroad.  By July of 1880, Best, still struggling financially, 
signed over a controlling share of his remaining stock in the Western to the Richmond 
and Danville.112   
It was the first step toward a railroad trust, the Southern Railway Company, with 
Andrews as its First Vice-President, and this company would become Clark’s most bitter 
political enemy throughout his time on the bench.  Andrews’s name would go on to 
become a byword for railroad manipulation of North Carolina’s political system.  By 
1897 Clark would complain bitterly to Sen. Marion Butler that the Populist Party’s efforts 
to create a railroad commission had been undermined by Andrews, who ran “the 
Commission as a Bureau of Andrews’ office.”113  And a few weeks later Clark 
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complained to his brother-in-law that Andrews “ha[d] debauched more young men than 
you have any idea of” through the liberal giving of free passes and railroad cash for 
campaigns and newspapers.114  The fight against Andrews was, according to Clark, “no 
child’s play but real war.”115 
At the same time that Clark served as legal counsel for multiple railroads, he also 
kept his practice busy by collecting debts for the Duke family.  In December 1876, in a 
letter that clearly was not the first exchange between the two men (although it is the first 
preserved in Clark’s collection of papers), Washington Duke requested Clark to quickly 
collect on multiple accounts placed in Clark’s care.  Follow-up letters on other accounts 
arrived at Clark’s law offices over the course of the year from both Washington Duke and 
Ben N. Duke.  In September 1877 Ben Duke wrote Clark, “Can’t you stir up some of our 
other delinquents & make them pay?”116  The following year the Duke family would 
form W. Duke Sons & Co. and soon thereafter make the gamble on machine-rolled 
cigarettes that fueled their ascent to trust status by the late 1890s.  And it was in the late 
1890s that Clark’s first public political conflict with the Dukes filled the pages of 
newspapers across the state as they battled over the direction of education at Trinity 
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College.  By the turn of the century Clark would renew his conflict with the Dukes, this 
time over the future of the state’s public energy policy.   
Clark the Superior Court Judge: 1885-1889 
 In March 1885 Governor Alfred M. Scales appointed Clark to the Superior 
Court.117  It was a significant transition in Clark’s life.  The previous summer Clark and 
his wife lost their fifteen-month-old daughter Anna.  The loss deeply affected Clark, who 
“sat by [Anna’s] bedside during the night and up to the hour she breathed her last.”  
Forlorn, he wrote his elderly mother, “No length of time will dim the recollection of the 
bright little being that brought us so many days of happiness.”118  Clark’s appointment to 
the bench served in many ways as a break from the past decade, as judicial propriety 
required Clark to quit his role as director and counsel at various state railroads, and he 
closed down his legal offices in Raleigh.119  The next four years were dedicated to riding 
the exhausting judicial circuit that took North Carolina’s superior court judges across the 
length of the state.120          
 Clark’s nomination met with popular approval in the state press.  The Farmer and 
Mechanic noted no opposition to his nomination and his reputation as a “man of talent, 
force of character, and legal acquirements.”  It also lauded his service to the Confederate 
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cause and his Democratic Party service while stockholder in the Raleigh News.  Lastly, 
the paper noted his connection by marriage to the Graham family, his solid Methodism, 
and his Mud Cut Boom circular.121  The Rocky Mount Reporter expected Clark to make 
“an excellent judge, prompt, painstaking, just.”122  On the other side of the Old North 
State the Charlotte Democrat praised Clark as “a prudent, discreet hardworking 
gentleman…a first rate Judge.”123 
 During his years in the state’s superior court system, Clark built up a reputation as 
an impartial law-and-order judge, issuing stern punishments for vice, and a progressive 
jurist intent on establishing an efficient, modernized court.  The Raleigh Christian 
Advocate commented “how generally he is commended for his strictness toward all 
classes of men.”124  When Jason Miller appeared before the court on charges of running 
for many years an illegal gambling establishment—conspicuously close to the Capitol 
building—Clark sentenced him to pay a $2,000 fine and thirty days in jail.125  When a 
jury convicted W. T. Bailey, described by the Weekly State Chronicle as a “man of 
property and position,” on charges of forgery, Clark sentenced him to ten years.  Clark 
addressed Bailey from the bench and condemned him for “trusting…to his money and 
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social influence to save him from the consequences of his actions.”126  Sometimes his 
sentencing efforts were criticized as overzealous.  Robert Winston recounted the story of 
a “degenerate son of a noble family charged with embezzlement…represented by leaders 
of the bar.”  The man successfully pled insanity as a defense.  Clark, frustrated, set aside 
the verdict and “intimated that if the lawyers filed a petition to remove…he would put 
them in jail, and then tried the case over.”  On the second trial the young man was 
convicted and sentenced to serve on the state’s roads for months.127   
 Clark’s sentencing of criminals of all social classes provoked many comments in 
the press.  The Weekly State Chronicle noted that “he has done more to give people a 
respect for the laws and wrongdoers a wholesome fear of them than any judge now upon 
the bench.”128  The Raleigh Christian Advocate—after listing Clark’s sentencing of 
fourteen people to the penitentiary, twenty-three to the workhouse and jail, and imposing 
$2,200 in fines—praised him as an “expensive judge to criminals, but a profitable one to 
the countd [sic].”129  These cases established Clark’s reputation as a tough, if not harsh, 
judge who did not show undue respect for friends or social class in conducting the court’s 
business.  And it provided an insight into future political success as his supporters 
pronounced, “We love him most for the enemies he has made.”130  Given his strict 
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approach to criminal cases, no doubt at this stage in his career many of those enemies 
consisted primarily of the criminal defense bar.   
 Moreover, Clark went after elements of late nineteenth-century court practice that 
often rendered the system inefficient, slow, and backlogged.  Clark was notorious for his 
timeliness and expected the same of lawyers, litigants, witnesses, and jurors.  A popular 
story recounted that Clark, late to hold court for the first and only time in his career on 
the bench, fined himself.  Clark objected to the story and told Aubrey Brooks such was 
not true, as he had never been late to hold court.131  The Rocket newspaper shared an 
account of Clark ringing the court bell himself at 9 a.m. due to the tardiness of the bell 
ringer.  The same editor found humor in accounts of jurors “‘hitting the dirt’ at top 
speed” to avoid a judicial reprimand.132  And such was not an unreasonable fear, as Clark 
had before fined jurors as much as forty dollars for lateness.  Intoxicated jurors fared 
even worse, with one sentenced to pay a hundred dollar fine and twenty days in jail.133  
The Weekly State Chronicle’s account of Clark’s first term in Pender County followed 
similarly: 
 
County officers were all on tip-toe to do their duty; witnesses jurors and 
suitors were promptly on hand as never before known, and discipline, so 
sadly wanting in the courts of North Carolina, ruled and reigned over all in 
our splendid new court house…a pin could be heard in the crowded court 
house during his charge, or at any other time while a trial was going 
on….The Poor and needy, learned anew that before Judge Clark, they 
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stand as good a chance and have the same rights under the law, as the rich 
and influential.  Gamblers, rascal, and depredators upon law and society 
squirmed….No waste of time is allowed by him.  While patient, he pushes 
business, demands promptness from all, and makes his own desires to get 
home…subordinate to his duty to hold court until midnight on Saturday if 
there remains any unfinished business.134 
 
Clark also labored to modernize the courts during his tenure as a Superior Court 
judge.  One of Clark’s first actions on arriving in a new courtroom for the first time was 
to demand the installation of a clock so that court business could be conducted in a timely 
manner.135  Robert Winston, in an attempt to label Clark a liberal and profligate spender, 
years later recounted that Clark had “standing orders in a hundred counties” to: replace 
jurors chairs with new swivel chairs, tear up and replace stained and odorous carpets, 
improve the law libraries, and in general to “transact public business in a business 
way.”136   
The newspapers often lauded him for his conduct on the bench.  The 
Commonwealth enthusiastically cheered, “If the people could have their way, Judge 
Clark would ride all the circuits and hold all the courts.”137  The Shelby Aurora called 
Clark “an able and fearless judge who pushes business,” after a term in which Clark 
imposed almost $1,000 in fines.138  None were eligible for straw bonds; as straw bonds 
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allowed those without adequate financial means to post bonds they could not pay.  Indeed 
by spring of 1888 several newspapers began calling for Clark’s nomination for governor 
on the Democratic ticket.  The Weekly State Chronicle found Clark’s merit in his 
youthfulness and “record he has made…during his brief career on the bench.”139  The 
Daily Journal advanced Clark as a “live, progressive, fearless man for Governor; one 
who has ideas of his own.”140  The Smithfield Herald supported Clark as a candidate for 
“the masses of the people” who could “bring from his home…every white voter in North 
Carolina.”141  The Franklinton Dispatch promoted Clark as a candidate whose victory 
“brings in its train reform and improvement.”142 
Divergent Paths: Executive or Judicial 
By 1888, Clark’s popularity was such that he was considered a possible candidate 
for governor.143  While Clark’s biographer, Aubrey Brooks, portrays Clark’s refusal to 
have his name entered for the nomination as an almost reflexive response due to his 
desire to pursue a career on the judiciary, Clark’s response is actually more 
complicated.144  Governor A. M. Scales was retiring after his term in office and a 
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previous governor, Thomas Jarvis, sought a new nomination.  Clark weighed his chances 
at winning the governorship and even reached out to his friends.  Walter Montgomery 
wrote back to Clark that he feared the “fast set” and “political farmers” might oppose 
him; the former because of his stance on public morals as expressed from the bench 
(prohibition, prostitution, and gambling), and the latter might prefer a “farmer 
candidate.”145  Undeterred Clark wrote to his brother-in-law, and closest friend, A.W. 
Graham, seeking to lock-up the support of Durham industrialist Julian Carr and railroad 
representative A. B. Andrews.  Meanwhile, Clark planned to try and keep Daniel G. 
Fowle, a fellow reformist Democrat, out of the race.  He worried various persons wanted 
Fowle in the race to “to divide Wake.”146  W. H. Moore wrote Clark the following month 
that his “record as a Judge on the Superior Courts” would make him “acceptable to the 
Prohibition element,” but he worried another prohibitionist would split the vote.147  
Yielding to that fear, Clark wrote a public letter, reprinted in numerous papers, 
withdrawing his name from the convention for the sake of party harmony.  Yet Clark still 
expressed some hope for nomination, as he wrote A.W. Graham that if there should be a 
deadlock, at the convention “my friends [can] use my name then if they see fit.”148 
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 Soon thereafter Clark began to express his political opinions more vocally in 
public forums.  In June 1888 Clark delivered the ninety-third commencement address at 
the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.  Judge Clark, addressing the assembled 
students, chose to speak on “the great question”: “The increasing accumulation of 
enormous wealth.”  In the address he questioned the ability to accumulate large fortunes 
without illegal conduct by “means which would send operators on a smaller scale to your 
penitentiary.”  Their generation would have to confront “the grinding rule of monopolies” 
that sought to impoverish the “toilers of the nation” and “control legislatures.”  If nothing 
was done, Clark worried aloud, “the pillaged, plundered masses” would 
“furnish…swarms of communists, anarchists.”149 It was his clearest condemnation thus 
far of great accumulations of wealth as inherently dangerous.  And from this point 
forward Clark continued with such arguments, taking them to larger forums and in new 
intellectual directions.   
In the 1890s Clark’s attacks on corruption by monopolies and plutocrats would 
reach nationally published journals, find themselves shelved in law libraries in the North 
Carolina Reports, inform crowds at various state bar association meetings, and even end 
up published as congressional documents.  His arguments would take new directions: 
criticizing judicial review and calling for the election of judges; seeking expanded 
democracy through government ownership of telegraphs, telephones, railroads, and 
natural resources; even calling for a new constitutional convention to better hold 
plutocrats in check with a more democratic political system.  Yet his political calls to 
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action remained centered on the themes Clark expressed in his commencement address, 
political beliefs in greater democratic faith in “the masses” to remedy corruption that 
often accompanied private monopolies and great accumulations of wealth.150   
By 1889 a vacancy on the Supreme Court offered an opportunity for Clark to 
climb the ladder of judicial office.  Governor Fowle appointed Clark to fill the vacant 
Associate Justiceship, which would not be up for election until 1894.  And with Clark’s 
ascension to the State’s Supreme Court, his progressive views now could be represented 
as the views of a southern Supreme Court Justice.  Defying stereotypes of the courts and 
the South as “the most conservative positions and dwelling,” Clark’s position could be 
used to undermine claims of radicalism and socialism emanating from opponents of 
reform.151  And as women’s suffrage activists, public ownership advocates, and 
proponents of union labor included Clark’s statements and opinions in their campaign 
literature and publications, Clark’s judicial career and political views would combine to 
create a national reputation for Clark as a southern progressive jurist.152      
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CHAPTER III 
FORGING A PROGRESSIVE JURISPRUDENCE 
 
 
The Struggle between the forces of progress and Conservatism was slow 
to develop in North Carolina, but when it came….Every department of 
state government was shaken to the center; the Supreme Court itself, 
whenever Chief Justice Walter Clark could dominate, becoming an 
incubator for remedial legislation, adviser of progressive political parties, 
defender and maintainer of radical propaganda.  
—Robert Winston1 
 
 
 When North Carolina’s largest Bar Association issued a resolution that 
commemorated Chief Justice Clark shortly after his death in 1924, they praised the 
Justice’s “great service” to the state for “interpreting precedents in accordance with 
modern condition and discarding the chaff in order to arrive at the kernel.”2  The usually 
conservative organization lauded how Clark “seized the bludgeons [of the law] on behalf 
of married women and their property rights” against a majority of the North Carolina 
Supreme Court that often proved unable to “accept so complete a revolution in marital 
relations.”3  Just to the north, the Iredell County Bar Association issued a similar
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resolution that described the Chief Justice’s jurisprudence as “drinking deep from the 
foundation of knowledge in sympathetic understanding with the real problems of 
humanity.”4  The bar association went on to recognize how Clark’s jurisprudence blended 
the political and legal in a way that often undermined the common law: “always being in 
the vanguard of important progressive movements refusing to stand by precedents of law, 
when they handicapped such movements.”5  These descriptions of Clark’s jurisprudence 
in the wake of his death briefly, but accurately, capture the conclusion of a career of a 
progressive jurisprudence that often ran contrary to the common law.  As Clark himself 
often wrote, “All progress in the law has consisted in getting away from the barbarous 
teachings of the common law.”6  And by his death in 1924, North Carolina, due in large 
part to Clark’s efforts, had shed significant aspects of common law jurisprudence.     
 Clark’s criticisms of the common law blended historical, political, economic, and 
moral factors.  His critique extended not only to the law itself but due to the process 
whereby it was created and the English judges whose opinions constructed its edifice.  In 
an article in the Michigan Law Review, Clark restated his view of the history and 
foundations of the common law: 
 
One of these [judges], in haste to get to his supper, or half comprehending 
the cause, or prejudiced, it may be, against a suitor, or possibly boozy (and 
such have been kenned) has rendered a decision, another Judge too 
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indifferent, or unable, to think for himself, or oppressed by the magic of 
precedent, has followed, other judges have followed each in turn and thus 
many indifferent decisions being interwoven with perhaps a greater 
number of sound ones….[formed] that fabric of law….that jumble of 
absurdities, consistent only in its inconsistencies.7    
  
Clark’s understanding of the origins of the common law led him to be less 
awed by precedent than many of his judicial colleagues, who echoed the 
sentiments of Blackstone that the judge made law was the “the perfection of 
reason.”8  This distinction had important implications when North Carolinian’s 
appeals reached the state’s highest court.  For example, in Pettit v. Atlantic 
Coastline Railroad, an eleven-year-old child messenger in the employ of the 
railroad, who died after his leg was severed by a train, was deemed contributorily 
negligent—allowing the railroad to escape civil liability.9  Justice William Allen, 
speaking for the Court’s majority went to great lengths to evade moral 
responsibility for such a seemingly unjust outcome, admonishing that the court 
“must accept the [common] law” despite their “pity” for the child and his 
mother.10  Justice Platt Walker’s concurrence went even further in denouncing the 
use of “sentiment” to decide the case, when courts should look “alone to the cold 
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and unyielding facts of the case.”11  And yet another Justice, George Brown, 
issued a concurrence to blandly state, “I do not think the Court should pass on 
matters not necessary to the decision of a case…it is a matter for…the General 
Assembly.”12  The majority’s views fit within the classical legal thought of the 
last quarter of the nineteenth century when judicial formalism had, in the words of 
Clark, rendered the common law “fossilized”13  The court’s justices showed 
extreme caution in overturning precedents, as the court’s application of stare 
decisis placed past decisions just slightly below reverence for constitutions, and 
sometimes co-equal with or above statutory enactments.   
 Yet, Clark’s progressive jurisprudence increasingly questioned the hold the 
common law should have on modern courts.  Testifying before the Federal Industrial 
Commission in 1915, Clark answered an inquiry on the application of common law to 
cases involving labor and the workplace, where he stated definitively, “I do not recognize 
the right of some unknown man, who lived in different surroundings and in a different 
state of society, to tell me what I shall say as to what is just between ‘A’ and ‘B’ to-
day.”14  Indeed, as the questioning continued, Clark discussed his openness to 
considering factors beyond the law to determine the outcome of cases: 
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Chairman Walsh: Should counsel be given an opportunity to indicate 
fairly economic and social bearings on judicial decisions in arguments 
before the courts? 
 
Judge Clark: Yes, sir: I think they should discuss them. 
 
Commissioner Weinstock: What effect [do] public opinion and public 
sentiment have on court decisions?   
 
Judge Clark: I think the decisions of the courts of the twentieth century 
ought to be delivered in accordance with justice, and we ought not to hark 
back to old opinions rendered three or four hundred years ago.15 
 
Despite Clark’s harsh rhetoric, his progressive jurisprudence did not destroy the 
common law so much as it sought to modify the common law to fit an industrial age.  
English courts had for centuries used the common law in a manner that adapted to 
changing economic and social change—admittedly with a significant lag between 
precedent and present conditions.  The lag between jurisprudence and modern conditions 
often left courts “caught between contending forces: muddle, confusion, mixed messages, 
and conflicting tendencies.”16  In this environment of the early twentieth century, courts 
caught between the passing antebellum era and a new industrial age, it was not Clark’s 
sympathies towards the victims of industrialization that set him apart, but his willingness 
to both work within the court and through the political process to immediately ameliorate 
the dangerous consequences of those changes.  As twentieth-century legal scholar 
Lawrence Friedman has noted, the very nature of judicial remedies obscures “how many 
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cases were never brought—how many workers, passengers, and ‘trespassers’…were 
maimed or killed, and no compensation was ever paid out.”17 
Justice Clark suggested several remedies to deal with the insufficiencies of the 
common law.  The first, and most unlikely, was a complete shift from the English system 
to the French Civil Law—or Code Napoleon.  Clark’s affection for the Civil Law can be 
found as far back as his studies at the University of North Carolina.  In his Senior Speech 
at UNC in the spring of 1864 Clark spoke of the Civil Law with the reverence nineteenth-
century jurists tended to reserve for English common law.  He praised the Roman system 
as deserving “the attention, the admiration, and the wonder of mankind.”18  It was a 
system that “kept pace with the advance of civilization”; unlike Clark’s later description 
of common law as backward and archaic.  In 1896, when Clark toured Mexico, reporting 
for the legal magazine The Green Bag, he once again praised the civil law and suggested 
it as a solution for a broken common law system.19  Mexican justices’ bookshelves were 
not replete with “groaning shelves filled with lengthening lines of reports”; errors were 
not incorporated into a system of stare decisis that reproduced them; and, instead of 
research precedent, “The legal mind is permitted to expand by arguing each case as it 
arises, upon the merits and ‘the reason of the thing.’”20  While Clark’s hope of seeing the 
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codified civil law implemented in North Carolina never came to pass, he was able to 
achieve partial success by writing statutes for the legislature that superseded common law 
doctrines on workplace injuries, women’s property rights, and child laborers.  And his 
opinions show a legal mind that used common law cases as a chance to explore “the 
reason of the thing.”21  
Second, Clark worked to overrule common law precedent where statutory law 
was silent—and whenever he could muster a majority of the court.  Many of these 
decisions rested on economic, moral, and political information that often ensured dissents 
from formalist members of the court, or at the very least concurrences that disclaimed 
Clark’s reasoning.  In murder cases concerning the definition of premeditation, Clark 
referenced national and regional murder and lynching statistics; in child workplace injury 
cases, he provided long lists of jurisdictions that had passed child labor laws; in adult 
workplace injury cases, he cited government statistics on the wealth of railroads 
contrasted with the epidemic of workplace injury; in women’s property cases, he 
referenced female labor statistics, jurisdictions that liberalized such laws, historical 
examples of female sovereigns, and even Shakespeare.  Historian Morton White noted,  
the early twentieth-century intellectual community—including the legal community—
was engaged in a “revolt against formalism.” 22  So it might be said that Clark resumed 
his earlier martial interests in the struggle against formalism.  The most succinct 
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statement of Clark’s jurisprudence can be found in his fondness for the Latin maxim 
Salus populi suprema lex (The public welfare is the highest law).23          
Third, Clark often exercised his ability to dissent.  During his time on the Court 
Clark wrote 371 dissenting opinions. 24  He was at his most outspoken when he dissented 
(often alone) from his fellow justices’ applications of the common law that defied “every 
sentiment of justice.”25  He vocally objected that the court’s decisions treated “all classes 
of [women], and all the time…as at least ‘half idiots’ and without legal rights.”26  When 
the legislature acted to grant women the title of notary publics, the court’s majority 
nullified the law because it determined that at common law notary public was a public 
office, and a public office could not be filled by a person who lacked voting rights.  Yet 
for Clark the determination rested on deference to legislative will and the present state of 
women’s office holding: “In all progressive communities feudal ideas have passed, or are 
passing, and women are held to be human beings, entitled to equal rights with men.”27  In 
Price v. Charlotte Electrical Railway Company the court’s majority awarded 
compensation to a woman injured in a horrific horse and buggy accident that ended in an 
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amputation of her foot.  Yet the court’s majority insisted on a technicality that preserved 
the common law standard that a married woman could recover damages only though her 
husband.  Clark’s dissent chastised the court as it “still fondly clung to [common 
law]…as a clog upon progressive legislation.”28  The Chief Justice insisted that “every 
age should have laws based on and expressing its own ideas of right and wrong.”29  When 
the court’s majority declared that under common law married women could not be 
freeholders, Clark’s dissent decried the use of common law and decried the outcome 
rendered, as “illogical and unjust.”30  He protested loudly, “It is not the province of the 
courts to seek out strained analogies or to delve in the debris of a rejected and barbarous 
legal system….It is not for us to bivouac always by the abandoned campfires of more 
progressive communities. The courts should construe legislation from the standpoint of 
this age and of the men who enact it.”31 
Fourth, Clark proposed changing legal instruction.  Speaking at the centennial of 
the North Carolina Supreme Court before a large crowd, the Chief Justice laid out a plan 
to limit the influence of the common law: 
 
Among…the law schools of this country there is one great defect…and 
that is the history of the law is not taught.  Not only are students, as a rule, 
and therefore lawyers, uninformed as to the development of our state 
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law…but they are misinformed as to the origin and development of the 
law in England.  From the charming narrative of Blackstone, students have 
conceived an admiration of the so-called common law…whereas though it 
may have been the best that could have been done by the judges who 
created it in a barbarous age, our progress consists in changing it in every 
way possible.32 
 
Clark’s campaign against the legacy of Blackstone in law schools and courtrooms 
stretched over two decades.  In a 1903 article Clark quoted with approval the words of 
James C. Carter, New York lawyer and legal reformer: “Blackstone, who held a 
professor’s chair for and a salary for praising the common law…it is like the Knight of 
La Mancha extolling the beauty and graces of his broad-backed mistress ‘winnowing her 
wheat or riding her ass.’”33  Clark continued to seek to discredit Blackstone and the 
common law.  Aubrey Brooks, commiserated in a letter, “In the past you have been so 
conspicuously effective, namely, in disillusioning the public about the appreciation of old 
fossils and men who…did not deserve the consideration that posterity is according 
them.”34  Those “old fossils” included Blackstone and the common law so closely 
associated with him.    
 Clark worked to convince influential men of the arguments for displacing 
common law.  He mailed off numerous copies of his article “Coke, Blackstone, and the 
Common Law” to many prominent men.  One recipient, Kemp P. Battle, former 
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University of North Carolina (UNC) president and historian, was a noted defender of the 
common law.  Clark’s letter implored Battle, “A system which could compel such 
men…to sustain as a right in the husband the power of personal chastisement of the 
wife…was radically wrong, and as far as possible from the ‘perfection of reason.’”35  
Eugene Branson, head of UNC’s Department of Rural Economics and Sociology, 
responded to Clark’s Blackstone pamphlet, “You are giving our men and me a liberal 
education in a field of concern that many of us would hardly get into otherwise.”36  
While Kemp Battle was not swayed, University of Chicago history professor 
William E. Dodd praised Clark as “the only judge of a high court I know who thinks 
seriously about social and political problems.”  Dodd conveyed to Clark that his ideas 
had spread beyond the confines of the Old North State: “Your opinions are quoted by all 
the lawyers of liberal views I know, men like Roscoe Pound.”  When Dodd praised 
Clark’s ability to “see things from the point of view of common men,” he was identifying 
Clark’s progressive jurisprudence. 37      
 And Clark’s progressive beliefs mirrored those of Edward Bellamy, Henry L. 
George, and other Gilded Age reformers who prophesied a more politically democratic 
and economically equitable future.  Unlike Bellamy or George’s utopian plans, Clark’s 
views were more conventionally Whiggish and mirrored the hopes of the Knights of 
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Labor and People’s Party for a more democratic and equitable future.  Yet even Clark 
could slip into fits of messianic hopefulness for the nation’s future: 
 
The world turns over completely every 24 hours, and at the end of every 
year we are thousands of millions of miles from where we were 364 days 
before.  We ought to be gratified that we are living to see the dawn of the 
day when war and its miseries and abominations shall cease and when, 
like Moses, you and I can see into the land of Millennial period though 
like Moses we shall not be spared, to enter in ourselves.38 
  
Yet that “Millennial period” must have seemed far away to workers and women at 
the dawn of the twentieth century.   
On Dangerous Ground: Labor and the Law 
 When Allen Tullos interviewed James Pharis, of Burlington, North Carolina, for 
an oral history of industrialization in the Piedmont region, Pharis vividly remembered the 
day his hand was “mashed into jelly.”  He was only eight or nine years old when he was 
injured riding an elevator pulley with a fellow child laborer.  When Tullos asked, “Those 
things happened a good deal?” Pharis responded, “Oh, yes, back in them days.  Nothing 
never said about it then.” 39  Pharis went on to explain: 
 
No use in suing. Poor people didn't stand a chance…They had a system 
back in them days. One company owned all the mills was around there. 
They had agreements with one another. If they said not to hire you they 
wouldn't hire you. So, if you done anything—anything the company didn't 
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like— they'd just fire you and tell the rest of them not to hire you. So, 
there you'd be. People who lived under them circumstances, back in them 
days, was nothing they could do. So they didn't try to do nothing.40 
  
Pharis’s story is part of a much larger “accident crisis” that grew throughout the 
latter half of the nineteenth century into the early twentieth century.41  Workers in the 
nation’s textile mills, furniture factories, and railroads were suffering an unprecedented 
number of work-related injuries and deaths.  The industrializing South did not escape this 
explosion of industrial accidents.  Indeed, in some ways the increase was all the more 
apparent in the post-Civil War South where mills, factories, and railroads sprang up 
across the southern landscape—North Carolina was no exception to this trend.  North 
Carolinians were increasingly drawn from the state’s farms into the mills in the last 
decade of the nineteenth century.  Consequently, an increasing number of these laborers 
lost life and limb to the industrial machinery in textile mills, furniture factories, and 
lumber mills.42   
Between 1870 and 1902 the number of textile mills increased from 33 to 220; 
operational spindles in textile mills from almost 40,000 to just under 1.75 million.43  
There was a corresponding increase in mill employment from one 1,500 mill operatives 
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in 1870 to 46,569 in 1902.44  The most drastic change occurred in the last decade of the 
nineteenth century, when the number of textile mills doubled, while the number of 
spindles and operatives quadrupled.45  In addition, the state’s furniture industry grew 
rapidly during the same decade to include 106 factories with 4,095 employees.46  And 
railroad corporations remained a large employer in the state reporting 11,157 employees 
in 1902.47   
Factory and railroad labor produced distinct and serious risks to employees.  The 
textile mills and factories of the state housed dangerous machinery, which frequently 
consumed fingers, hands, arms, and lives.  Young workers—often inattentive, 
uninstructed, or unattended—moved about a workplace crowded with potential dangers.  
For instance, thirteen-year-old Carrie Sims lost her fingers to a mangle in a steam 
laundry; nine-year-old William Fitzgerald had his hand mashed while leaning against a 
sander; and ten-year-old Willie Evans “arm was torn off” by live rollers.48  Adult laborers 
also bore significant risk when working in the mills.  Alice P. Levitt recalled how, when 
working in the speeder room of the mill, her apron was on multiple occasions “tore off 
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me two or three times a week” by the machinery.49  She acknowledged the potential risks 
when she stated, “I was just lucky I managed to stop 'em and didn't get my arms in them. 
Them fliers would break your bones.”50  While Levitt was fortunate enough to avert 
disaster on multiple occasions, many other laborers were not as lucky.  Carl Thompson 
recalled one such incident at a textile mill where “one man, his shirt or something or 
other got caught in that belt, and that belt throwed him to the top of the mill and busted 
his brains out….it killed him.”  Others, fortunate by comparison, got “their whole arm 
and all broke and the skin pulled off, maybe slam through the bone.”51   
Railroad work also played host to its own line of dangers.  Discussing the large 
number of “railroad casualties” before the Interstate Commerce Commission in 1899, 
Clark called the numerous deaths and injuries a “blood tax” on the laboring class.52  In 
1890, the same year Clark’s tenure on the Supreme Court began, 2,451 employees died 
from work-related injuries while more than 20,000 employers were injured.53  This 
amounted to the death of one in every 306 and the injury of one in every 33 men working 
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for the railroads.54  By 1899 North Carolina’s growing railroad system contributed 26 
killed and 648 injured railroad workers to a national total of 2,210 killed and 34,923 
injured railroad employees.55   
For an injured workingman in Progressive Era North Carolina, Pharis’ statement 
that there was “no use suing” was not entirely unfounded.  In addition to any collusion by 
mill and railroad owners to blacklist litigious employees, the State’s courts erected 
seemingly insurmountable barriers to recovery by injured employees, or their relations, 
who sought compensation and justice.  First, upon completion of the plaintiff’s evidence, 
the defendant could move to dismiss the case and “non-suit” the plaintiff, denying a 
potentially sympathetic jury the chance to decide the case and effectively granting a 
judgment in the defendant’s favor.56  Second, trial court judges sometimes crafted jury 
instructions that erred toward protecting business interests at the expense of injured 
plaintiffs.  Third, common law doctrines of assumption of risk, contributory negligence, 
and the fellow servant rule acted as an almost complete bar to a plaintiff’s attempts to 
recover damages and assigned the risks and costs of industrial accidents to injured 
employees, despite any negligence of the employer or one of his agents.  Most of the 
legal precedents were the product of early and mid-nineteenth-century industrial changes 
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confronted in Massachusetts and other industrializing northern states that were later 
embraced by other jurisdictions facing similar changes in their respective economies.  
Although courts in the latter half of the nineteenth century had already begun carving out 
exceptions to these common law doctrines, they remained in force and continued to 
impede the attempts of railroad laborers, factory workers, and mill operatives to recover 
damages against their employers.57   
A nonsuit was the equivalent of the common law practice known as a “demurrer 
to evidence.”58  Upon the close of the plaintiff’s case, the defendant could demurrer on 
the evidence to nonsuit the plaintiff, alleging that the plaintiff had not produced sufficient 
evidence to prove his case.  In theory, this action removed cases where the plaintiff failed 
to provide even a scintilla of evidence to support their suit.59  In practice, judges often 
employed the nonsuit to remove cases where some evidence existed to prove negligence 
of an employer.  The practice amounted to a non-prejudicial dismissal that allowed 
plaintiffs to renew litigation at a later date, but for what purpose?  Nonsuits, combined 
with other highly technical legal issues, could drag out legal proceedings for years, and 
even decades, until key witnesses had died, the plaintiff’s attorney was dispirited, and the 
plaintiff’s ability to recover hopelessly frustrated.   
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Should a plaintiff’s case reach the jury, a superior court judge could issue jury 
instructions that nudged juries toward finding in favor of the defendant corporation.  In 
the case of a five-year-old mill village resident, drowned in a reservoir on the property of 
Selma Cotton Mills, Judge William Bond instructed the jury that North Carolina was 
“greatly indebted for its development to corporations and investment of capital by people 
who do not live in the state.”60  The judge went on to ask the jury to consider “how your 
county or our State would be today if we had no railroads in it, and no corporations, 
except those capitalized by residents of the State.”61  Consequently, the jury returned a 
verdict in favor of the defendant.  Although these jury instructions were later held to be 
erroneous by the North Carolina Supreme Court, they show the way in which a pro-
business bias could find its way into the jury instructions provided by the trial judge.62  
 Nonsuits and pro-industry jury instructions were not the only difficult obstacle to 
recovery for the prospective plaintiff.  The many-headed hydra of common law defenses 
(contributory negligence, fellow servant doctrine, and assumption of risk) guarded the 
storehouse of compensation against the plaintiff’s entry.  These doctrines mutually 
supported one another in complex ways that effectively shifted risk from the employer to 
the employee and from industry to the public.  Whereas contributory negligence sought to 
assign fault to the plaintiff, the fellow servant doctrine and assumption of risk were part 
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of a legal fiction that the laborer contracted with the employer knowing the respective 
dangers of both the machinery he worked upon and the fellows he worked with.  These 
doctrines were all relatively new creations in North Carolina’s courts, born or adopted 
into the law in the mid-nineteenth century.  The earliest to be adopted in North Carolina 
was the fellow servant doctrine.  It is a historical oddity that the common law doctrine 
that hindered attempts at recovery by industrial white laborers was adopted in a case 
concerning the rights of a slaveholder to recover from a local railroad for the death of a 
slave hired out to labor as a brakeman.63   
Unlike every other supreme court in the southern states, North Carolina’s 
Supreme Court held that both hired-out slaves and free laborers could not recover 
damages from their employers caused by the negligence of a fellow servant.  Justice 
Thomas Ruffin’s opinion embraced the public policy concerns of English and 
Massachusetts courts, noting “the great number of servants needed and employed on the 
steamboats and railroads, which, have come so much into use in our times, and on which 
so many casualties or injuries from negligence happen.”64  Despite the inability of a slave 
laborer to contract for his labor, speak up about a negligent fellow servant, or leave his 
labors should the danger become too great—all underlying assumptions of the fellow 
servant doctrine when it was laid down in Priestly v. Fowler—Justice Ruffin waved these 
                                                          
63 Mungo T. Ponton v. Wilmington & Weldon Railroad Company, 51 N.C. 245 (1858); See Frederick 
Wertheim, “Slavery and the Fellow Servant Rule: An Antebellum Dilemna,” New York University Law 
Review 61 (December 1986): 1133-1137. 
 
64 Mungo T. Ponton v. Wilmington & Weldon Railroad Company, 51 N.C. 245, 246 (1858). 
 
89 
 
 
concerns aside as a “distinction [that] does not seem sound.”65  The master retained the 
ability to “provide for the responsibility of the bailee for exposing the slave to 
extraordinary risks.”66    
 Contributory negligence and assumption of risk were also fairly recent creations 
of the mid-nineteenth century.  Contributory negligence as a complete bar to recovery by 
the plaintiff was adopted by the North Carolina Supreme Court in Morrison v. Cornelius.  
The 1869 case dealt with an abandoned saltpeter factory whose owners had fled the 
arrival of Union troops in April 1865, as the Confederacy fell apart.  The plaintiff’s cattle 
had wandered onto the defendant’s property and consumed a poisonous liquid used to 
manufacture saltpeter, resulting in their subsequent deaths.  After studying “leading 
American and English authorities,” the court concluded that an injured plaintiff “must 
show that he has exercised proper care and is free from blame in regard to the matter” or 
suffer damnun absque injuria (a loss without injury).67  The doctrine was softened in 
1887 when the North Carolina General Assembly passed an act to shift the burden of 
contributory negligence claims to the defendant.68  
 Last, and most recent in adoption, was the doctrine of assumed risk.  Although it 
was spawned alongside the fellow servant rule in the Fowler case, North Carolina courts 
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were relatively slow to adopt the doctrine.  However, by the 1880s the Supreme Court 
had adopted the doctrine of assumed risk as a bar to plaintiff’s recovery in two 
circumstances.  First, as in Fowler, a worker was assumed to have contracted with his 
employer for higher wages to compensate for any increased risk of his particular 
occupation.69  Second, a worker could assume the risk of working a particularly 
dangerous piece of machinery if he either failed to report the defect to his employer or 
continued to labor on a dangerous piece of machinery of his employer whose defect the 
employer failed to remedy.70  The worker was fixed with protecting himself from the 
risks of employment, as courts were fearful of making employers insurers of work-related 
injuries through the mechanism of tort law.71   
Justice Clark’s War on the Southern Railway Company 
Despite, or maybe because of, Clark’s employment with several North Carolina 
railroads in the 1870s and 1880s, Justice Clark emerged in the 1890s as a crusader against 
corrupt and dangerous railroad practices.  From his private study in Raleigh, Justice Clark 
penned articles, editorials, and speeches denouncing the free pass system, high rates, and 
unsafe conditions.  Often his struggle against the political influence of the railroads—that 
allowed them to block reform measures in the legislature—meant collaboration with 
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members of the Republican and Populist fusion movement that took control of the state 
legislature in 1894.    
Justice Clark’s first decision affecting the interests of the railroads was 
Wilmington and Weldon Railroad Company v. B. I. Alsbrook.72  In 1891 North Carolina’s 
legislature passed an act authorizing the State’s first Railroad Commission.  The 
commission, still in its first year of operation, assigned a value of $161,709 to a branch 
line of the Wilmington and Weldon line and instructed the Halifax County 
Commissioners to place the railroad’s property on the county tax list.  The railroad 
sought injunctive relief against the newly imposed tax based on an exemption from 
taxation granted by the North Carolina legislature before the Civil War.73  The battle over 
the authority to assess and tax railroad property, especially in the infancy of the Railroad 
Commission, was perceived as a struggle between the sovereign power of the state to 
levy taxes and the ability of a railroad to avoid those taxes through exemptions over half-
century old.  Over the dissent of Chief Justice Merrimon, Justice Clark wrote a majority 
opinion strictly construing the railroads exemption so as not to cover newer branch 
lines—valued by Justice Clark at “ten to twelve millions.”74  Clark’s opinion in Alsbrook 
earned the ire of railroad operatives in the state, and his decision was appealed to the 
United States Supreme Court as a violation of the federal Constitution’s Contract 
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Clause.75  While the United States Supreme Court upheld Clark’s opinion, the state’s 
railroad interests remained opposed to Clark’s attempts to expand the powers of the 
Railroad Commission, as well as his attempts to whittle down traditional common law 
defenses they relied upon.  Indeed, after the Alsbrook case Clark’s colleagues on the court 
relied on him to write the court’s majority opinions related to Railroad Commission 
cases.76  
Justice Clark viewed his relationship with the railroads—and by extension the 
people’s relationship with them—as a “fight against R.R. domination.”77  It was a 
struggle that saw Clark enter the public and legislative arena numerous times to contend 
for “the forgotten man” who paid the rates, labored for the railroads, or suffered from 
other illegal actions of railroads and their agents.78  Often this stance put Justice Clark at 
odds with his fellow Democrats.  A public feud with J. W. Wilson, a prominent member 
of the North Carolina Railroad Commission, who Clark resented as a functionary of the 
Southern Railway Company vice President, Alexander B. Andrews, strained Clark’s 
relationship with the Democratic political machine in North Carolina.79  This conflict led 
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Clark to work with the new Fusion legislature elected in 1894 and Republican Governor 
Daniel Russell elected in 1896 to achieve railroad reforms.  Clark’s collaboration with 
Republican and Populist elected officials led to legislation restricting the free pass system 
and abrogating the fellow servant defense for railroads in personal injury cases—Clark 
wrote both bills at the request of state legislators.80  Shortly after Clark crafted these 
legislative bills, he also wrote two important majority decisions in railroad personal 
injury cases that served as the first interpretation of the federal Railroad Safety Act by a 
state court.  Taken together, they significantly limited, or negated, the ability of railroads 
to avoid liability for negligent acts committed by their agents or injuries caused by faulty 
appliances.81   
 The conflict took a personal nature in 1894 when Clark crafted an amendment to 
the North Carolina State Constitution, modeled on a similar provision in the Constitution 
of New York, to strictly prohibit the practice of railroads issuing free passes.82  Of 
numerous railroad reform measures advocated by Clark, he considered a limitation on the 
railroads’ practice of issuing free passes the most important.  The original act authorizing 
the Railroad Commission in 1891 did include a prohibition on the issuance of free passes, 
but it was riddled with loopholes and almost entirely unenforced.83  Indeed, Sen. Marion 
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Butler, writing Clark in the winter of 1896, expressed frustration with the state’s Railroad 
Commission as “slow & almost useless & powerless.”84  Enforcement was so lax that the 
state’s Railroad Commission’s chairman estimated that since the 1891 law was passed 
“100,000 free passes were issued annually.”85  Free passes offended Clark’s progressive 
principles on two grounds.  First, they acted as a non-monetary bribe to politicians.  
Second, and perhaps more odious to Clark, was that they served as a “cheap mode of 
controlling the politicians & officeholders of the state,” paid for by “the masses.”86  The 
free pass system allowed the “rich and influential free [travel], by adding to the cost of 
their riding to the tickets of the poor and uninfluential.”87   
With the New York State Constitution’s anti-free pass amendment as a template, 
Justice Clark authored an amendment to graft a similar prohibition onto the North 
Carolina State Constitution.  However, despite passing its first Senate reading, the bill 
was postponed when two of the state’s three railroad commissioners counseled against its 
passage.88  Clark expressed his frustration with the process and the constraints of his 
judicial role: “My position on the court and the jealousy & criticism of a judge taking part 
in politics, prevents my getting round among the members” of the legislature.89  Clark’s 
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frustration was no doubt aggravated when a “well known railroad official” personally 
asked that the bill be withdrawn.90  The conversation left Clark further ill-disposed 
toward the political activities of the railroad.  When the anti-free pass amendment came 
back up for review on February 27, it was not even considered, according to Clark, 
because the bill was “stolen from the files no less than three times by some railroad 
lobbyist.”91  With his bill defeated, Clark lamented to Sen. Butler, “This fight between 
R.R.s & people as to the mastery is no child’s play but real war.”92 
The 1896-1897 legislative session was not a complete bust for Clark’s railroad 
reform agenda.  Justice Clark wrote, and Rep. Hartness introduced to the state legislature, 
a fellow servant bill.  The bill, if passed, would abolish the common law doctrine of 
fellow servant in cases involving railroad workers.  The bill encountered similar 
resistance from the railroads, which sought to kill the bill by amending it to include “all 
dangerous callings—cotton mills, mine, steamboats and the like”—a proposition that 
could not have passed.93  Unlike the contemporaneous free pass legislation, the fellow 
servant bill received near unanimous approval from the House Judiciary Committee and 
passed unanimously in the State House.94  North Carolina’s Labor Commissioner praised 
the passage of the legislation as setting “human rights…at least equal to property 
                                                          
90 Walter Clark, “About Railroad Rates,” Fayetteville Observer, August 20, 1896.   
 
91 Ibid. 
 
92 Walter Clark to Marion Butler, March 12, 1897, in PWC, Vol. I, 305-306. 
 
93 “The Fellow Servant Law,” News and Observer, February 18, 1897. 
 
94 “Fellow Servant Law,” News and Observer, February 21, 1897.\ 
 
96 
 
 
rights.”95  Years later Justice Clark still took pride in the law, disclosing publically for the 
first time in 1914 at a Labor Day rally that “[the] statute was drawn by me.”96  
Addressing the assembled crowd, he called for extending the Fellow Servant Act to 
include “factories, saw-mills, or other large companies employing great bodies of 
laborers.”97 
As the national economy recovered from the Panic of 1893 in the last several 
years of the nineteenth century, North Carolina’s Supreme Court increasingly 
encountered the problems created by the accident epidemic that plagued industrial 
labor—particularly the railroad industry.  Steve Greenlee, an employee of the Southern 
Railway Company, lost an arm to a failed effort to couple two railroad cars at an 
Asheville, North Carolina, station.98  A local jury found in Greenlee’s favor and awarded 
him $1,500 in damages, to which the defendant company appealed, alleging that the 
judge’s jury instructions concerning contributory negligence and assumption of risk were 
in error.99   
Justice Clark, writing for a divided court, held that the railroad’s failure to provide 
automatic couplers for its freight cars constituted “continuing negligence” that overrode 
any contributory negligence of the plaintiff.  Clark noted that the court had ruled in 
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Mason v. R.R. that the failure of a railroad to furnish automatic couplers for passenger 
cars constituted negligence per se; yet that decision put off a similar requirement for 
freight cars for reasons left unclear in the court’s decision.100  Consequently, Mason had 
left many railroad employees laboring on freight routes without protection from the 
dangers of old and often defective couplers. While the federal government had acted to 
remedy this problem with the Railroad Safety Appliances Act of 1893, the act only 
affected interstate railroads.101  In addition, the Interstate Commerce Commission gave 
railroads until January 1, 1900, to comply with the act’s provisions, which called for 
automatic car-couplers—along with the implementation of several other safety devices.102  
The delay in enforcement of the federal penalty and the limitation of federal enforcement 
to interstate railroads left a considerable number of railroad employees without 
protection.   
Justice Clark’s decision not only expanded Mason to include freight trains but 
ensured protection for employees who labored on intrastate railroads.  With the 
establishment of railroad commissions by the federal and state governments to regulate 
the conduct of corporations, Clark remarked, “The courts will be very derelict in their 
duty if they do not force justice in favor of employees as well as the public.”103  Greenlee 
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granted injured employees the same protection passengers received six years earlier in 
Mason.  Clark’s chief purpose in creating the negligence per se standard was to grant 
“10,000 R.R. employees in N.C….equal protection of the law.”104   
One year later the Southern Railway Company, dissatisfied with the court’s ruling 
in Greenlee, appealed the case of S. H. Troxler, a brakeman, whose hand was mangled 
(and subsequently amputated) while coupling two cars.105  The defendant requested the 
court “reconsider and overrule Greenlee’s case.”106  They were no doubt encouraged by 
Justice Furches’s dissent in Greenlee, which “was written as the opinion of the Court; but 
since it was written the Court has changed its opinion.”107  Public response to the decision 
was mixed, with the News and Observer and Fayetteville Observer responding positively, 
publishing the decision in full, while the Charlotte Observer labeled Clark’s majority 
opinion “communistic.”108  It was not unreasonable on the part of the Southern Railway 
Company to think the earlier three-two decision might yet be overruled in its infancy. 
Instead, in Troxler a unanimous court upheld Greenlee and issued an opinion, 
written by Justice Clark, that upbraided railroad corporations for their “indifference…in 
not adopting these life and limb-saving appliances” despite their small cost.109  Turning to 
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the Interstate Commerce Commission’s Twelfth Annual Report, Clark took notice of the 
“yearly casualties to railway employees” in 1897 that far exceed the number killed and 
wounded in the Spanish-American War.110  The nation’s high accident rate was despite 
the increased use of automatic car-couplers throughout the 1890s which had led to a 
decrease of roughly 50 percent in railroad employee deaths and injuries from all causes.  
North Carolina suffered similarly, as the State’s Railroad Commission’s report for 1898 
recorded an accident rate of one in six and-a-half injured or killed in the employ of the 
state’s railroads.111  Expressing his frustration with the slow pace of compliance with the 
federal Railroad Safety Act and the “terrible cost to life and limb” of older latch and 
skeleton couplers, Clark lamented that “it should not have required an act of Congress to 
enforce their universal adoption.”112  
Clark’s condemnation of the railroads in Troxler was much stronger than in 
Greenlee.  Responding directly to defense counsel’s arguments seeking a reversal of the 
court’s position in Greenlee, Clark wrote: 
 
This matter of requiring these great corporations to protect the traveling 
public, and their employees as well, by the adoption of all safety 
appliances which have come into general use, is so important that we have 
gone into the subject at this length. Ordinarily owned by great syndicates 
out of the State in which they operate, and their management at all events 
removed from subjection to that sound public opinion which is so great a 
check upon the conduct of individuals and of government itself, the sole 
protection left to the traveler and the employee alike is the application of 
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that law which is administered impartially, and which can lay its hand 
fearlessly upon the most powerful combination and protect with its care 
the humblest individual in the land.113 
 
It was a conflict that did not end with a written opinion but continued into the public 
sphere.  When the Charlotte Observer labeled Clark’s opinion in Greenlee 
“communistic,” he responded with public appeals through local newspapers, since the 
railroads “cut off all information from the people whenever they can.”  Indeed, Clark’s 
letter to A.W. Graham is strikingly similar to an editorial in the News & Observer—
suggesting that it was written by Clark himself and forwarded along to the newspaper but 
published as an editorial comment.114   
Taken together, Greenlee and Troxler created a negligence per se standard that 
effectively blocked railroad companies from raising the common law defenses of fellow 
servant, contributory negligence, and assumption of risk, and thereby improved the 
chances of success for the plaintiff laborer.  Moreover, the court’s ruling was translated 
into other states and other industries.  A few years after Troxler, Interstate Commerce 
Commission Secretary Edward A. Moseley wrote Clark to praise his opinion in Greenlee 
as a “great service to…the railroad employees of the country…it being the first judicial 
interpretation of the Safety Appliances Law.”115  Moseley went on to compliment Clark 
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for being “one of the judiciary who takes the people’s view on public questions and who 
hands down decisions in accordance with that view.”116   
Justice Clark and the Mill Industries 
 With the combined efforts of federal and state authorities railroad workers were 
better protected at the beginning of the twentieth century than their fellow laborers in the 
furniture factories, lumber mills, and cotton mills of the South.  The exclusion of 
southern mill laborers from these protections is most likely attributable to a combination 
of several factors.  First, mill labor possessed less of an interstate nature, leaving federal 
authorities uncertain if they possessed the constitutional authority to intervene in 
intrastate industries.  Second, unionization of mill laborers proceeded at a much slower 
pace than that of railroad employees.  Local industrial leaders effectively resisted early 
attempts at unionization by the Knights of Labor in the 1880s and the American 
Federation of Labor’s National Union of Textile Workers in the 1890s.117   
Third, the role of corporations and capital from outside the state was more 
apparent in the case of railroads, whereas the mill industry tended to be financed with 
greater local investment and managed or owned by local families.118  Thus, that the mill 
industry played less upon traditional southern resentment of northern wealth and foreign 
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corporations.  Whereas the wealth of northern and European railroad magnates reminded 
Southerners of their peripheral position in the national economy, cotton mills were seen 
as signs of a South that was maturing economically to regains its once prominent position 
in the national order.119  Richard H. Edmonds, prominent New South advocate and editor 
of the Baltimore Manufacturers’ Record liked to brag that it was “southern men and 
southern money” that prompted the growth of southern industry.120 Despite Edmond’s 
exaggeration, contemporary indictments of railroads compared with cotton mills show 
the general perception that cotton mills were less a creature of outside financial interests 
than railroads.121  Fourth, similar to railroads, cotton mill owners had influence in the 
state legislature and could trade their importance as employers, taxpayers, and 
community leaders to prevent or stall legislation against their interests.  Fifth, the 
necessity of railroad travel kept the railroads in the public eye.  To travel one had little 
choice in the last few decades of the nineteenth century but to take the train; few people 
who did not work at mills had any reason to visit them. 
 Clark was not opposed to industrial development.  In 1865 Walter Clark, an 
eighteen-year-old Confederate veteran at the time, wrote to the Daily Sentinel 
complaining of the economic consequences of “southern indolence”: 
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Our magnificent country is unimproved, our factories unbuilt, our wants 
supplied from without, and the South, like the sun upon Gideon, has stood 
still in the onward race.  The old declaimed against the Yankee enterprise 
as an abomination of Egypt, and the rising generation have lisped it in 
detestation.—Let them look around.  From the inkstand from which I 
write and the pen with which I trace these lines, to the printing press on 
which they are promulgated, from the cradle in which we are rocked and 
the carved bedstead on which we repose, to the coffin that will receive us 
at our death, and the tombstone that shall commemorate our virtues to the 
succeeding generation, there is but little of the comforts or conveniences, 
and few even of the necessaries of life for which we are not indebted to 
that same universal Yankee nation.  The very cotton that whitens our 
fields must pass through Yankee looms before it adorns our belles or 
clothes our laborers…we must foster enterprise.122  
  
Clark defended his criticism of Southern attitudes toward the North in 1865 in 
much the same manner he defended his more radical progressive beliefs—with an appeal 
to his southernness.123  In the shared struggle for the Lost Cause (a myth Clark played a 
role in advancing but also manipulating to progressive ends) and his prominent southern 
pedigree as a descendant of the pre-war planter class, Justice Clark found common 
ground despite his uncommon, and often unpopular, political beliefs.  Yet, despite 
Clark’s openness to what some Southerners condescendingly referred to as “Yankee 
values,” like many southerners, Clark was suspicious of foreign capital and 
corporations.124  Clark favored industrialization similar to that proposed by J. S. Wynne 
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in the News and Observer Chronicle that advocated investment by the local “capitalist, 
banker, merchant, clerk, laborer and all others.”125  Writing the paper to commend 
Wynne’s plan, Justice Clark noted the rapid payment of the indemnity placed upon 
France after the Franco-Prussian War: “The prompt milliards which startled Germany 
and removed the last German soldier from the soil of France came from the hoarded 
savings of the people.  The millionaires were ‘not in it.’”126    
 With unionization efforts making little headway in the late nineteenth century, the 
strongest voices for industrial labor reforms came from anti-child labor advocates like 
Minister Alexander McKelway, Populist Clarence Poe, and Democrat Charles Aycock.  
Child labor reforms gained popular traction where other industrial labor reforms had 
failed because they could be advocated by their proponents as a “special kind of 
legislation having ‘nothing to do with’ the controversy between capital and labor.”127  Yet 
it was not until 1903 that North Carolina enacted its first, flawed child labor law, which 
was relatively conservative and hard to enforce.128  The sentiment of W. H. Williamson, 
owner of Pilot Mills in Raleigh represented that of many mill owners and legislators: “let 
the employer and employee settle these things, this is a free country for all.”129 
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 As child labor reforms progressed slowly in North Carolina, the need for child 
laborers increased in North Carolina’s industrial enterprises.  The North Carolina Bureau 
of Labor boasted that during the 1880s “the manufacturing and mechanical pursuits of the 
State have trebled and even quadrupled.”130  In 1895 the state’s 156 cotton and woolen 
mills employed 15,752 laborers, of which 4,689 were children (and 1,558 were under 
fourteen years old).131  It should be noted that these numbers were self-reported by 
manufacturers to the Bureau of Labor Statistics and no doubt underreported the number 
of young children working in cotton and lumber mills throughout the state. By the end 
1897 the number of textile mills in the state had increased to 207, operated 24,517 looms, 
and employed 26,287 (5,363, or 20.4 per cent were children).132  This growth trend 
continued as the economy recovered from the financial panic of 1893. 
 In an environment where “the threat of serious injuries was all around,” child 
labor increased the risk of serious injury or death.133  Children hung from, climbed upon, 
played ball (with improvised balls made of yarn) around, leaned against, and generally 
neglected to pay attention to the fast moving and powerful machines around them whose 
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exposed parts offered the constant threat of lost fingers, hands, limbs, and lives.134 
Unfortunately for those children injured in the mill, the common law doctrine of 
contributory negligence often held the inattentive child to the same standard as a 
negligent adult.135   
 Such was the case for Ebbirt Ward, an eleven-year-old boy whose parents brought 
suit against Odell Manufacturing in the winter of 1899.136  While employed by Odell 
Manufacturing, Ward walked past a workbench where a co-worker was cutting wire and 
one of the errant pieces struck the child in his eye.  The injury caused Ward permanent 
blindness in the injured eye.  An Iredell County jury had awarded $1,000 in damages; to 
which defense counsel appealed on the grounds that the judge’s instruction on 
contributory negligence had been in error.137  Clark’s opinion for an evenly divided court 
responded directly to defense counsel’s argument that Ward’s claim should be barred 
because of the boy’s own negligence.138 
 First, Clark criticized the practice of child labor, comparing child laborers to 
“little prisoners” who labored eleven to twelve hours per day in a “stifling atmosphere” 
filled with dangerous “machinery whirring at high-speed.”139  He also criticized the social 
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impact of child labor, as the “little prisoners” were “deprived…of [an] opportunity for 
education,” and adult wages were driven down by their competition.140  While Clark 
acknowledged that these were “matters of public policy which must be addressed solely 
to the legislative department,” he found room to attempt to implement changes within the 
common law.  “There is an aspect in which the matter is for the courts,” Clark argued, 
attempting to convince his fellow justices that “it is negligence per se” for an industrial 
employer to hire young children.141  Clark’s reasoning for setting a negligence per se 
standard followed social and political critiques: 
 
The children without opportunity of education, without rest, their strength 
overtaxed, their perceptions blunted by fatigue, their intelligence dwarfed 
by their treadmill existence, are over-liable to accidents. Can it be said that 
such little creatures, exposed to such dangers against their wills, are guilty 
of contributory negligence, the defense here set up? Does the law, justly 
interpreted, visit such liability upon little children?...Every sentiment of 
justice forbids that the corporation should rely on the plea of contributory 
negligence.142 
 
Clark’s opinion served three purposes.  First, it prodded the “legislative department” to 
act upon the issue of child labor.  Second, it served as a harsh rebuke to mill owners who 
employed children in similar conditions.  Third, it argued for the establishment of a 
negligence per se standard of liability for cases involving child laborers.  However, this 
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last purpose was frustrated because Clark was writing for an evenly divided court.  Under 
court practice, implemented by Clark seven years earlier, the decision of a divided court 
affirmed the judgment in the particular case but did not serve as legal precedent.143 Ward 
was entitled to collect his $1,000 judgment against Odell Manufacturing Inc., but the 
negligence per se standard would have to wait. 
 Two years later the court heard a similar case, this time involving an even 
younger laborer.  Nine-year-old William A. Fitzgerald began working for the Alma 
Furniture Company of High Point on January 1, 1900.144  He was put to work sweeping 
the saw dust on the floors into the furnace for twenty-five cents per day.  Two days later 
the boy was told to work on a sanding machine.  Left alone with the device, Fitzgerald 
leaned against the machine.  As a result “his hand was mashed between the rollers.”145  A 
Davidson County jury awarded Fitzgerald $1,000 in damages.  Defense counsel appealed, 
listing numerous exceptions, the majority of which were directed towards the judge’s jury 
instructions.146  Justice Clark’s opinion, again written for a divided court, ventured 
beyond the boundaries of the case to issue a warning to factory owners.  Despite the fact 
that the defendant’s exceptions had not raised the issue of contributory negligence by the 
plaintiff, Clark stated: 
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It is a subject of growing importance to lawyers, as well as in public 
interest generally, it may be well to cite, as indicative of the conclusion to 
which the maturer judgment of mankind is tending, the age below which 
legislative construction in other States had made it illegal, and therefore 
negligence per se and irrebuttable, to employ any child in a factory, at the 
close of the year 1901.147 
 
Clark followed with a carefully compiled list of the child labor laws of twenty-seven 
American states and twenty different foreign nations.148  Given the “consensus of opinion 
in the nearly entire civilized world,” Clark wrote, “it might be that it would not have been 
error if the Judge had held that it was negligence per se to put a child of the tender age of 
nine years to work on a dangerous machine.”149  In 1914, when Clark testified before the 
Industrial Labor Congressional Commission, he recalled that plaintiff’s counsel had made 
no broad social arguments: 
 
The whole matter originated with me.  I argued with the court and 
presented the proposition; I said the world out to move, and that the 
decision ought to be as broad as the injury, and that it was time to take a 
broader view, and two of the judges [Justice Faircloth and Justice 
Douglas] concurred with me and two dissented.150  
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Although dissenting Justices Montgomery and Furches in their dissent lamented the 
personal injuries, “which so often come to these little sufferers,” they held fast to the 
“duty of the court—to expound the laws, not to make them.”151 
Whereas in Ward the evenly divided Supreme Court’s opinion negated the 
decision’s value as precedent, Clark’s opinion in Fitzgerald was also of limited value as 
precedent given that it was in obiter dicta.  However, the language was carefully worded 
to put on notice employers that the court would likely apply a negligence per se standard 
in the next case involving an injured child laborer.  Such a standard invalidated the 
defendant’s traditionally strong defenses of contributory negligence, assumption of risk, 
and fellow servant in personal injury cases involving infant laborers.   
Clark’s opinion in Fitzgerald no doubt represents the increasing frustration of 
child labor reform advocates in North Carolina.  When, in 1901, the state legislature was 
ready to pass its first child labor reform act, a signed agreement by cotton manufacturers 
agreeing not to employ children under ten or children under twelve during the school 
term suddenly appeared.152  The voluntary agreement was unsatisfactory to child labor 
reform advocates like Clark in numerous ways.  First, it was limited to child laborers in 
the state’s cotton mills; child laborers like William Fitzgerald working in the state’s 
furniture factories and Carrie Sims in its steam laundries were not included.  Second, the 
agreement’s voluntary nature left it entirely unenforceable against its signatories—which 
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included less than half of the state’s cotton mills (and none of its lumber mills, furniture 
factories, and other industrial enterprises).153    
The legislature’s failure to act, according to Justice Clark, had left the door open 
to judicial modification of the common law.154  While entirely hesitant to overturn the 
enactments of the legislature, he had few reservations about adjusting common law 
doctrines that he perceived as harmful to justice for the state’s laboring class.  Clark told 
a United States congressional committee, “I don't recognize the right of some unknown 
man, who lived in different surroundings and in a different state of society to tell me what 
I shall say as to what is just between "A" and "B" to-day.”155  The inaction of the state’s 
legislature left room for a proactive judiciary to adjust the standards of negligence with 
regard to injured child laborers. 
 In addition, the child labor issue could not be divorced from adult labor issues.  
Clark’s opinions made direct reference to mills and factories “using the competition of 
[children’s] cheap wages to reduce those of maturer age.”156 Indeed, in Fitzgerald H. B. 
Crouch, an adult coworker, testified that at Alma Manufacturing “boys are generally 
employed to do such work as the plaintiff was doing.”  In response to cross examination, 
Crouch claimed children were used “because they are cheaper than men.”157  A State 
                                                          
153 Ibid. 
 
154 Testimony of Walter Clark, United States Commission on Industrial Relations, Final Report and 
Testimony, 10454.  
 
155 Ibid., 10460. 
 
156 Ward v. Odell Manufacturing, 126 N.C. 946, 948 (1900). 
 
157 Testimony of H. B. Crouch, Ward v. Odell, Supreme Court Original Cases, 1800-1909, Box 1,036, SANC. 
112 
 
 
Bureau of Labor Statistics report for 1900 recorded that the average daily wage for a 
child laboring in North Carolina’s furniture factories, like Fitzgerald, was forty cents; 
unskilled adult male labor cost the employer 50 percent more and skilled adult male labor 
cost almost eight times that amount.158  Progressive reformers routinely complained that 
the low wages paid to children drove down the wages of adult laborers.159  By imposing a 
negligence per se standard for the employment of young children the court readjusted the 
cost of child labor.  It discouraged the employment of children by increasing the 
likelihood that the employer could not avoid liability for the kinds of accidents children 
tended to cause due to their natural tendencies toward inattentiveness, distraction, and 
playfulness.     
 Clark’s opinion in Fitzgerald suited the public mood of the day.  The legislature 
had grown tired of the cotton mill owners’ failure to live up to their voluntary agreement 
to limit child labor.  Moreover, Clark’s decision “encouraged some textile mill owners to 
accept regulatory legislation.”160  No doubt informed by their legal counsel that their 
recourse to common law defenses in infant personal injury suits was already clearly 
endangered by the North Carolina Supreme Court, there was less economic reason to 
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resist a limitation on the prohibition of child labor below a certain age.  When Alexander 
McKelway, southern organizer for the National Child Labor Committee, requested Clark 
send him a copy of his opinion in Fitzgerald, McKelway praised the decision as 
contributing to the state’s first child labor law.161     
 Soon after the enactment of the 1903 child labor law that prohibited the labor of 
all children under twelve years of age, the North Carolina Supreme Court officially 
instituted a negligence per se standard in child personal injury cases where failure to 
follow the statute led to the plaintiff’s injury.162  Yet many employers continued to 
employ child laborers regardless of the inherent liability issues.  For example, in 1911, an 
eleven-year-old boy working for the Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company as a 
messenger boy was found dead on the tracks with one of his legs severed from his body. 
No one had seen the accident, although witnesses had seen the boy riding on the 
defendant’s train earlier that morning.  Over Chief Justice Clark’s dissent the court held 
there was insufficient evidence of the defendant’s negligence to go to the jury. 163    
 Chief Justice Clark’s particularly harsh dissent, filled with references to the Civil 
War and condemnations to railroad employers, wedded the issues in Greenlee and 
Troxler with those of Ward and Fitzgerald.  Clark, seemingly exasperated by the 
majority’s decision that there was insufficient evidence of the defendant’s negligence, 
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wrote, “The little child being found dead with his leg cut off in such a network of tracks, 
among constantly shifting trains, creates as strong a presumption that his leg was cut off 
by one of these trains as, when a soldier is found dead on a battlefield with a bullet 
through his head, that he was killed by the enemy.”164  Clark lamented that it appeared 
the court was turning away from the principles expressed in Ward v. Odell and 
subsequent “humane decisions of this court.”165 The infant Pettit was exposed “to an 
accumulation of perils greater to him…than that which met the charging column of brave 
men on Cemetery Ridge [Gettysburg].  Many soldiers survived four years of war.  This 
child was slain on the fourth day of his employment.”166  Clark simultaneously expanded 
his Civil War analogy to include all industrial laborers.   
 
A conservative estimate of the number of workmen killed or maimed in 
this country every year in industrial accidents is about 500,000. It is said 
that the total number killed and wounded in the Union Army during the 
Civil War was 385,325. In other words, the whole Confederate Army was 
unable to kill and cripple as many Union men in four years as are now 
killed and crippled in industrial employment in a single year.167   
 
 As he did in Troxler and Greenlee, Chief Justice Clark assailed the “avarice of the 
defendant.” He also criticized the reluctance of the court to intervene to ensure the fair 
distribution of the risks of employment in dangerous industries: 
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We cannot expect this condition to improve if the courts can be induced to 
place the blame upon those killed and wounded, because, in order to make 
a livelihood and with a purpose of obeying those for whom they labor, 
they venture in dangerous pursuits, while under such conditions the same 
courts relieve the master, who created the condition and gave the orders, 
of all liability and blame whatsoever.168 
 
Despite the imposition of a negligence per se standard in cases involving railroad 
couplings for adults or violations of the child labor law by the state’s employers, Pettit 
provides an example of how defendants still found ways around liability to injured 
workers and their families.  Moreover, it should be noted that the plaintiff employee in 
most industrial enterprises still bore most of the risk of accidents and negligence—not his 
employer.   
Chief Justice Clark’s opinion in Pettit, and other child labor cases, was consistent 
with progressive reform movements of his era but different in that it sought to give the 
state’s highest court a more active role in reform.  Clark advocated a proactive judiciary 
in cases where the legislature had failed to enact reforms that shifted the economic risk of 
negligent injuries in the industrial workplace based “upon the principles of right and 
justice.”  While the majority were wary of the influence of “sentimentalism” and insistent 
that the court must decide the case with recourse only to the “the cold and unyielding 
facts of the case,” Clark appealed to rebalancing liability in negligence cases in the 
plaintiff’s favor.169   
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Infants, Idiots, Lunatics, Convicts and Married Women 
 Antebellum North Carolina courts embraced common law views of femes covert 
(married women) as “morally incapable of doing any act which is to bind themselves.”170  
Common law doctrine and North Carolina statutory law in the colonial and antebellum 
eras often made special provision for “the deeds of infants, feme coverts, of one non 
compos, a person under legal duress, & c.”171  As a class “the law deemed [them] 
incapable of taking care of themselves.”172  North Carolina’s Supreme Court attached 
such importance to common law doctrine that despite acknowledging the legislature’s 
power to modify the common law via statutory enactment, on some occasions the court 
modified “the true and grammatical construction” of a statute regarding the legal 
disabilities of married women to fit “the privileges and immunities possessed by persons 
at the common law.”173  The Reconstruction state legislature in 1868 substantially 
changed married women’s property rights.  Article X, Section 6 of the 1868 Constitution 
established a wife’s property as her “sole and separate estate and property,” which could 
be sold with her husband’s consent and, furthermore, protected from her husband’s 
“debts, obligations, or engagements.”174   
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Yet the hold of the common law could not be easily broken.  North Carolina 
courts continued to apply common law to civil and criminal actions involving husbands 
and wives.  In civil cases the courts employed the common law to limit married women’s 
ability to make commercial transactions.  In the area of criminal law the North Carolina 
Supreme Court refused to recognize the state’s ability to intervene in “trivial complaints 
arising out of the domestic relations.”  In an 1868 case where a husband, without 
provocation, had assaulted his wife with a switch, the court refused to recognize the 
husband’s assault as actionable because “the evil of publicity would be greater than the 
evil involved in the trifles complained of; and because they ought to be left to family 
government.”175  An 1870 case where a husband tried to stab his wife on a public street 
compelled the court to recognize an assault between husband and wife; after all, the 
public nature of the assault rendered concerns about publicizing marital troubles moot.176  
Even four years later, in 1874, while the Supreme Court was conflicted.  While the court 
called the judicial doctrine that allowed domestic violence “barbarism,” the court still 
insisted that “if no permanent injury has been inflicted, nor malice, cruelty nor dangerous 
violence shown by husband, it is better to draw the curtain, shut out the public gaze, and 
leave the parties to forget and forgive.”177  This precedent was not entirely abrogated 
until 1921.178          
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Clark’s early career in newspapers, law, and as a superior court judgeship 
provides little information on Clark’s views of women’s rights issues.  The first 
indication of such appears in a dissenting opinion written by Justice Clark in 1892, three 
years after his appointment to the North Carolina Supreme Court.  The case, Williams v. 
Walker, involved the obscure legal identity of the free trader.179  Married women, lacking 
the ability to own or convey their own property at common law, were given via statutory 
enactment in North Carolina, a means to engage in commerce.  A woman’s husband 
could sign a legal form consenting to her buying, selling, and trading in real property.  
This legal instrument then had to be filed with the register of deeds in her principal place 
of business.  In William v. Walker, a deceased married female property owner had 
executed a mortgage on her property that her husband agreed to and signed yet had not 
appropriately recorded the free trader certification at the register of deeds.180     
Based on these facts the court’s majority voided the mortgage because the wife 
lacked free trader status due to her failure to file the requisite paperwork.  The court’s 
majority reasoned that to do otherwise would have “broken down all the protection now 
afforded to femes covert.”181  Behind this justification rested the legal assumption that 
women required elaborate protections against fraud, undue inducements, and their own 
poor judgment. Yet Associate Justice Clark, in one of his first dissents on the court, 
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argued, “The Constitution and the present statutes…were certainly intended to 
emancipate [women], not to assimilate them farther into the condition of infants in law, 
and incompetents.”182  
When a similar case arose a year later, in this case the wife’s free trader status 
was undisputed, and Justice Clark wrote for a unanimous court that the Constitution of 
North Carolina did not throw “additional shackles around women” in the management of 
their property and that the law—properly interpreted—was “in accordance with the free 
spirit of the age and the universal trend of legislation the world over.”  The Constitution 
did nothing less than “emancipate [women] from most of the restrictions formerly 
existing.”183  The themes of the “spirit of the age” and emancipation showed up often in 
Clark’s subsequent opinions, letters, and addresses.   
 In 1898 Clark developed a new line of argument against legal discriminations that 
targeted married women.  In McLeod v. Warren Williams and Wife a married female 
debtor sought to evade a creditor’s judgment because, lacking free trader status, she could 
not have incurred the debt.  While the court’s majority found that she was not a free 
trader and therefore could not bind herself or her property, Clark once again vigorously 
dissented.  In addition repeating his past arguments regarding the state’s constitution, 
Clark introduced several new arguments.  First, he argued that the classification of 
women “with ‘idiots, lunatics, and infants’” was “unjust and ungallant.”184  It was the 
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beginning of arguments based on verbiage about chivalry and gallantry meant to appeal 
to a southern audience that valued such concepts in theory, if not in practice.  Second, 
through historical allusions to Deborah (Judge of Israel), Queen Elizabeth, and Queen 
Victoria, Clark sought to establish the competency of women to exercise judgment 
without existing legal “protections.”  Third, he argued pragmatically that these 
discriminations in law had been eliminated in numerous jurisdictions (American and 
foreign).  Moreover, in numerous states married women were fit to serve as lawyers, 
doctors, bank presidents, postmasters, and even voters.185  His decisions and speeches 
from 1899 through 1920 echoed and built on these arguments.   
 The North Carolina legislature acted in 1899 to remedy legal discriminations 
against women when it removed women from the legal classes (infants, idiots, lunatics, 
and convicts) “under disabilities” against whom the statute of limitations could not run.186  
Yet the court’s majority proved unwilling to change along the same lines.  In Weathers v. 
Borders, the same year, a husband and wife verbally contracted with a builder to 
construct a home on the wife’s property.  The couple failed to pay the full balance and the 
contractor sought a judgment against the husband and wife.  While the lower court 
awarded a judgment against the husband, the court refused to award a judgment against 
the wife or place a mechanic’s lien on the wife’s house.187   
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The court’s majority held that the statutory requirements of Section 1826 of the 
North Carolina Code regarding free traders required explicit written consent for all 
transactions.188  Seeking to inoculate himself from Clark’s biting criticism, Republican 
Justice Robert Douglas wrote a concurrence that no doubt spoke for at least one other 
member of the court’s majority—if not all.  “I certainly did not intend the slightest 
reflection upon married women by continuing to give them the same protection afforded 
to ‘infants, idiots, lunatics and convicts,’" the Republican justice pleaded.189  Hers was a 
domestic sphere that required protection, and women recognized as much: “She feels no 
degradation in being upon an equality with that ‘infant’ in the love of a father and the 
protection of a husband.”190  Justice Douglas no doubt spoke for the majority, even if the 
majority was not willing to put into writing a sentiment against liberalizing the law: “I 
feel neither the desire nor the obligation to shoulder my judicial battle-axe in a crusade 
against the wisdom of the ages.” 191  
 While Justice Douglas was loath to lift his judicial battle axe, Justice Clark had no 
such reservations.  Clark’s dissent attacked the court’s expansion of the law to include all 
contracts—not simply conveyances.  It was a violation of the North Carolina Constitution 
and a legal reversion that placed married women “in medieval leading strings” created by 
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the courts. Lastly, by way of a reference to the American Law Review, Clark introduced 
yet another argument that would become a staple of his speeches about women’s rights.  
He claimed, “The law of the status of woman is the last vestige of slavery.”192  In a 
generation not far removed from the antebellum era the argument assumed a distinctly 
southern (and controversial) aspect when employed by Clark.193  
 These requirements remained an issue even in 1911, when Justice Clark wrote the 
majority opinion for a divided court in the case of Rea v. Rea.194  A widow sought to 
undo a transfer of stock in a cotton mill to her deceased husband, which had been caught 
up in his estate, by pleading that her husband had not agreed to her transfer of the 
stock.195  Clark used the case to speak for a court divided three-to-two that judicial 
limitations on married women’s ability to contract and convey property were to be 
viewed as narrowly as possible.  A new bare majority of the court composed of Chief 
Justice Clark and Associate Justices Platt Walker and Allen Brown established Clark’s 
previous dissents as the new precedent.  The change did not go unnoticed.  The News and 
Observer ran a headline proclaiming, “Married Women are Emancipated.”196  An 
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editorial in the same paper praised the decision for “giv[ing] women absolute control 
over their property….[and] insuring a broader and more enlightened policy.”197   
 Before Clark’s lauded opinion in Rea v. Rea, the Chief Justice had grown 
impatient with the glacial pace of change on the court with regards to women’s property 
rights.  Consequently, in November 1910, Clark penned and distributed a letter to all the 
members of the North Carolina General Assembly.  In that letter the Chief Justice 
requested the representatives to bring the statutory law pertaining to women’s property 
rights “into harmony with the best modern thought and conditions.”198  Several legislators 
responded, some with requests for the Chief Justice to draw up specific bills for them to 
introduce at the upcoming session.199  The period from 1910-1920 saw an activist Clark, 
who fully embraced women’s suffrage and promoted the expansion of women’s rights by 
opinion, letter, and speech.   
 After 1910 Clark’s correspondence with suffragists exploded, as he suddenly 
began exchanging letters with Anna Shaw and Carrie Catt (National American Woman 
Suffrage Association presidents), Jeannette Rankin (U.S. Representative from Montana), 
Alice Paul (National Woman’s Party), and a host of other local and state suffrage leaders.  
Most of these exchanges concerned requests for Clark to speak at conventions, draft 
pieces of legislation, or write letters in support of the legality of suffrage for distribution 
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to prominent, but reluctant, state officials.200  The Chief Justice responded: he wrote at 
least half a dozen legislative bills concerning women’s property rights and suffrage; 
delivered at least one public speech on women’s suffrage every year between 1912 and 
1919; and he actively petitioned the North Carolina legislature and the state’s senators to 
push for significant changes in the law.  Yet Clark still advocated from the bench, and his 
judicial advocacy often overlapped with his public advocacy (even going so far as to use 
the exact same language in his opinions and speeches).     
Femes Covert: Judgments, Petitions, Privy Examinations 
 Ten days after the 1912 election Clark sent a letter to several prominent women’s 
suffrage leaders in North Carolina.  He sought to bring their attention to a “case argued 
before our court…yesterday.”201  In the case, a married woman, Louisa Price, was riding 
through Charlotte in a horse and buggy when an electric railway train collided with her 
carriage and dragged her some distance.  The collision, and subsequent dragging, caused 
significant injuries, including an amputated foot, a crippled arm, and a severe gash to her 
face.  Mrs. Price and her husband brought suit against the Charlotte Electric Railway 
Company seeking damages for the wife’s pain and suffering and diminished capacity to 
labor.202  The jury found for the plaintiff and awarded her $5,000 in damages.203  While 
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there was sufficient evidence to prove the engineer’s negligence in exceeding the speed 
limit and failing to issue a warning or signal, the company challenged the ruling on the 
ground that a feme covert could not recover damages for diminished capacity—such 
belonged to her husband alone.204  While the outcome of the case had already been 
decided, though not published, Clark suggested the suffrage leaders pre-emptively strike 
against the common law rule that barred recovery to a married woman by pressing the 
legislature for a statute overturning the common law principle.  Clark included a bill of 
his own drafting that “if introduced and properly championed” would pass the North 
Carolina legislature.  Sallie Southall Cotton, president of the North Carolina Federation 
of Women’s Clubs, responded affirmatively with promises to “try to have it enacted into 
law.”205  
 Shortly after Mrs. Cotton’s response, the North Carolina Supreme Court’s 
decision in Price v. Charlotte Electric Railway Company was published.  While the 
court’s majority sidestepped the issue of the discrimination at common law against 
married women by noting the husband’s role as co-plaintiff was sufficient remedy, Clark 
issued a concurrence to directly address the issue.  In language almost word-for-word 
with his earlier letter to women’s suffrage leaders, Clark skewered the common law rule: 
“[it] cannot be maintained except upon the principle that the earnings of a slave and 
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damages for injuries to the slave's person are the property of the master.”206  Clark 
concluded with a broad view of the relationship between the courts, women, and statutory 
law: 
 
Every age should have laws based upon its own intelligence and 
expressing its own ideas of right and wrong. Progress and betterment 
should not be denied us by the dead hand of the Past. The decisions of the 
courts should always be in accord with the spirit of the legislation of to-
day, which should not be misconstrued to conform to the views of dead 
and forgotten judges of centuries long over past, who were not always 
learned and able, and who, if wise, were rarely wise beyond the narrow 
vision of their own age.207 
 
In a postscript forever etched into the North Carolina Law Reports, which Justice Clark 
edited, Clark noted: “The General Assembly of 1913 enacted that a married woman can 
recover her earnings and damages for personal injuries for her own use, and without 
joinder of her husband in the action.”208  Notably Clark did not acknowledge that it was 
likely his bill that was enacted in 1913.209 
 Less than one year after the passage of this act, meant to remedy the majority 
decision in Price, the Supreme Court considered a similar case in Josephine Floyd and 
Husband v. Atlantic Coast Line Railway Company.210  Grady O’Berry Floyd, an 
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eighteen-year-old boy, was struck and killed by an Atlantic Coast Line Railway train.  
The boy’s mother filed suit for mental anguish due to the mutilation of her son’s body 
that occurred post-death.211  The boy’s father joined as a nominal party and disclaimed 
any right to recover on his behalf.  The trial court nonsuited the plaintiff mother, holding 
that the father was the only party who could bring suit.212  While the Supreme Court’s 
majority held that the claim for mental anguish was actionable, it joined the trial court in 
holding the wife could not bring the claim, as such a right belonged to her husband.  The 
court’s holding rested on statutory law regarding the property of deceased children 
reverting to a hierarchy of next of kin, with the father given the first position.213  Yet this 
decision meant the court was treating the body of Grady Floyd as a piece of quasi-
property so that it might fall within the statute concerning intestate individuals.         
 Clark’s dissent argued that the court should not consider this case one of 
distributing an estate, but as a straightforward tort for mental anguish.214  The injury 
rested not in the damage to the son’s body but in the emotional trauma suffered by the 
mother in seeing her son’s mangled corpse.  As a tort it fell within the statute, passed the 
previous year, to allow married women the right of recovery even when suing alone.  
Once again a conservative majority on the court had interpreted statutory law in such a 
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way to defeat a statutory enactment that had sought to broaden women’s legal rights to 
recover.215   
 In the same year the court’s majority issued its decision in Price limiting 
women’s right to recover, it also issued an opinion indirectly related to women’s suffrage 
that elicited another Clark dissent.  In Gill v. Board of Commissioners of Wake County 
the court was asked to decide if a woman was a freeholder for the purposes of a statute 
that required one-fourth of freeholders to sign a petition requesting the creation of a 
special school district.  At issue was a tax levied to finance the new school district in 
Wake Forest.  Opponents sought to block the new tax by claiming that the statutory 
requirements had not been met since female freeholders were not included in the tally of 
Wake Forest freeholders. 216  If women counted as freeholders it would dilute the number 
of petitioners and thereby bring the petition beneath the required statutory bar of one-
fourth.  
 The case turned upon the fairly technical matter of the legal definition of a 
freeholder.  The court’s majority held that for the purposes of the statute a freeholder had 
to both own property and meet the qualifications of a voter.217  The court’s ruling in Gill 
upheld the creation of the special school district and the resulting tax, while limiting 
protections for female property holders who would bear the burdens of taxation.  Clark’s 
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dissent stressed the gender neutral definition of freeholders.  Clark lamented that once 
again the “debris of a rejected and barbarous legal system [had] destroy[ed] an act…in 
accord with the spirit of an advancing civilization.”218  He concluded by reprimanding the 
majority, “It is not for us to bivouac always by the abandoned campfires of more 
progressive communities. The courts should construe legislation from the standpoint of 
this age and of the men who enact it.”219  It was the first of several cases where the 
court’s majority relied upon common law and women’s disfranchisement to place 
obstacles in the way of women seeking greater autonomy.   
 Two examples of such cases are State Ex Rel. Attorney General v. Noland Knight 
and Bank of Union v. R. B. Redwine, et al.220  As mentioned earlier, the Knight case arose 
to test the legality of appointing a woman to fill the role of notary public under a new 
state statute.  The case turned upon the legislature’s declaration that notary publics were 
“a place of trust and profit, not an office.”221  The court’s majority held the statute 
unconstitutional, as notary public was a public office that, under the 1868 Constitution, 
could only be filled by one eligible to vote.  As women lacked suffrage in the state, they 
could not be appointed to fill the office of notary.  Chief Justice Clark’s dissent argued 
that “the entire experience and recognition of the rest of the world is against the 
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[majority’s] position.”222  Clark construed the statute as a piece of social legislation to 
address “changing conditions…[that] forced [women] to seek new and wider 
employment.” Such legislation was within the recognized authority of the legislature.  
Moreover, the court’s reading of the Constitution went beyond its wording, which merely 
protected the rights of eligible voters to hold office (a protection inserted to protect black 
officeholders). “If the plaintiff were a man,” Clark argued, “he would not be debarred 
from holding this appointment unless he were an idiot, a lunatic, or a convict.”223  Clark’s 
argument, refuting sex discrimination in office holding, concluded, “It is neither a crime 
nor a defect in this appointee to discharge the clerical duties of a notary public because 
she is a woman.  Will the Court hold that it is?”224     
 And again the following year the same question of female office holding arose in 
Bank of Union v. R. B. Redwine, et al. in a more roundabout manner.  On its face the case 
adjudicated claims to stocks used as collateral to secure a loan between the estate of the 
deceased and the bank.  Yet the facts of the case included the involvement of a female 
deputy clerk of the superior court who recorded one of the liens.  While the court’s 
majority declined to consider the question of her involvement, as it was not necessary to 
the outcome of the case, it felt compelled to again make clear its decision against women 
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as public office holders.225  Perhaps still smarting from the publication of Clark’s Knight 
dissent in the News and Observer, the majority stated: 
 
It is unnecessary to repeat the reasons given for the decision of the Court 
in the Knight case, but none of them were based on the inferiority 
of women or their unfitness for office. The propriety and wisdom of 
female suffrage, and of the eligibility of women to hold office are political 
questions, which must be settled by the people, and which we cannot 
discuss or consider in the determination of legal questions.226               
 
Clark’s dissent noted that the court’s view of female office holding had grave 
implications.  It had passed upon deciding directly if women could hold the office of 
deputy clerk—instead merely suggesting it in dictum—to avoid a disastrous outcome.  If 
women were disqualified from holding the office, then their actions while in office 
carried no authority.  And as Union County at the time had a female deputy clerk, and 
had previously had three other female deputy clerks, there existed a large number of titles 
and legal proceedings whose legitimacy could be questioned.  Indeed, in the present case 
the plaintiff’s brief argued the deed at issue void “because the deputy clerk was a woman, 
and, therefore, not qualified to administer an oath.”227  Moreover, Clark’s dissent 
questioned why women, able to hold office at the federal level as well as abroad—
including under the common law in England—were considered unqualified to hold the 
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position of notary in North Carolina.  Clark’s frustration then veered into sarcasm and 
attacked the court’s construction of the state’s constitution: 
 
But it is urged that the duties of the deputy clerk, though not a very high 
position, are "judicial." It is perhaps natural that judges should think that 
"duties judicial" require a peculiar qualification of mind. They would not 
like to say, perhaps, "a mind superior to that possessed by women," but "a 
mind of a different cast from that of women," for though they have been 
able sovereigns, they might not make good judges, and might be "too 
emotional" to properly probate this deed in trust!228 
 
Redwine was the last of the office holding cases that barred women from public office 
due to their disfranchisement.  Within the next half decade North Carolina’s women 
would gain the franchise and clear the obstacle placed in their way by the court’s 
majority.   
Segregation, Lynching, and the Common Man 
 Considering Clark’s sympathy for the powerless and oppressed, one may wonder 
what sympathies Clark had for the most oppressed group of all—African Americans?  
Clark’s career coincided with the rise of legal segregation in the South, along with the 
brutal wave of extra-legal terror toward blacks in the form of lynching.  How did Clark 
respond to the subjugation of African Americans?  During Clark’s thirty-five-year tenure 
on the North Carolina Supreme Court, the court only dealt directly with the issue of 
segregation on two occasions.229  Clark’s dissenting opinion in the case of Merritt v. 
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Atlantic Coastline Railroad, although regarding a substantially different subject than the 
rest of the cases discussed above, is framed along much the same lines as Fitzgerald, 
Pettit, Greenlee, and Troxler.  The needs of the common (white) man and suspicions 
about foreign corporations abusing or neglecting to follow North Carolina statutory laws 
enacted in the interest of the white masses existed in the Merritt case. 
 It had been almost a decade since the conclusion of the White Supremacy 
Campaign of 1898 and the enactment of the railroad segregation statute by the 
Democratic legislature in 1899 when W. M. Merritt attempted to board the Atlantic Coast 
Line train at Ivanhoe, North Carolina.230  The year legal segregation began, the 
application of Jim Crow to North Carolina’s railroads had been contested by both white 
and black citizens.  The former were eager to ensure enforcement by reluctant railroads, 
the latter eager to overturn the recent enactment of racial separation in most common 
means of public travel.231  The protests by both sides decreased as Jim Crow continued 
his strange career—only now riding North Carolina’s railroad cars.  Merritt, along with 
three of his coworkers, possessed twenty-five cent tickets to carry them home to 
Tomahawk, North Carolina.  As the train slowed into the station, Merritt and his 
coworkers, all lumber workers dragging their gear behind them, were instructed by the 
conductor to enter the “other car.”  The men complied only to discover the conductor had 
directed them into the Jim Crow car.  The testimony of Merritt and one of his 
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companions, J. H. Boney, both emphasized that their presence in the Jim Crow car was 
corrected by its black occupants, who instructed the white working men that they “were 
in the wrong car.” No sooner had they complied with the new request to leave the Jim 
Crow car, the conductor, seeing them walk into the car meant for whites, waved them off 
with his hand saying, “Go on back in the other car.”  Once again they returned to the Jim 
Crow car, but this time they assumed their seats.  When the conductor came through to 
collect the tickets for these white men sitting in a Jim Crow car, they protested being 
placed in the wrong portion of the train.  The conductor informed them that if they 
wanted to keep their baggage, which consisted of the tools of their work in a tow sack, 
they would have to ride in the Jim Crow car as there wasn’t sufficient room in the white 
car. 232   
 For Merritt and his companions, their treatment by the conductor was nothing less 
than demeaning and offensive.  In his testimony, J. H. Boney said indignantly, “The 
railroad had provided separate cars for the two races, but we are white men, and the 
conductor ordered us to go into the colored car.”233  The plaintiff Merritt brought suit 
under the North Carolina statute that required “separate but equal accommodations for 
the white and colored races on all trains carrying passengers.”234  The Jim Crow statute 
provided a private right of action to “any passenger on any train…which is required to 
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furnish separate accommodations to the races.”235  Merritt sued the railroad for its failure 
to provide him separate accommodations under the act, and a Sampson County jury 
rendered judgment in the plaintiff’s favor for $100.   
 Justice Brown, writing for the court’s majority held that the railroad had complied 
with the statute.  It furnished two separate cars for their black and white customers.  Even 
if the conductor erred in instructing white passengers to sit in the Jim Crow car, the 
railroad could not be held accountable for the improper conduct of its conductors in 
assigning passengers to the already provided separate cars.236  The jury’s verdict was 
reversed and the plaintiff’s case dismissed.237  Merritt was never compensated for his 
one-time Jim Crow experience on the Atlantic Coast Line Railroad. 
 Clark’s dissenting opinion focused on the legal liability of the railroads for 
disregarding the segregation statute when applied to these poor white men.  After all, “an 
arbitrary conductor” had taken a statute intended “for all white men, not for some white 
men” and forced them to ride in the Jim Crow car.238  For Clark, the conductor’s action 
was a clear example of a corporate agent’s misdeeds.  If the statute allowed the railroad 
to avoid liability for its agents’ violation of the segregation statute, as the court’s majority 
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ruled, then “the statute is a delusion…the company through its conductor, is supreme, and 
not the statute.”239     
 In another context, railroads had successfully avoided liability for injuries caused 
by fellow servants to their coworkers.  In this instance, an agent of the railroad, the 
conductor, once more provided a shield from corporate liability.  The conductor’s 
authority over passengers, his role as the “Alter Ego of the company,” its “only visible 
and, indeed, sole representative” led Clark to argue that the railroad should bear the 
responsibility of such errors of judgment—in this case discriminations against common 
white laborers.240  Moreover, in Merritt the conductor did not simply make an incorrect 
judgment about the race of a passenger, Clark complained, but the conductor (and by 
extension the corporation) assumed the power to nullify a public statute.241  
As Clark argued that the Merritt case presented a form of segregation that ignored 
the rights of common white men, he similarly argued that lynching was a problem bred of 
a lack of faith in democratic processes.  Although Clark criticized the lynch mob’s 
actions, he spent far greater amounts of ink blaming legal delays, elitism, and legal 
privilege for leading lynch mobs to “protect themselves when the law does not.”242  Clark 
attacked the state’s “slow and cumbersome” legal system as the primary cause of 
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lynching.  Between State Supreme Court decisions that overturned jury verdicts on 
technicalities, a legal structure of criminal trial requirements that heavily benefitted the 
defendant, and elites who attempted to limit application of the death penalty in murder 
cases contrary to public will, Clark blamed all of these for undermining the will of the 
community to see criminals convicted by juries and punished soon thereafter.  As a result, 
Clark perceived lynchings as “a protest of society against the utter inefficiency of the 
court.”243   
Two things stand out about Clark’s arguments pertaining to lynching.  First, he 
refused to acknowledge the racial nature of lynching as an extra-legal punishment.  
Second, instead of racial antipathy, the true culprits were the courts, lawyers, and the law.  
In a case that preceded Merritt by several years Clark’s views on lynching and 
segregation intersected in State v. Cole.  In the fall of 1902, a group of black men—Joe 
Cole, Joe Cole Jr., John Jones, and three or four friends—boarded a train in Norlina, 
Virginia, bound for North Carolina. As Captain Clements moved through the second-
class white compartment of the train, he came upon Joe Cole and his companions and 
claimed they were drunk and “singing boisterous songs.”244 After instructing them to 
quiet down and move to the Jim Crow car, some of the men resisted.  One stated they 
would “go when we get ready,” another grumbled to the conductor, “We’ve got first-
class tickets, and we are driven round this way?”  The conductor apologetically told them 
                                                          
243 Ibid.; State v. Alphonso, 124 N.C. 847, 860 (1899). 
 
244 State v. Cole, 132 N.C. 1069 (1903). 
 
138 
 
 
the men that “it was a State law, and the railroad had nothing to do with it.”  Then Joe 
Cole came back into the second class white car “roaring” to the assembled group, “We 
are all friends, we are all brothers; we'll all fight for one another, and we'll all die for one 
another.”  From there, the situation deteriorated rapidly.  After a physical altercation 
between the train’s porter, the conductor, and several of the group of black men, the 
roadmaster, Fred Stevens, entered the fray to try to restore order.245  Joe Cole leveled his 
gun at the advancing Stevens and shot him in the head at close range immediately killing 
him.  Joe Cole, Jr. then shot the porter, a wound that proved fatal days later.         
The state’s newspapers presented the event as not only a murder but also an attack 
on the state’s recently enacted segregation statute.  In a sub-headline The Wilmington 
Messenger proclaimed in bold type that those arrested, “Object to Jim Crow Law.”246  
The News and Observer considered the actions of the black men before the shooting in its 
sub-headline, “Six Negroes Invade First Class Car.”247  Numerous papers reported 
sporadic rumors of lynching but noted that for now all seemed calm and doubted that 
such an event would occur.248   
A trial court in Vance County convicted Joe Cole of first-degree murder and Cole 
appealed the decision.  His counsel argued that the judge, in error, denied his requested 
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jury instruction that there was insufficient evidence to prove premeditation.  The 
Supreme Court’s majority opinion, written by Justice Connor, agreed.  The trial judge 
should have given an instruction that insufficient time existed for the defendant to form 
the necessary premeditation to be convicted on a first-degree murder charge.  Yet the 
court also addressed itself to Justice Clark’s polemic dissent that included references to 
statistics on lynchings, murder, and capital convictions in the United States and abroad.  
These things were a deviation from “the orbit assigned to [the courts] by the 
Constitution.”249  Clark’s dissent risked, by going “outside of the record,” inviting 
“counsel to address us with arguments fit for other forums than this, and ourselves 
embark into unknown and unsafe waters.”250  This approach, the majority warned, “is not 
the example or teaching of the elders.”251       
Clark’s dissent argued there was sufficient evidence for premeditation.  Echoing 
the sentiments of the newspapers, he noted how the accused were “incensed at the legal 
requirement in this State for the separation of the races in cars,” and it could be sufficient 
evidence that the black men’s resistance to segregation, along with subsequent statements 
and actions, proved premeditation. Certainly, Clark reasoned, the evidence was at least 
sufficient to allow the jury to decide the matter.252    
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Yet the bulk of Clark’s dissent turned not on the definition of premeditation as it 
did on the “subversive” practice of lynching.  For Clark, the tragedy of lynching was not 
the death of the victim, whom Clark seemingly presumed to be guilty, but the “conflict 
between the public desire for the repression of crime and the execution of that will 
through their properly constitution public officials and servants.”253  With criminal 
statistics showing a significant increase in crime between 1890 and 1902, the only 
remedy was more certain punishment of criminals by the courts.254  After all, as Clark 
reasoned, London, a city with three times the population of North Carolina, suffered only 
twenty murders in contrast to North Carolina’s one hundred and ninety one.  The only 
explanation for this difference Clark could see was in “some defect in the execution of 
the laws.”255  And until it was remedied, lynching would remain “but one form of public 
protest…one from which only evil can come.”256  It was the white population, who paid 
taxes to sustain a court system that failed in its task of punishing criminals, which 
concerned Clark.  The men lynched were criminals who should have suffered death at the 
hands of the state.   
For Clark, it was decisions, like the majority opinion in Cole, which undermined 
public faith in the courts.  A local jury had reviewed the evidence and convicted Cole, 
and now the Supreme Court had undermined that democratic process and decision by 
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declaring a new trial and removing from the jury the judgment of whether there existed 
sufficient evidence of premeditation.  Once again, as in Merritt, Clark saw agents of the 
state thwarting a valid expression of public opinion—the jury’s verdict.  In this case the 
subversive villain was not a corporation, but instead, the state’s courts.  Yet the railroad 
in Merritt and the Supreme Court’s majority in Cole both presented a common kind of 
villain, an elitism that thwarted the collective will of North Carolina’s common white 
population expressing themselves through their role as electors and jurors.  
Conclusion 
 The conductor’s actions in Merritt and the majority’s opinion in Cole, although 
seemingly different from the other cases mentioned in this chapter, no doubt looked very 
similar from Clark’s perspective.  In an era where many Americans were suspicious of 
courts that nullified or limited progressive legislation, or overturned jury verdicts in civil 
and criminal cases, Clark’s progressive jurisprudence provided a source of confidence for 
the working class in the state’s justice system.  As Kansas governor, and later U.S. 
Senator, Arthur Capper, wrote to Clark, your “decisions…cannot fail to increase respect 
for our laws and courts.”257  At a time when many working-class Americans feared 
concentrations of wealth, corporate excess, and courts that often barred—or impeded—
legal recovery for injury or death, Clark’s progressive jurisprudence shared their concerns 
and imputed them into the law.  The Chief Justice’s decisions are consistent in the degree 
that they display a suspicion of concentrations of wealth and power and a tendency to 
keep a wary eye toward encroachments on the liberty of the common (white) man.  His 
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views of the common law left him less bound by judicial traditions like formalism that 
limited the effectiveness of many judges during the Progressive Era.  In addition, his 
willingness to fight in the public arena for the gains he made as a jurist, although they 
brought him great opprobrium from some during his lifetime, also helped to push North 
Carolina’s progressive movement ahead on issues like workplace injuries and child labor.   
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CHAPTER IV 
LEARNING, RELIGION, AND TOBACCO: THE BATTLE OVER PUBLIC AND 
PRIVATE EDUCATION 
 
 
There you have the “machine” disclosed.  Trinity is to run North Carolina.  
Dr. Kilgo is to run Trinity and the cigarette millions are to run him and to 
aid him to maintain his supremacy.  
—Walter Clark1 
 
 
In the summer of 1905 many of North Carolina’s leading figures sat in a crowded 
courtroom as legal counsel argued over a motion to non-suit a civil claim of libel.2  The 
defendants included the charismatic president of Trinity College, John C. Kilgo, and the 
wealthiest Trinity College trustee, Ben Duke.  The plaintiff, an elderly Methodist minister 
and book seller, Thomas Jefferson Gattis, sought $100,000 in damages for libelous 
statements made by Kilgo and published by the Trinity College Board of Trustees.3  Up 
to this point the case had stretched over seven years, three trials, and four North Carolina 
Supreme Court decisions4.  Two juries had awarded verdicts in Gattis’s favor along with 
five-figure damages, only to have their verdicts overturned by the Supreme Court.  This 
trial was to be the last, as a fourth Supreme Court ruling sustained the Superior Court’s
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declaration of non-suit, citing no evidence of malice on behalf of Kilgo and Duke.5  
Justice Walter Clark was conspicuously absent from all four of the Supreme Court 
hearings, having recused himself due to personal involvement in the Trinity College 
Board of Trustees.6   
 The controversy became public in the summer of 1898, sharing space in the 
state’s major newspapers with the Democratic Party’s White Supremacy Campaign.  The 
Charlotte Observer published news that Justice Clark had been asked to resign by 
Trinity’s board of trustees.  That request was based on an exchange of letters between 
Clark and Kilgo one year earlier, wherein Kilgo had accused the Associate Justice of 
spreading a “rumor” about him among the trustees.  The ensuing contest, and the lawsuit 
it spawned, occupied the press and the courts, created religious and partisan divisions, 
and threatened to end the tenure of Kilgo and the philanthropic generosity of the Duke 
family.  For both Clark and Kilgo the initial dispute quickly evolved into an act of 
political warfare from which neither dared back down.  Moreover, those following the 
events related the contest between Clark, and later Gattis, against Kilgo and Duke to the 
White Supremacy Campaign, the struggle against plutocracy, and the public education 
policy of the state.7   
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 Clark’s involvement in the entire affair allows us to further explore the sometimes 
complicated nature of his southern progressive worldview.  Indeed, Clark’s attack on 
Kilgo, and by extension Trinity, threatened to undermine an institution that would come 
to represent freedom of academic inquiry and the inclusion of women on an equal footing 
with men.  Yet, Kilgo’s rhetoric from the pulpit, stump, and president’s desk at Trinity 
College threatened to significantly cut funding to state universities, further imperil the 
state’s struggling tobacco farmers, and hamstring a host of local progressive legislation.  
Like many of Clark’s public battles, this one came with mixed results.  As Clark 
criticized the “machine” built by Kilgo and Duke, State Democratic Party Chair Furnifold 
Simmons used the White Supremacy Campaign to build a conservative political machine 
that would often frustrate Clark’s attempts at reform for the rest of Clark’s life.  
Regardless of the years of legal conflict, Trinity went on to prosper under Duke family 
patronage and Kilgo’s academic leadership.  Ultimately, Clark would use the 
accumulated political credibility as an anti-monopolist reformer to aid his 1902 campaign 
for the Chief Justiceship, as the enemies he acquired from his public conflict with Kilgo 
would unsuccessfully attempt to defeat his candidacy.     
Trinity: An Institution in Need of an Endowment 
Trinity College’s roots go back to a community school founded in 1838 in the 
town of Trinity, Randolph County, North Carolina.  Over the next six decades the college 
moved through many names: Brown’s Schoolhouse, Union Institute, Normal College, 
and finally in 1859, Trinity College.  The school served primarily poor and 
undereducated young men.  Its 1849 incorporation papers with the state denoted the 
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school’s role as a “people’s college”—dedicated to “the education of ‘poor boys.’”8  
Given the economically precarious position of the college’s students, and their parents, 
financial struggles were a consistent headache for leadership. Financial problems plagued 
the college as students were unable to pay their tuition charges. Methodist laymen were 
too impoverished to donate a sufficient sum, and the North Carolina Methodist 
conference, often as cash-strapped as its parishioners, failed to provide sufficient 
funding.9  In the ten years between 1875 and 1885 the college failed to pay its professors 
their annual salary of $1,000—in its best year it managed to pay only a little over half 
that sum.10  Yet while North Carolina Methodists sent little money, they continued to 
send their children. 11  Trinity College as an institution desperately needed a wealthy 
patron and an endowment. 
 The College also needed a new location.  Several factors facilitated this change of 
venue.  First, in 1887 Trinity hired its first northern president—John F. Crowell.12  
Crowell, born in Pennsylvania, had studied for a year at Dartmouth College and received 
his B.A. from Yale.  When he took over Trinity College it was the fourth largest college 
in the state.13  That ranking was largely the result of the state’s relatively poor educational 
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resources both public and private.  In 1887 Trinity had only one building, ten thousand 
uncatalogued volumes in its library, six professors, and barely over one hundred students 
taking classes.  The institution seemed anemic compared with the University of North 
Carolina at Chapel Hill, which boasted ten buildings, more than double the number of 
students, professors, and bound volumes, and an annual appropriation of $27,500 from 
the state legislature.14  It is little wonder that “Crowell toyed with the idea of giving it up 
and going home” on his first trip to Trinity’s campus that summer.15  Yet Crowell 
persisted and implemented numerous changes to improve the rigor of the college, 
including instituting entrance examinations, eliminating the preparatory program, and 
recruiting new faculty trained at leading colleges like Johns Hopkins.16 
Second, Crowell promoted “‘leavening the lump’ of public affairs” through direct 
engagement by the college and its faculty with important public issues.  Crowell himself 
directly urged the state’s legislature to enact progressive reforms ranging from greater 
funding for public schools to the establishment of credit banks for North Carolina’s 
struggling farmers.  Students at Trinity were also encouraged to analyze the controversial 
issues of their day.  The senior graduation theses of Trinity students increasingly dealt 
with current political issues, including those issues that would become important during 
the political controversies of the 1890s as the Populist Party influenced state and national 
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politics.  Yet such political involvement was complicated in rural Trinity, a town so far 
removed from main thoroughfares that “one could not buy a newspaper, get a haircut, or 
have a tooth pulled.”  If the university sought to influence public affairs, it would need to 
relocate.17 
Third, given the state’s poor allocation of resources to education, the pool of 
academically qualified students was small.  Despite a population in excess of 1.6 million 
people the school year of 1886-1887 college enrollment “in all types of institutions was 
less than 2,800.”  Consequently, institutions competed for students: jealously guarding 
their territory, keeping an eye on their competitors, and publishing hyperbolic claims 
about their curriculum.  In the 1890s this rivalry for students led to attempts by Baptist 
and Methodist leaders to freeze, or cut, public funding for state colleges.  For now, 
though, it helped to convince Crowell and the trustees that relocation of the college was 
essential to its vitality and growth.18     
 While the need to relocate seemed obvious to Crowell, the answer to the question 
of where to relocate to was less certain.  Both Raleigh and Greensboro expressed interest 
in becoming the new home of Trinity College.  The choice was made in fall of 1890 to 
relocate to Raleigh.19  In October President Crowell wrote Walter Clark, as a member of 
the relocation committee, to request aid in securing legislative authorization of the 
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college’s incorporation documents.20  Yet within a matter of weeks Trinity’s move to 
Raleigh came into doubt as Durham now eagerly competed for Trinity.  While Raleigh 
offered land and enough money to replicate their campus, Durham matched the offer plus 
a $50,000 endowment funded by Washington Duke.  Washington Duke’s son, Ben N. 
Duke, had joined the Trinity College Board of Trustees one year before Clark.  Both 
father and son were staunch Methodists and seeking philanthropic ventures for their 
growing wealth. With the Duke family invested financially and personally the board of 
trustees presumed “still greater gifts for the College at Durham…[and] consider the 
financial prosperity of the College as good as guaranteed.”21  Given the change Crowell 
wrote again to Clark in January, 1891, requesting Clark draw up a charter for the real 
property that would become the campus of Trinity College.22  The resulting act created 
the Trinity College Park municipality; an entity with its own governing officers and a 
legislative council composed of upper classmen and those over 21 years of age.23   
Although Clark never directly stated his sentiments toward the relocation to 
Durham, he likely would have preferred Raleigh.  As early as 1881 Clark worried about 
the growing power of tobacco manufacturers over the political process.  In the winter of 
1881 prominent Durham residents, including Washington Duke, pushed for the creation 
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of Durham County out of the northern and eastern portions of Wake and Orange counties, 
respectively.  Walter Clark was part of a group of prominent Wake County residents who 
organized a public rally in opposition to the creation of the new county.24  Privately, he 
wrote Augustus W. Graham, advising him on collecting signatures for a petition against 
Durham County to seek out “those who don’t want Blackwell & Co. to have a little 
county in which they will virtually appoint the members of the legislature & all the 
county officers.”25  The following week Clark wrote again, still optimistic about the 
chance of defeating the bill but worried that “Blackwell, Carr & Morgan are hard at work 
trying to change votes.”26  Clark was referring to William Blackwell, Julian S. Carr, and 
Samuel T. Morgan; all three were wealthy industrialists.  Blackwell owned W.T. 
Blackwell and Co. Tobacco (owner of the famous Bull Durham label tobacco), and 
Samuel Morgan owned the Durham Fertilizer Company; Julian Carr was heavily invested 
in both companies as well as textiles, banking, and railroads.  W. Duke & Sons Tobacco 
Company was only just recently incorporated in 1881.27   
Clark’s concern about tobacco money corrupting local and state politics would 
soon transition to the Duke’s wealth and influence over Trinity.  In a significant, but 
merely coincidental, development during the same weeks that Ben and Washington Duke 
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offered Trinity a generous endowment in exchange for its relocation to Durham, James B. 
Duke chartered the American Tobacco Company in New Jersey—capitalized at 
$25,000,000, with James B. Duke as president.28  The Duke family had brought to 
Durham a new college and a new corporation.  The College’s growth was nowhere near 
as impressive as that of the American Tobacco Company, which controlled over 90 
percent of the country’s paper cigarette business.  Yet, the combination wedded tobacco, 
Trinity, and the Dukes together in the public mind, setting the groundwork for future 
debates over the influence of the tobacco trust over education at Trinity.29  
For a while those debates slumbered with Crowell as president of the college.  
The faculty continued to expand with new additions from colleges like Johns Hopkins.  
The student body maintained its interest in political issues, with one student, Luther 
Hartsell, writing articles critical of trusts and even calling the American Tobacco 
Company a “large monster.”30  Yet conflicts with some of the trustees and the Methodist 
Conferences plagued Crowell’s administration in Durham.  In 1893, with a rumor 
circulating that the Dukes would withdraw their support unless Crowell voluntarily 
resigned, the infuriated president offered the board his resignation.  The board refused to 
accept it and Crowell continued on through the next year.31 Yet his time was limited, as 
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angry (and often unpaid) faculty, lukewarm students, and Methodist Conference 
meddling led Crowell to seek employment elsewhere.  Crowell wrote Clark one month 
after he resigned the presidency and implored him to consider contending for the 
presidency of Trinity: “I want to know so I may have the assurance of the college’s being 
in the safest possible hands.  I would like exceedingly to put your name in nomination.”32  
Industrialist, and trustee, Julian S. Carr, also wrote Clark to similar ends, “I am for you 
first, last and all the time, if you will allow your name presented to the Board.”33  With 
Clark’s interests almost always prioritizing political concerns, he declined the potential 
nomination.  As it was, Clark was actively engaged in preparing for the 1894 election to 
renew his Associate Justiceship and was soon to be embroiled in a small controversy that 
summer, as his Democratic Party allegiance was questioned when he refused to disown 
his nomination to, and position on, the tickets of both the Republican and Populist 
parties.34  With Clark and other local candidates turning down offers of nomination, the 
college’s board of trustees looked elsewhere.  Whereas they had looked northward for 
Crowell, this time they looked south toward South Carolina’s John C. Kilgo.  And in the 
summer of 1894, Kilgo took over as president of Trinity College.  The financial problems 
and distractions of the Crowell era would soon be replaced by the political controversies 
of the Kilgo era.35  
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The Clark-Kilgo Controversy 
Kilgo arrived in North Carolina with a reputation as a Tillman-ite in his political 
sentiments—a pro-silver Jeffersonian.  Clark likely expected the incoming president to 
share his belief in what Clark’s biographer described as “Jeffersonian democra[cy],” as 
well as his fervent faith in bimetallism.36  Indeed, Clark remarked during a public speech 
at Kilgo’s inauguration that he believed Kilgo a worthy successor to Craven and Crowell.  
No doubt Clark applauded the sentiments expressed by Kilgo in the first year of his 
tenure that “society must be made more democratic…character and not money must be 
enthroned.”37  President Kilgo and the Dukes soon found themselves closely aligned and, 
soon after, maligned together by the state’s anti-monopoly politicians and newspapers.  
Although the Dukes had already given a significant sum to the university, their giving 
during Kilgo’s presidency would dwarf past contributions.  Robert Durden’s history of 
James B. Duke describes Washington Duke as “captivated by Kilgo.”  Ben Duke, 
described Kilgo as “one of the greatest and best men in every way I have ever know.”  
For his part, Kilgo shared the sentiments of the Methodist Conference paper, The 
Advocate, as it “prais[ed] ‘consecrated wealth’ and…Andrew Carnegie’s new Gospel of 
Wealth.”38  And since the college still sought to build a substantial endowment to put a 
permanent end to the scramble for money that had defined its existence since the 
                                                          
36 Brooks, Fighting Judge, 103; PWC, Vol. I, 361-363. 
 
37 Durden, Bold Entrepreneur, 90-91; Robert F. Durden, The Dukes of Durham, 1865-1929 (Durham, N.C.: 
Duke University Press, 1975), 108-109. 
 
38 Porter, Trinity and Duke, 24. 
 
154 
 
 
beginning, the Dukes were the closest and wealthiest potential patrons.  The new 
relationship between Kilgo and the Dukes paid off quickly.  In 1895 Washington Duke 
pledged his first gift since the relocation: $50,000 contingent on the conference raising 
$75,000.  And the following year Washington Duke made another donation,  time of 
$100,000, to the university on the condition it admit female students, “placing them on an 
equal footing with men.” 39 
With a new president, more secure funding, and a steady stream of Methodist 
youth applying, there was reason for substantial optimism about prospects for Kilgo’s 
tenure at Trinity.  Yet a series of events, beginning in 1897, would bring about a 
controversy that publicly distracted and undermined Kilgo for nearly a decade.  Other 
scholars have presented the controversy between Justice Clark and President Kilgo as a 
battle over academic freedom for faculty.  Kevin Walters argued in his article Balancing 
Freedom and Unity: John Carlisle Kilgo and the Unification of Methodism in America 
that it was “Kilgo’s advocacy for academic freedom [that] soon put him at odds with 
several prominent North Carolinians including Judge Walter Clark.”40  Indeed, Kilgo’s 
supporters similarly argued that the controversy was an attempt to limit academic inquiry 
at Trinity College.  The board measure in dispute, the rumor spread by Clark, and the 
letters subsequently exchanged between Kilgo, Clark, and members of the Trinity board 
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of trustees show that the fundamental issue was not academic freedom for faculty, but the 
undue influence of great wealth in social institutions.  
The controversy began in June 1897, when John Kilgo sent a terse note to 
Clark—a note pregnant with potential controversy.  Earlier that month the Trinity trustees 
had met and a special committee, which included Clark, was appointed to consider a 
proposal to offer faculty four-year contracts instead of the traditional one-year contract.  
Clark thwarted the proposal by warning of potential “legal entanglements.”41  Kilgo’s 
letter questioned the veracity of that statement and indirectly accused Clark of suggesting 
Kilgo sought “the presidency of Trinity of College for a longer term.”42  The letter 
betrayed Kilgo’s sensitivity about the security of his position at Trinity.  Clark’s response 
only exacerbated the situation as, over the course of several letters that summer, Clark 
refused to admit his statement while demanding to know the informer’s identity.  Finally, 
in July, Kilgo released the name of his informant, J.G. Brown (a trustee and Clark’s 
personal banker), and Clark conceded he said essentially what Kilgo had accused him of 
in the first letter.43  Clark bristled at the intrusion into presumably privileged board 
member discussions, and his comments betrayed Clark’s growing opposition to Kilgo’s 
presidency:          
 
The growing opposition to you, which has become intense with many, in 
the tobacco section especially; your reported speeches attacking the 
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honesty of silver men (who constitute nine-tenths of the white men of 
North Carolina); the attacks you have made on the State University; the 
quarrels you have managed to get up and keep up…have created 
antagonism which must shorten your stay, unless you are protected by a 
four years’ term or some influence not based on public esteem.44  
 
Clark continued in the next paragraph, now including the Dukes in his attack: 
 
The charges in public prints, however, intimating that the consideration of 
the gift by members of the Tobacco Trust to Trinity was that the youth 
were to be proselyted and taught political heresy foreign to the faith of 
their fathers, would have had small effect with so just a people as ours, if, 
by your parade of your gold standard views (which must have an untoward 
effect on the minds of the young men in your care), and your 
reiterated…assertions of your superiority to public opinion had not given 
color to their charge.  If [you] persever[e]…wealthy syndicates may give 
you money, but the public will not send you boys.45   
 
Although Clark’s letters do not mention any plan to move against Kilgo, it is 
likely that his conversation with fellow trustee, J.G. Brown, was an early effort by Clark 
to test the waters for action against Kilgo. It was an action that backfired badly.  Not only 
did the conversation reach Kilgo, but also when the Trinity College president brought up 
the accusation to the board of trustees in June 1898, the trustees adopted a resolution 
requesting that Clark voluntarily resign from the board.  Clark was not present at the 
meeting and only received notification thereafter in a short letter from the secretary that 
enclosed the board’s resolution.46     
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 As the argument between Clark and Kilgo escalated, North Carolina descended 
into the throes of the virulently racist White Supremacy Campaign.  The Democratic 
Party had organized a host of speakers to spread throughout the state “the cry of Negro 
domination.”  That group included future education governor Charles B. Aycock and 
News and Observer editor Josephus Daniels.  In addition, state Democratic Party Chair 
Furnifold Simmons sought to capture the vote of business interests and religious interests 
(primarily Baptists and Methodists) who were not as easily moved by emotional appeals 
to fears of Negro domination.  Simmons promised two years of no new taxes for 
businesses and no new appropriations for the state college at Chapel Hill.47  Trinity found 
itself caught in the middle of the turbulent campaign.  Its chief patrons, the Duke family 
members, were longtime Republicans, carriers of the pejorative “scalawag” since 
Reconstruction.  The Dukes themselves were caught up in the complicated politics of the 
Fusion Era.  The Dukes were part of a disliked Republican minority in central North 
Carolina.  Many of their managers, business partners, and neighbors were Democrats; 
despite the unseemly politics implications for both sides, the Dukes invested in the 
newspaper stock of The Caucasian (a Populist Party paper owned by Populist Sen. 
Marion Butler) and still maintained support for the Republican Party and its candidates.  
Unlike its contributions to The Caucasian, the Dukes status as Republicans was common 
knowledge.  And although Kilgo declared non-affiliation with any party, his pro-
                                                          
47 Edmonds, The Negro and Fusion Politics in North Carolina, 138-140. 
 
158 
 
 
corporation, gold bug views were anathema to the anti-corporation elements in the 
Democratic and Populist parties.48 
 In the contentious atmosphere of Fusion Era North Carolina, Kilgo’s comments 
were deliberately provocative and divisive. Yet given the chance to repudiate Kilgo, the 
board of trustees voted to support Kilgo and ask for Clark’s resignation.  Moreover, one 
of the trustees leaked the board’s decision to the Charlotte Observer—a conservative 
paper that was an old political adversary of Clark. 49  Clark saw in the board’s decision 
and the disclosure to the press a plan to stigmatize him and placate the Dukes:  
 
As there were expressions in my letter not gratifying to those who make 
their millions by illegal trusts (at the expense of the toiling masses) there 
were doubtless some who felt it was necessary to propitiate them by 
condemning, unheard, the man who had been bold enough to let it be seen 
he did not fear “injustice though wrapped in gold.”50      
 
As Clark’s resentment of the Duke family’s contributions to Trinity, and his suspicions of 
its effects, surfaced, Clark charged the board’s action was done “to soothe Dr. Kilgo’s 
vanity and to please the Trust that more money might be obtained from it.”51   
 His letter to trustee James H. Southgate Clark established a series of charges that 
would echo through the state’s courts and newspapers for nearly a decade.  First, as noted 
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above, Clark appealed to anti-corporatism and decried Kilgo’s alleged “affluence of 
sycophancy” and “deification of wealth.”52  Second, he appealed to progressive concerns 
regarding corruption, he accused Kilgo of being a “wire-puller” and a “ward politician 
type.”53  Lastly, that Kilgo was complicit in making Trinity “an annex of the Duke’s 
cigarette factory—an asset of the trust.”54  Clark also bristled at how the politically 
conservative views of fellow trustees never served as a reason for removal from the 
board.  He reminded Southgate of a meeting one year before when the board passed a 
resolution endorsing the common school system; a resolution that trustee Southgate 
vocally opposed and labeled “socialism.”  Clark chided, “Such language coming from the 
President of the Board of Trustees of Trinity College is more calculated to damage the 
College than my views of Kilgo.” 55   
 Clark’s letter to Southgate followed his usual predilection for writing judicial 
opinions, telegrams, and letters as documents meant for public consumption, intended to 
appeal to the anti-corporate sentiment strong among many poor and middling white 
farmers and anti-ring public sentiment to appeal to progressive professionals in the state.  
Clark skillfully manipulated public opinion as he labeled the Duke Tobacco Trust a 
“cow” that “makes her milk by eating up the collard patch of other people,” and Kilgo 
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Trinity’s “artist in milking” that cow.56  He appealed to Methodists to remember when 
the university “stood broad-based on popular support….Such sentiments as we now hear 
did not then echo from the President’s chair.”57   
It was an appeal to majoritarian sentiment against a seemingly elitist, and corrupt, 
combination of a few powerful men controlling Trinity College.  His appeal was well 
suited to the politics of the fusion era.  It elicited letters from some who lamented there 
was no way “to run that [tobacco] trust out of N.C.”; others simply said “thank God for 
our judge Clark”; and even from a former Trinity faculty member that called the trustees’ 
actions “inquisition methods.”58  B.B. Nicholson, successful Democratic candidate in the 
1898 North Carolina House election, wrote Clark “they are averse to you greatly… 
because they seem to think you are too anti-corporation [of a] Justice; that you are too 
populisitic in politics; that you write too much on subjects other than law.”59 
For his part Kilgo was equally forceful and eager to cross swords in the public 
eye.  Despite asking Clark to resign because his private words to Brown might damage 
Kilgo “personally and, if true, the institution,”  Kilgo further escalated the controversy by 
demanding the college’s board of trustees hold a trial to examine the veracity of Clark’s 
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charges against him.60  Clark had already begun collecting evidence against Kilgo.  In 
August Clark sent A.W. Graham to track down witnesses in North Carolina who could 
testify to Kilgo’s character, sent letters to inquire about Kilgo’s reputation in South 
Carolina, and sought evidence of Kilgo using his power at Trinity to suppress academic 
inquiry.  Sometimes these requests came back bearing fruit—a witness.  Other times they 
revealed a witness allegedly bought off or intimidated, leading Clark to complain, “I had 
rather fight a dog with a spade than an unprincipled preacher-demagog [sic].”61  And 
other times, the search led to hearsay evidence.  For instance, in August 1898, Charles 
McIver, President of the State Normal and Industrial School (now UNCG), wrote Clark, 
“Prof. C. L. Raper…told Prof. Claxton that on one occasion he knew of a certain subject 
to be proposed for a debate among the students of Trinity College, and that the faculty 
prohibited them from debating the subject…it either touched the labor question or trusts 
or some such modern topic.”62        
 Clark and Kilgo’s similar personalities fueled the contest.  Both men were 
accustomed to being right, skilled in leading public opinion, and saw themselves as 
champions of their respective causes.  Kilgo came into the state in 1894 promoting an 
agenda of Christian education.  He defined Christian education as “that education that 
assumes Christ’s estimate of all things and seek to develop manhood in the light of His 
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ideals and by His methods and inculcates His truths as the fundamental truths of personal 
and social character.”63  Kilgo found a receptive audience among many Methodists, 
Baptists, and Presbyterians.  Since the early 1880s these denominations have maneuvered 
behind the scenes in the legislature and in the editorial space of North Carolina’s 
newspapers against “unfair competition” of the state university which provided free 
tuition at taxpayer expense.64  Kilgo’s tenure coincided with a revival of these efforts by 
the state’s Baptist Conference and spearheaded by Josiah W. Bailey’s Biblical Recorder.  
By 1896 Kilgo had aligned himself with Bailey in a campaign to end free college 
education provided at state expense.  Yet Kilgo’s rhetoric went even further as he toured 
the state from 1896-1898.65   
John Webster, a Democratic newspaper editor, and former Speaker of the North 
Carolina House, recounted that in a public speech Kilgo had referred to the state’s public 
schools as “baby ranches into which parents, careless of their children, pitched them” and 
stated that were he “looking for vice and immorality he would…[look] into the [state’s] 
graded schools.”66  On other occasions Kilgo warned North Carolina crowds of the 
dangers of public universities in Europe that had “atheism in state education,” and 
consequently, “produced a crop of infidels and anarchists in France and Germany.”  And 
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as the race became the central issue of the 1898 campaign, that summer Kilgo chided a 
crowd “the blackest negro in the State could walk up to the young man who accepted 
[free tuition at the state college] and say, ‘I helped pay for your education.’”67  In Kilgo’s 
summation parents who used public schools were careless, and students who attended the 
state universities were to be inculcated in socialism and anarchism, and even their claims 
of white superiority would be tarnished by the contribution of black taxes toward their 
children’s education.  In addition, Kilgo continued to accuse North Carolina’s farmers, 
gripped in the final years of the panic of 1893, of “laziness” and “trifling.”  Clark even 
produced an affidavit that Kilgo had told a crowd that the “average woman can be led 
anywhere by a diamond ring.”68  Colonel E. J. Holt wrote Clark, “His slander of the 
women of N.C. is meaner and worse than that of the negro editor, Manly.”69  Although 
few North Carolinians likely shared Holt’s opinion, it is a sign of the degree to which the 
White Supremacy Campaign become a touchstone for all things political in the state. 
Gattis v. Kilgo: A Series of Trials 
 In September 1898, Trinity College Board of Trustees met to conduct a trial of 
President John C. Kilgo.  Kilgo himself requested the unusual proceeding as a means to 
clear his name.  The board offered Justice Clark the opportunity to serve as prosecution, 
but Clark declined the opportunity.  Instead, Dr. Oglesby, a board member and the pastor 
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of the Duke family’s church, was selected as prosecutor.  Several weeks were allotted for 
all parties to collect evidence before the trial.  The allotted time was insufficient, as Clark 
complained that without compulsory process to obtain testimony, “Kilgo’s machine & 
Duke’s money has frightened off all they could.”70  Heading into the week-long trial 
before the board of trustees, Clark lamented “the jury is packed, the witnesses are 
bulldozed.”71 
 The trial began with a host of requests by Clark that were quickly overruled.  
First, Clark claimed that the board had already passed on these matters earlier in July 
when they requested Clark’s resignation and so could not be considered an impartial jury 
of the charges at hand.  Moreover, certain members of the board had already made public 
statements that showed they had already reached a conclusion on the charges.  For 
example, Rev. N.M. Jurney publicly stated to friends, “I [will] stand by Dr. Kilgo and 
Trinity College and fight for them until they knock my teeth out, and then I [will] chew 
for them with my gums.”  Clark also challenged the involvement of Ben Duke, given his 
interest in the outcome of the proceedings.  Second, Clark objected to the use of Kilgo’s 
private secretary as reporter.  When that objection was overruled, Clark requested the 
reporter be sworn in, which was also overruled.  Lastly, Kilgo moved to have the fifth of 
the five counts against him (his reputation in North Carolina) excluded.  Despite being 
overruled by Chairman Southgate, on appeal the board sustained Kilgo’s motion.72  With 
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the board already set against convictions and the bulk of Clark’s evidence excluded, the 
outcome seemed predetermined.  At the conclusion of the hearing Clark asked to present 
a closing argument he had written for the occasion.  Kilgo proposed that it only be 
allowed provided Clark agreed not to publish it in any outside forum.  The board 
sustained Kilgo and Clark’s argument went unheard, although it would subsequently be 
published in several North Carolina newspapers.73  With a favorable outcome seemingly 
in hand President Kilgo shifted his attention away from Clark toward Clark’s most 
crucial witness—Thomas J. Gattis.  Kilgo presented Justice Clark as “falsely dealt with 
by some common gossiper.”  He insisted, “You cannot make...[me] believe, you never 
will do it…[that] Judge Clark…would have made a charge like  without believing he had 
just grounds upon which to make it.”74  Kilgo blamed Gattis, an elderly Methodist 
minister and bookseller, and labeled him “the original gossiper.”75    
The verdict that cleared Kilgo only began a new, even more public, phase in the 
controversy that lasted from 1899-1905.  Promptly, both Clark and Kilgo published their 
respective closing statements in multiple newspapers.76  Moreover, the board, with Ben 
Duke’s authorization, published ten thousand copies of a blue book of the hearings.77  
The blue book contained Kilgo’s statements against T.J. Gattis and formed the primary 
                                                          
73 Ibid., 115. 
 
74 Quoted in Ibid., 114. 
 
75 Ibid., 115. 
 
76 Ibid., 115, 119. 
 
77 “Arguing Motion to Non-Suit,” Raleigh Morning Post, June 16, 1905. 
 
166 
 
 
evidence in the subsequent libel trials against Kilgo and Duke. The libel trials would 
possess three features lacking from the trial before the board: a local jury drawn from 
primarily rural communities; the necessary legal mechanisms to compel testimony; and a 
forum open to the public and the press.  The difference in forum and jury produced 
verdicts in the first two trials of $20,000 and $15,000, respectively.78  Yet in both cases 
the North Carolina Supreme Court ordered new trials on evidentiary issues.  Clark 
recused himself from both cases due to his personal involvement, yet Clark remained 
involved in the case.  Lead counsel for Gattis included Cyrus “Cy” Watson, one of 
Clark’s closest friends and supporters, and A.W. Graham, Clark’s brother-in-law.   Kilgo 
and Clark’s defense included some of the state’s leading counsel, even Governor Charles 
B. Aycock who argued three of the four cases for the defense.79  In the end Gattis’s 
attempts at recovery for libel ultimately failed.80   
Conclusion: From Kilgo to Simmons 
The controversy between Clark and Kilgo, although publicly replaced by that 
between Gattis and Kilgo, continued.  As Clark sought the nomination for the Chief 
Justiceship in 1902 the 1898 confrontation remained relevant.  Foremost, the conflict 
added to Clark’s reputation as a popular hero of democratic and anti-monopoly 
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sentiment.  Clark’s supporters echoed the sentiments of the Farmer’s Friend published 
during the trial of Kilgo before the board: 
 
The banks and the railroads and the Cigarette Trust…do not like Judge 
Clark, and they have good reason for not liking him.  On the bench and 
off, with tongue and pen, through magazine and newspaper, he has sought 
to make them bow their proud necks to the yoke of law—the law which 
yokes you and me so readily.  This is his true offence and for this he has 
received such punishment.81 
 
It was a public image that Justice Clark himself relished and his friends cultivated.  In a 
private letter, later published, Clark compared his adversaries to “enemies of the people” 
and himself to “the patriot orator of Athens [Demosthenes].”82  Cy Watson, lead counsel 
for T.J. Gattis in all four of his libel suits, stated during the trial (and repeated during 
Clark’s 1912 senatorial campaign) that “the people of North Carolina can lie down in 
security while Judge Walter Clark guards their interests.”83 
 Of course, increasing credibility as an opponent of the plutocracy came with 
redoubled efforts to defeat Clark’s political aspirations.   In spring 1902 Clark saw his 
primary opposition as a combination of “[Western Union], the ‘Southern [Railway Co.]’ 
& the ‘Cigarette Trust’ (all Republican concerned).”  Moreover, he worried about men at 
the county nominating conventions being on “retainer from [the] Duke-Kilgo crowd.”  
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Substantiating these fears were reports of “Three Kilgo preachers…[in] the crowd 
distributing Wilson’s [anti-Clark] pamphlets.”84 
Despite the opposition, Clark emerged with the nomination and, with the 
opposition virtually eliminated by the outcome of the 1900 election and the 
disfranchisement amendment, the office was nearly guaranteed.  Yet Clark did not take 
notice of an important development, the growth of a conservative Simmons political 
machine.  Formed at the height of the White Supremacy Campaign by an agreement with 
denominational and business interests in 1898, this agreement was detrimental to the state 
university, the state’s recipients of public programs, and its poor and middling taxpayers.  
The Simmons machine would go on to block reform legislation at the local level and the 
national level—via Simmons’s terms as U.S. Senator.  And perhaps of greatest 
importance to Clark, the same machine would halt his aspirations in the 1912 election 
when Simmons’s machine held Clark to approximately 10 percent of the vote in a three-
way race.85  When Clark protested the Simmons machine in 1912, it was too late.  Clark’s 
battle with Kilgo distracted him, and kept him from pushing (as he had in 1896) for 
Democrat-Populist Fusion. Moreover, with Republicans sidelined by the outcome of the 
1900 election, Clark’s perception of a dangerous Kilgo political ring, financed by the 
Duke family, to control educational, political, and ecclesiastical matters in the state could 
hardly be taken seriously.  Yet, as discussed in Chapter 7, the Duke family’s considerable 
                                                          
84 Walter Clark to A.W. Graham, May 8, 1902, in PWC, Vol. II, 15; Walter Clark to A.W. Graham, June 5, 
1902, in PWC, Vol. II, 36. 
 
85 Brooks, Fighting Judge, 185-187. 
 
169 
 
 
wealth would still buy access to power and influence.  The Clark-Kilgo controversy 
would be just one of two major conflicts between Clark and the interests of the Duke 
family. 
Almost two decades after the last of the Kilgo-Gattis trials, Upton Sinclair wrote 
Clark inquiring about the influence of the plutocracy on North Carolina’s denominational 
colleges.  Sinclair discovered in his research that, “Professors are frequently afraid to put 
their troubles into writing, but I am sure they would be willing to talk to you…and [you 
could] pass it along to me confidentially.”86  Although there is no record of Clark’s reply 
Sinclair’s The Goose-Step: A Study of American Education concisely told a story of Duke 
and Kilgo as if it had come directly from Clark’s pen.  In Goose-Step Sinclair summed up 
the Duke Machine: Duke “brought in a South Carolina minister of pliant principles, and 
made him president of the university, and this president never lost an occasion to chant 
the praises of his grand Duke.  The grand Duke had this chief chanter made a director of 
his Southern railroad, and wanted to have him made also a bishop of the church.”87 
 This book was part of Sinclair’s critique of the role of religious institutions and 
plutocrats on education in the United States.  This critique, at least as it concerned the 
undue influence of wealth on social institutions, mirrored Clark’s views of the potential 
corruption of education by close ties between the Duke family and Trinity.  Regardless, 
by 1924 that connection was completed, as Trinity College changed its name to Duke 
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University after James B. Duke’s creation of a $40,000,000 endowment that supported 
numerous charitable institutions in the Carolinas and the newly named Duke University.88      
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CHAPTER V 
 
RECONSTRUCTION AND REDEMPTION REDUX 
 
 
The real issue is shall his [J.P. Morgan’s] combination of London and 
N.Y. bankers who own our railroads continue to control N.C., select its 
governors, judges & legislatures or shall we control them.   
—Walter Clark1 
 
 
I have read [the Democratic Hand-book] through…Is there anything about 
free silver and the dangers of monopolies and trusts?  No.  What is on 
[the] first page?...On the first page there is but one thing.  What is it? 
“Nigger.”  
—Marion Butler2 
 
 
In March 1900 the galleries of the North Carolina Capitol building in Raleigh 
were filled with eager spectators.3  From the second-story gallery that encircled the lower 
floor of the North Carolina Senate, they witnessed a busy commotion of representatives, 
senators, lawyers, and witnesses (North Carolina’s political elites).  Both the participants 
and spectators were there for a rare and consequential event—the impeachment of two 
justices of the North Carolina Supreme Court.  While the events served as entertainment
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for many in the crowd who gasped, cheered, laughed, and hissed at the lawyers’ 
questions and the witnesses’ testimony, the events were of great political importance in 
North Carolina and the United States.4  The events were orchestrated to ensure success in 
the final act in overturning Reconstruction and the recent White Supremacy Campaign.   
The outcome would determine the fate of two-party politics and the civil rights of African 
Americans in North Carolina for over half a century to come.   
 The goal of the Democrats supporting impeachment was complete political 
supremacy in North Carolina.  Seeking to implement their legislative agenda and official 
appointments, the Democratic legislature encountered opposition from a majority of the 
State Supreme Court.  The Republican and Populist judges, elected in 1894 and serving 
eight-year terms on the court, would serve until 1902—too long to wait for many newly 
elected Democrats.  Eager to ensure perpetual one-party rule in North Carolina 
Democrats in the State House impeached Justices Furches and Douglas.  The State Senate 
was to determine their fate—acquittal or removal from office.  Democratic supporters of 
impeachment were certain that the removal of the justices from the court would clear a 
path for new Democratic official appointments, and more important, keep the planned 
disfranchisement law and its grandfather clause safe from judicial review.    
 While the White Supremacy Campaign of 1898 has been well and often 
chronicled by numerous historians, the narrative of that campaign remains incomplete.  
Histories of Fusion victories in 1894 and 1896, as well as histories of the White 
Supremacy campaigns of 1898 and 1900 have focused almost exclusively on the 
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legislature and the executive—ignoring the judicial branch.  While Helen Edmonds’s The 
Negro and Fusion Politics in North Carolina did an admirable job of addressing the State 
Supreme Court’s role in thwarting Democratic legislation, subsequent histories have 
ignored the role played by the State Supreme Court in the fallout from the Democratic 
victories in 1898 and 1900.5  The racist rhetoric of the summer of 1898 and the violent 
happenings during the Wilmington Coup have captured the overwhelming share of 
attention from historians researching the 1898 election in North Carolina.  The 
Democratic victory at the polls—secured through fraud, violence, and appeals to popular 
prejudice—is treated as the final event of the Reconstruction era; the tragic fall of the last 
successful biracial political movement in the South until the final decades of the 
twentieth century.  The Wilmington Coup often serves as an epilogue to the White 
Supremacy Campaign; further confirmation of the finality of Democratic victory by 
means fair and foul.  Yet there is a substantial element often left out of the narrative.  The 
Fusion majority on the North Carolina Supreme Court brought the struggle to preserve 
the gains of Reconstruction into the twentieth century.  Even if they ultimately failed, 
supplanted by a majority Democratic court in 1902, their struggle remains historically 
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significant to our understanding of the decline and fall of the last biracial state and local 
governments in the South until well into the twentieth century.     
 Clark’s role in this drama both reinforces and complicates Clark’s image and 
legacy as a progressive, reform-minded judicial statesman.  Clark’s cooperation with 
Fusion office holders (including the despised Gov. Russell and Sen. Butler) and both 
private and public criticisms of the Democratic Party provide an alternative path toward 
Democratic victory that focused on genuine progressive reforms instead of appeals to 
racial prejudice.  However, Clark’s dissenting opinions not only laid the groundwork for 
the impeachment trial but brought about a change in jurisprudence that would benefit a 
Democratic legislature eager to implement a slate of reforms harmful to local democratic 
control, free and fair elections, women’s rights, and agricultural and labor reforms—all 
positions Clark sympathized with or actively supported in editorials and public speeches.     
 The struggle between the new Democratic legislature and the Fusion Supreme 
Court naturally entangled outspoken Associate Justice Walter Clark.  His dissenting 
opinions in several controversial office holding cases, along with his testimony at the 
impeachment trial, were central to the case against the Fusion justices.6  Yet the victory 
of Democratic forces in the battle between coordinate branches of government would 
mark a setback for Clark’s vision of radical progressive reform in North Carolina.  
Moreover Clark’s cooperation with Fusion government officials (1894-1898) would test 
his lifelong ties with the Democratic Party, while his cooperation with Democrats seeking 
                                                          
6 Edmonds, The Negro and Fusion Politics, 211. 
175 
 
 
to impeach the Fusion justices would return to haunt him in 1902 when he campaigned 
for the Chief Justiceship.      
Walter Clark, Fusion, and the White Supremacy Campaign 
 The Democratic White Supremacy Campaign, with its connection to conservative 
elements of the Democratic party and compromised by its connection to the railroads and 
other business interests, posed a moral problem for Clark.  As a lifelong Democrat, the 
justice publicly lauded his allegiance to both the Democratic Party specifically, and more 
broadly, majoritarian white democratic government.  Between 1894 and 1898 Clark 
would sometimes privately sacrifice the former to expand the latter.  And when the 
Democratic Party attempted to reclaim control of the legislature in 1898, under cover of 
confidential communication, Clark sought to undermine Democratic victory in the 1898 
campaign.  Yet, Clark’s judicial philosophy would ease the path to absolute rule by the 
Democratic Party after the election.   
 For a man as public and outspoken as Clark, the justice was uncharacteristically 
silent about the White Supremacy Campaign.  He did not pen any editorials in support of 
the campaign, delivered no speeches on behalf of the campaign (as did many prominent 
North Carolinians), and had little correspondence with those running the campaign.  No 
doubt some of Clark’s time was diverted by his struggles with Dr. Kilgo and the Trinity 
College Board of Trustees.  Yet previously, Clark’s energy and work ethic had allowed 
him to manage a hectic schedule, so the Trinity controversy cannot totally explain Clark’s 
public silence.   
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 The answer can be found in Clark’s complicated relationship with the state’s often 
conservative Democratic Party.  In June 1894 rumors started to circulate that Clark might 
be selected as the Populist’s United States senate candidate and, a more widespread 
rumor, that the Populists would endorse Justice Clark as part of a non-partisan slate of 
Supreme Court candidates.7  In July Marion Butler confirmed the rumors and mentioned 
Clark’s planned endorsement by the Populist Party.  One judicial nominee, H.G. Connor, 
confronted with multi-party support, turned down the Populist endorsement.8  Clark, with 
the endorsement of all three major parties, remained in the race.  As a result, some 
questioned his party loyalty.  A letter to the Charlotte Observer labeled Clark a “doubting 
Thomas” and questioned his allegiance to the Democratic Party.9  Clark defended himself 
in a letter to the Observer the following day.  Employing an unusual defense for a judge 
as political as Clark, the justice cited judicial propriety as the reason why he stayed silent 
in the face of his multiple endorsements.  He pled his Democratic Party bona fides and 
protested, “I am not and have not ever been at any time a candidate for any nomination 
other than the democratic nomination.”10  Nevertheless, his letter also did not repudiate 
the endorsement; it only claimed that he had not deliberately sought it out.  Indeed, Clark 
admitted in his correspondence that the Populist endorsement caused him “genuine 
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surprise.”  Clark insisted that upon being endorsed he “immediately consulted…party 
leaders,” and his letter to the Observer reflected their counsel and their blessing.11       
 During the Populist-Republican legislative majority of 1894-1898, Clark often 
assisted Fusionist political ends—both openly and secretly.  On the eve of the 1892 
election, Clark penned a dissent, joined by only one other justice on a Supreme Court 
composed entirely of Democrats, to provide a more democratic interpretation—and 
Republican and Populist Party friendly—reading of the state’s election law.  At issue was 
an election law the Democratic legislature had passed in 1889 as a first attempt at 
disfranchising black voters.  The legislature copied a South Carolina law that required 
voters to supply place and date of birth information for voter registration.  Many black 
voters lacked sufficient knowledge of such details and could thereby be disqualified from 
voting, as Democratic registrars saw fit.12  And as with subsequent election laws aimed 
indirectly at black voters, often some white voters similarly found themselves 
disfranchised.  
In one case, Travis Harris, Republican, contested the outcome of the election of 
George Scarborough, the Democratic incumbent, as register of deeds of Montgomery 
County.  Harris sued when he discovered that the Democratic registrar had disqualified 
and thrown away ballots from voters who did not specifically identify their place of birth 
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or residence.13  The crucial question was whether the court could consider the registrar’s 
actions in failing to ask voters to clarify answers that he believed insufficient under the 
voting law he was employed to enforce.  The court’s three-justice majority upheld the 
lower court’s ruling and presumed the registrar had performed his duties.  Justice Clark 
dissented from the court’s reasoning and employed a more liberal, and democratic, 
reading of the election law.  Clark reasoned the registrar, whose job consisted of 
enforcing the law, knowing the answers insufficient, should have sought clarification at 
the time instead of later disqualifying the ballots.  Clark worried that the majority’s 
reasoning provided registrars the opportunity to “deprive [voters] of their constitutional 
right of exercising the right of voting.”14   
Seven years later, in Quinn v. Lattimore, the Supreme Court—with three 
Republicans, one Populist, and Justice Clark in the majority—unanimously overturned a 
lower court’s ruling and reinstated voters disqualified because they voted outside of their 
district or were not sworn before voting.  Justice Furches’s opinion held that voters acting 
in good faith should have their votes counted, and it was the registrar’s duty to ensure 
that voters not be unnecessarily disqualified.15  Clark’s construction of the Democratic 
voting law in 1892 and 1897 in both cases placed a Republican and Populist, 
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respectively, in office and placed a more democratic construction on the law passed by 
the Democratic legislature in 1889. 
 Most of Clark’s collaboration with elected officials outside of the Democratic 
Party did not share the public nature of the court’s decisions.  Not wanting to risk his 
position within the Democratic Party, Clark provided confidential assistance to prominent 
Republican and Populist officeholders.  He corresponded with both Republican governor 
Daniel Russell and Populist U.S. Sen. Marion Butler to advance progressive legislation in 
the state.  Clark and Russell had a great deal in common.  Both descended from the 
state’s small plantation aristocracy, growing up on eastern North Carolina plantations 
with over two hundred slaves employed thereon.  Their fathers had opposed secession 
only to be caught up in the wave of secession that swept the Upper South in 1861, and 
both boys enlisted at a young age in the Confederate Army eager to fight for the cause.16  
By the 1890s Clark and Russell shared a similar political vocabulary.  Attacking federal 
injunctions and corrupt railroad practices, Russell claimed, similarly to Clark, to be “on 
the side of the ‘producer and the toiler’ and against the ‘coupon clipper.’”17   
By 1897 Russell, elected governor the preceding year, was locked into a political 
battle with the state’s railroads.  The state’s Railroad Commission provided little 
assistance, as two of its three members sided with the railroads in tax and fare issues 
proposed by the governor.  Clark’s perennial dislike for the railroads made Russell and 
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Clark natural allies in the fight.  By early 1897 Clark acted as a go-between, attempting to 
talk his Democratic brother-in-law into accepting a nomination to the state railroad’s 
board of directors as part of Russell’s plan to create a “strong Board of Directors, 
irrespective of party.”18  Russell also sought to remove two of the three railroad 
commission’s members.  Citing a conflict of interest, Russell suspended commissioners 
James Wilson and S. Otho Wilson.  Years later Russell would allege the idea of 
suspending the commissioners originated with Clark as its “most active prosecutor.”19 
Meanwhile Clark also wrote frequently to Populist U.S. Sen. Marion Butler, 
seeking his help in influencing both state and national progressive legislation.  In national 
affairs he sought Butler’s aid with a host of progressive measures: government ownership 
of telegraphs; direct election of U.S. Senators; and Clark’s most earnest cause, the direct 
election of federal judges.  Clark and Butler exchanged drafted bills on such topics, with 
Clark pushing for action and Butler seeking advice on drafted legislation.  On the state 
level Clark implored Sen. Butler to return to North Carolina more frequently to push rate 
reduction and anti-free pass bills as, “My position on the court and the jealousy & 
criticism of a judge taking part in politics, prevent my getting round among the 
members.”  With votes on the anti-free pass and rate reduction bills closely split, Clark 
entreated the Senator, “Unless you are here there is no one who has the ability & 
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influence to save these bills….Unless you come & prevent it, the monopolies are in the 
saddle.”20    
 By March of 1897, Clark began looking toward the upcoming election. Instead of 
focusing on white supremacy—an issue Simmons would make dominate the 1898 
election—Clark believed the Democratic Party was doomed unless the election centered 
around the issue of railroad domination.21  Perceiving continued cooperation between the 
state Populist and Republican Parties as unlikely Clark hoped to see the Democratic Party 
carry the banner of anti-monopoly sentiment.  Indeed, Justice Clark congratulated A.W. 
Graham on accepting Republican Gov. Russell’s nomination to the North Carolina 
Railroad Board.  Having a Democrat on the board would benefit the party, as that way 
“the fight against R.R. domination shall not seem to exclude democrats from being on the 
people’s side.”22  Around this time Clark began to exchange letters with Gov. Russell 
mentioned above.  The exchange was meant to be kept confidential and Clark took great 
pains to ensure it remained secret.  In an undated letter, most likely penned in March or 
April, Clark wrote to Russell “there are spies watching your house and mine— is R.R. 
rule.”  Clark was later forced to acknowledge his correspondence with Russell during his 
1902 campaign for Chief Justice.  On several occasions the Charlotte Observer went so 
far as to publish the names of those who visited Clark’s house and, according to Clark, a 
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railroad agent even accosted a messenger carrying his mail to the local post office to 
check on the recipients of his correspondence.23     
Clark’s heightened desire for secrecy was not only due to his alliance with 
Governor Russell in pushing for the removal of the state’s Railroad Commission, ending 
the lease, free pass prosecutions, or even rate reduction.  In October 1897 the Washington 
Post reported that a conference was held at the North Carolina Governor’s Mansion to 
discuss forming a new political party with both Sen. Butler and Justice Clark in 
attendance.  The party would have its strongest base in the Populist Party voters but 
attract anti-railroad Democrats and Republicans.  According to the Post the move was 
deliberately aimed at undercutting the Democrats talk of running a White Supremacy 
Campaign “to re-establish the ‘white man’s’ party, and to make the color of a man’s skin 
the badge of democracy.”24   
While Clark never commented in his private letters on the meeting, Clark’s 
disillusionment with the Democratic Party can be inferred from several instances in his 
correspondence.  In December Clark wrote Sen. Butler about his plan to provide the 
Senator with a bill for the election of federal judges and appended a postscript: “If I were 
in the Senate, instead of the colleague you have, possibly I might help you in pushing 
these…reforms.”25  Clark’s statement perhaps hinted at a hoped for Senate nomination 
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should Populists emerge victorious in the 1898 election.  Several months later, in April 
1898, Clark again wrote Butler to complain that the upcoming election would be a “sham 
battle” because the railroads were already working to purchase the “nomination by each 
party of railroad judges, congressmen & legislators.”26  Moreover, Clark lamented that at 
the Democratic Party convention, in May of that same year, “Andrews was supreme”—
stacking the convention with Southern railroad lawyers.27  And in September, with the 
election less than two months away, Clark’s despair for the Democratic Party deepened.  
He wrote A.W. Graham, “The R.R.’s in confidence—have so taken possession of our 
party & contemplate such Revolutionary Measures…”28 Clark’s certainty that the 
Democratic Party, with its conservative agenda focused on white supremacy over 
economic issues, would lose the election proved wrong.  Through a combination of fraud, 
intimidation, and violence the Democratic Party emerged victorious in the election.  
White supremacy had triumphed over anti-monopoly sentiment. Clark’s hope for an anti-
railroad Democratic Party, or even a new party, appeared dashed in the electoral 
outcome.    
Democrats Ascendant, Fusion in Decline 
 With the success of the Democratic Party’s White Supremacy Campaign at the 
polls in 1898, Democrats gained a significant majority in the state legislature.  However, 
Republican Governor Russell remained in office as did Populist U.S. Sen. Marion Butler.  
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Moreover, the Fusion majority on the State Supreme Court remained—and outnumbered 
Democratic Associate Justice Clark four-to-one.  There also remained numerous 
appointed and elected Populist officials in state commissions and county boards with 
terms that did not expire until 1900 or later.  Fusion may have been defeated at the polls, 
but there remained an infrastructure of Fusion officeholders to attempt to recreate the 
victories of 1894 and 1896.  At the very least, these Fusion officeholders could serve as a 
stopgap until the political misfortunes of the Populist and Republican Parties could be 
reversed.29   
 It was this remnant of earlier Fusion victories that would frustrate Democratic 
attempts to establish one-party political rule in North Carolina.  Despite their ultimate 
lack of success, Republican and Populist officeholders pushed back against Democratic 
attempts to remove any and all political challenges to their dominance of North Carolina 
politics.  This drama would play out in over a dozen cases brought before the North 
Carolina Supreme Court between 1898 and 1901.  Populist and Republican railroad 
commissioners, board of education members, and even a shellfish commissioner resisted 
removal from office—and the loss of corresponding income and authority—through 
direct legal challenges to the actions of the state legislature.  Consequently, the attention 
of the state and the fortunes of the state’s political parties would be decided in a Supreme 
Court with a Fusion majority.  The struggles over these political offices would take on 
larger significance as Democrats in the state legislature worried that the politically 
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opposed court might frustrate their most significant legislative plan: their plan to 
disfranchise and segregate the state’s African Americans population.30   
 The struggle between the Democratic legislature and the Fusionist officials 
produced yet another conflicted outcome for Clark.  Even as Clark bemoaned the 
railroads power over Democratic politics, his dissenting opinions between 1898 and 1901 
established a means to undercut the last vestige of Fusionist power—the Supreme Court 
and various appointed public officials—and ultimately led to the attempted impeachment 
of two Supreme Court justices.31  Consequently the same Democratic Party that struck a 
bargain with businesses and railroads during the campaign, and sent the conservative 
Furnifold Simmons to the Senate, would be better able to implement its legislative 
agenda that was often at odds with Clark’s progressive ideals. Yet consistently, 
throughout the litany of office-holding cases, it was Clark’s progressive anti-corruption 
and (white) majoritarian sentiments that guided his decisions.   
 The membership of the court between 1898 and 1901 included Chief Justice 
William T. Faircloth and Associate Justices Robert M. Douglas, David M. Furches, 
Walter A. Montgomery, and Walter Clark.  Chief Justice Faircloth, a pre-war Whig and 
post-war Republican, had made his name as a corporate lawyer and banker in 
Goldsboro.32  Faircloth was a relatively Conservative member of the court and his 
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decisions were known for their brevity—often less than a page in length.  Justice Robert 
M. Douglas was the son of antebellum politician Stephen Douglas.  Although born in 
Rockingham, North Carolina, Douglas frequently travelled between his father’s homes in 
Washington, D.C., and Chicago, Illinois, and his maternal grandparents’ home in 
Rockingham County, North Carolina.  Too young to serve in the war, Douglas left his 
father’s Democratic Party to become active in Republican politics.  Douglas spent four 
years, 1869-1873, serving as President Ulysses S. Grant’s personal secretary.33  Justice 
David M. Furches, after a failed run for the governorship in 1892, was elected as 
Associate Justice in 1894.  Justice Walter A. Montgomery, born on a Warrenton, North 
Carolina, plantation with over one hundred slaves was elected as to the Supreme Court as 
a Populist in 1894.34  Since all of the justices were elected in either 1894 or 1896, their 
eight year terms were not set to expire until 1902 at the earliest—assuming they did not 
win reelection.   
 With the court’s four-to-one Fusion majority, the stage was set for a serious 
conflict between coordinate branches of the state government.  The Democratic 
legislature was eager to act quickly to set in stone its recent victory at the polls, and both 
Republicans and Populists were planning to regain lost ground.  The State Supreme Court 
would now have to mediate between the state legislature and Fusion officeholders.  The 
                                                          
33 William Powell, ed., Dictionary of North Carolina Biography, Vol. 2 (Chapel Hill: University of North 
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actions of the court led to conflict between the court and legislature that reached drastic 
proportions by 1901 when the House impeached two of the Fusion justices.  
Of Precedent and Political Power 
 The chief savior of Fusion officeholders, and the cause of friction between the 
court and the Legislature, was the doctrine of Hoke v. Henderson. 35  The North Carolina 
State Legislature jealously guarded its role as representative of the public will.  Indeed, 
North Carolina’s legislature did not even create a State Supreme Court until 1818.36  The 
case originated during a time in North Carolina political history when democratic forces 
were undermining the State’s Supreme Court—salaries were cut and the court almost 
abolished.  In one of its many attempts to democratize the court, the state legislature 
enacted a law in 1832 making the office of Clerk of Court elective.  Before the act clerks 
of court had been appointed by the legislature, and provided they posted their annual 
bond, the office would continue indefinitely—a life office.  Soon after the passage of the 
act, all but one of the state’s clerks of court resigned from office.37  The sole remaining 
clerk, Lawson Henderson of Lincoln County, refused to resign or stand for election.  
When the elected clerk, John D. Hoke, attempted to claim his office, Henderson brought 
suit to maintain his office.38   
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 Justice Thomas Ruffin, wary of further legislative intervention to weaken the 
courts, cautiously worded his opinion.  Wary that the exercise of judicial review to 
invalidate the 1832 Act might provoke the wrath of a hostile legislature Ruffin grounded 
his opinion in the sacred ground of contract and property rights.   The ruling was based 
on two fundamental arguments.  First, that public office is a form of property.  The 
legislature was free to discontinue an office or reasonably decrease the pay of the 
office—but it could not transfer the office between men.  Second, the taking of an office 
from one man and giving it to another constitutes a violation of property rights; a breach 
of contract between the state and the officeholder.39    
 The Hoke decision remained valid precedent when the new Democratic majority 
began enacting its legislative agenda in 1899.  Shortly after the Legislature convened in 
January 1899, it set about ousting Fusion officeholders and installing party loyalists.  
African-American North Carolina State Sen. Thomas Fuller noted that “Fusionist 
officeholders were made to resign by extraordinary pressure.”40  Fusion officeholders 
who remained despite the pressure saw their offices abolished by the State Legislature.  
Some, like the City Alderman of New Bern, were even threatened by statute with up to a 
$1,000 fine and one year’s imprisonment if they attempted to maintain their offices by 
any means—including legal action.41    
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 Between January and February 1899 the state legislature acted to remove 
reluctant Fusion officeholders whose terms had not yet expired.  In some instances, they 
transferred the duties of office from a single superintendent to a board of directors.  In 
other instances, they merely abolished the existing board and appointed a new board.  
The offices affected included county boards of education, solicitors of the criminal 
courts, the shellfish commissioner, and the directors of the state hospital, penitentiary, 
and railroad.  The offices varied in the source and amount of their emoluments.  The 
office of superintendent of the state’s prisons paid $2,500.  However, most offices paid 
considerably less.  Indeed, the office of director of the state’s railroad board paid only $3 
per year.42   
 Since all of the offices mentioned above were essential to the management or 
regulation of state and private resources, these offices could not be abolished 
permanently—thus avoiding the application of the Court’s decision in Hoke.  Instead, the 
legislature abolished the office and/or commission and subsequently resurrected each of 
them by a separate piece of legislation.  Often the abolition of a commission—and the 
related office(s)—and the statutory rebirth of the commission occurred on the same day.43     
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 The earliest of the officeholding cases resulted from an attempt to remove 
Fusionist Captain William Day from the position of superintendent of the state prison and 
replace him with a Democratic board of directors.  By February the News and Observer 
published a half-page article titled, “Capt. Bill Day Refuses To Go,” lamenting that Day 
“does not propose to give up his grip on the superintendency of the State’s Prison until he 
is thrust out by the courts.”44  On February 15, the legislature passed a special act 
authorizing the new Democratic board to “test in the courts the claims of any claimant or 
claimants to the possession, custody and control of the property of the State’s Prison.”  
The Wake County Superior Court ruled for the new board, and the case was appealed by 
Captain Day to the State Supreme Court.45   
 Populist Justice Walter A. Montgomery wrote the court’s opinion, reversing the 
lower court and reinstating Captain Day as Superintendent of the State’s Prisons.  After 
examining the 1897 Prison Act side-by-side with the 1899 Act the court found the 
Legislature had created “no new duties or powers” for the newly created board.   
Montgomery, citing Hoke as precedent, declared that “where the duties are continued the 
office is continued.”46  However, the political implications were significant and worried 
Associate Justice Furches who wrote a concurring opinion to stress the non-political 
nature of the majority’s decision making process.  Despite noting that “it seems to me 
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that the defendant’s claim is looked upon with disfavor as resting upon an act passed by 
the legislature of 1897,” Justice Furches spent most of his concurrence protesting that his 
motives were apolitical and his legal reasoning untainted by party bias.  Justice Furches 
insisted, “I propose to regard this Legislature just as I would any other Legislature, and to 
deal with its legislation just as I would any other legislation—just as I did the Legislature 
of 1895.”47    
 With the court already on the defensive Justice Clark’s dissent declared that the 
majority’s opinion was an assault upon the “inalienable right of the state to control its 
own institutions.”48  Reading Hoke narrowly Clark argued that the office of 
superintendent had been abolished, and with its abolition Day had lost any claim to the 
position.  Moreover, Clark claimed Hoke limited Day to recovering only the 
compensation due him for the office—not his reinstitution as the majority had decided.  
According to Clark, the broad reading of Hoke advanced by the Fusionist majority of the 
court turned officeholders into the equivalent of Milton’s fallen angels who could “only 
by annihilation die.”49  Subsequent office-holding cases would see Clark and the court’s 
Fusion majority drift further apart.  The majority continued to broaden Hoke—protecting 
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Fusion officeholders—while Clark loudly advocated the repeal of Hoke as an outdated 
and unwarranted precedent.50    
The day after the court’s opinion was released the News and Observer published a 
“synopsis of the Opinion of the Supreme Court” so the “lay reader could get a clear 
understanding of the whole question.”51  The News and Observer was laying the 
groundwork for an attack upon the Fusion court in the same way it had rallied the attack 
against the Fusion Legislature in 1898.  Moreover, the News and Observer was creating a 
“truly democratic and Jeffersonian” hero in Justice Clark, whose dissent was “a protest 
against the prevalent Republican tendency to exalt the executive and judiciary at the 
expense of the law making part of government.”52  Clark, for the time being, would serve 
as the judicial standard bearer of the Democratic Party’s drive to political domination.  
Time would show that both had radically different purposes, and those purposes would 
collide in the 1902 race for the Chief Justiceship.  For now, however, the allied resistance 
to Hoke and the Fusion majority on the court served the purposes of both Justice Clark 
and the Democratic Legislature.  
 The next two cases, closely related, of Bryan v. Patrick and Atlantic and North 
Carolina Railroad Comp. v. Dortch, tested the ability of the North Carolina Legislature 
to abolish the board of directors of the state railroad and recreate the board with new 
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membership.53  The new Democratic board was similar to the old board except that it 
expanded membership from eight to nine members and removed appointment power 
from the Governor and placed it in the hands of the Legislature.  In private conference 
Clark tried to impress upon the court the importance of scaling back Hoke and upholding 
the Legislature’s appointment of the new board of directors.  However, the Fusion 
majority once again decided to support the claims of Fusion office-holders against the 
newly appointed Democratic board.54    
 Clark assailed the majority opinion as “defy[ing] the will of the people, as 
expressed by their representatives.”55  It set the purposes of government at odds as it set 
“the salary of officers…[over] the right of the people to change the control of their state 
institutions.”56  Next, Clark, for the first time, presented a controversial argument, that 
perhaps Hoke v. Henderson should be overruled.  Even more controversial, at least to 
Clark’s formalist colleagues on the bench, Clark presented historical arguments to 
explain why the notable court—composed of North Carolina judicial luminaries Thomas 
Ruffin, William Gaston, and Joseph Daniel—had issued such a problematic precedent.   
Justice Clark noted the tenuous position of the State Supreme Court in the 1830s, “of 
legislative origin and without the present constitutional guarantees.”57  Its error was made 
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more apparent by the fact that “nowhere else has it ever been held by any court, in any 
country, at any time that there was or could be private property in a public office.”58  Yet 
the court’s majority did not agree and lamented that anyone would question the motives 
of the Ruffin court.59  Yet at the same time, Clark’s blistering dissents were already 
fueling public questions about the motives of the Fusion justices.60    
 Two more important cases remained to be heard by the court on the issue of 
officeholding.  The first, Theophilus White v. George Hill, concerned the office of 
shellfish commissioner for southeastern North Carolina.61  Republican appointee 
Theophilus White refused to abandon his office when the state legislature abolished the 
1897 Act to Promote the Oyster Industry in North Carolina and replaced it with the Act to 
provide for the General Supervision of the Shell-fish Industry of the State of North 
Carolina during its 1899 session.  The new act replaced White as Chief Inspector with a 
board of three commissioners.  On March 13 the new board arrived at the steamer Lillie, 
the mobile offices of the shellfish commissioner, to take possession of the ship.  Their 
demand for the ship’s logs was denied twice, before they finally returned with a local 
policeman who cleared the decks of the “stubborn crew.”  The News and Observer 
charged that “instructions…were left by [White] with the captain to resist.”62  Such a 
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charge was most likely accurate, as White continued to resist the efforts of the new board 
to supplant his role as chief inspector of shellfish.  Chief Inspector White brought suit 
against the new board seeking reinstatement.  The court’s majority, as they had done in 
the previous cases, compared the legislative acts side-by-side and determined that the 
“same general object [can] be found in both acts.”63  Once again, Clark wrote the sole 
dissent, calling the court’s attention to the anti-democratic nature of the Hoke decision.  
 The same day as the White case the court issued its ruling in another officeholding 
case—Abbott v. Beddingfield.64  The case concerned the state’s Railroad Commission.  
The Fusion commissioners had been appointed in April 1, 1897, by Republican Governor 
Daniel Russell.  The commissioners’ terms were meant to last six years, setting the end of 
their terms in April of 1903.  To remove these Fusion railroad commissioners the 
Democratic Legislature passed An Act to abolish the Railroad Commission and enacted 
An Act to establish the North Carolina Corporation Commission.  After another side-by-
side comparison of the repealed Railroad Commission Act and the Corporation 
Commission Act the court’s majority ruled that the Legislature had “re-enacted the Act of 
1891 in almost the very words in which it was originally enacted.”65  Then, in response to 
Justice Clark’s stinging dissent, Justice Furches ventured into dangerous territory.  Justice 
Furches insisted in the majority opinion that the Legislature incorrectly “thought they had 
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the right to…put the office…held [by Abbott] in the hands of a party in harmony with the 
political sentiment of that party which controlled the Legislature.”66  Justice Montgomery 
was so worried about this tact that he filed a one sentence concurrence to state that he did 
not “wish to be bound by that part of the opinion in which is discussed the motives of the 
members of the General Assembly.”67   
 Clark’s dissent in the Beddingfield Case was a scathing indictment of Hoke and 
the court’s Fusion majority.68  Clark’s dissent, almost three times the length of the court’s 
majority opinion, began by condemning attempts by the executive and judiciary to 
interfere with the Legislative branch going back to the English Bill of Rights of 1688.  
Hoke represented a part of this problematic trend and consequently needed to be 
discarded as bad precedent.  Its long existence was no excuse to continue to perpetuate an 
error.  Despite the majority’s hesitancy to question established precedent, Clark, quoting 
Lincoln, noted that “such matters are never settled, till they are settled right.”   Overruling 
Hoke would end the “continuous struggle between the people acting through their 
Legislature and the courts.” 69   
 As Clark’s thirty-plus page dissent continued, his political objections to Hoke 
began to emerge:  
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Nay, more, if some vast trust, some powerful combination of capital shall 
elect one Legislature, it can fill the offices for life, and a generation of 
men must pass away without any voice in, or control of, the government 
they created; for even a constitutional convention can not vacate offices, if 
office is a contract. Or if the same oppressive combination shall succeed in 
nominating and electing three members of this bench, it can, through 
them, for eight years at least, nullify and set aside any act of legislation 
which they may deem proper to hold unconstitutional.70  
 
Clark didn’t just fear the power of Hoke to preserve Fusion office holders—and thereby 
thwart the will of the state’s new Democratic majority— he also feared that Hoke might 
become the tool of corporate interests seeking to stifle reform movements through 
lengthy appointments or control of a majority of the court.  Indeed, Clark thought he was 
not just addressing a hypothetical, but a reality that was already taking place on the 
federal judiciary that had recently held the income tax unconstitutional in Pollock v. 
Farmer’s Trust.  Both the Fusionist State Supreme Court and the Federal judiciary were 
“in conflict with the spirit and express letter of the organic law and opposed to the 
manifest movement of the age.”71 Their undemocratic spirit was further confirmed by 
reliance on the Hoke decision, over two-thirds of a century old, which was itself the 
product of “Judges, educated under the old system of distrust of the capacity of the 
people for self-government.”  Clark directly criticized the court’s majority; “Court…has 
acted unconstitutionally and exceeded the powers confided in it.”72       
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 Despite the differing goals of Justice Clark and the Democratic Legislature, Clark 
received numerous letters from prominent Democrats that congratulated him on his 
dissenting opinion in Beddingfield.  John E. Woodward praised Clark as “unterrified by 
‘antiquated precedents’”; Locke Craig declared the dissent a “powerful stand for 
democratic representative government…the finest opinion that has emanated from the 
bench of North Carolina”; Charles Aycock praised the dissent but worried it went too far 
in questioning judicial review.73  The state’s Democratic press was also quick to condemn 
the court and praise Justice Clark.  Under the heading of “Government by the Judiciary” 
the Clinton Democrat declared that “our non partisan judiciary has gone Republican.”74  
The News and Observer carried reports from the Durham Sun, Charlotte News, and 
Winston Sentinel that condemned the court.75 The Durham Sun complained that “the 
‘non-partizan (sic) judiciary’ disposes of all the political cases by turning the Democrats 
out and turning in Republicans and Populists.”  The Charlotte News lamented that the 
court was “composed largely of partisans…[that] has never failed to decide every contest 
brought before it in favor of the Republican or Populist.”  Praising Clark’s “vigorous” 
dissent the Durham Sun summarized the worries of Democrats after their repeated losses 
in the Supreme Court: “The question now is: Where are we ‘at.’”76  
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 With tension continuing to build between the court and the legislature, it was the 
return of Theophilus White’s case during the May 1900 term that brought conflict to a 
head.77  As the court had previously sided with White in his attempt to regain his office as 
chief inspector, White had returned to seek a writ of mandamus compelling a reluctant 
state treasurer to pay his salary of $75 per month plus travelling expenses.  The state 
auditor and treasurer, both Democrats, refused to pay White’s salary as they had received 
explicit instructions from the legislature against paying Chief Inspector White—perhaps 
hoping to use the power of the purse to starve White out of office.78  The court, reluctant 
to use the full power of a writ of mandamus, instead issued a ruling that Theophilus 
White was entitled to his pay as the proper chief inspector.  The court’s majority 
expected, or at least hoped, that the legislature would authorize payment during its 
summer session.79   
 White’s attorney returned to the court during its next session and again requested 
a writ as the legislature took no action upon White’s claim and the state treasurer still 
refused to pay White’s salary.  The arguments in chambers over White’s request for a 
writ were extraordinarily uncivil and political; they were described by one justice as 
“political brawls.”80  The greatest detail about these meetings comes from Justice 
Montgomery’s testimony before the Senate during the impeachment trial of Justices 
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Douglas and Furches.  In addition to the conflict between members of the court over their 
power to compel the treasurer to pay White’s salary, the divide grew when Clark asked 
for permission to file a dissent in the case and to attach it to the court’s writ.  Justices 
Douglas, Furches, and Montgomery “declined to allow it.”  Montgomery, the most vocal 
of the three justices, upbraided Clark for filing “dissenting opinions…full of appeals to 
the people and of political learning.”  Montgomery went on to blame Clark for the court’s 
infamy in the press; “You have been at the bottom of all the troubles of the court.  These 
newspaper attacks have come from you, and I know it.”81  When Clark pressed yet again 
for permission to file a dissent, Justice Douglas sarcastically stated that “he was willing 
for it to go into the obituary column.”  Clark prophetically retorted, “It may suit the 
obituary column, but it is not in my funeral.”82                  
  The court then instructed the clerk to issue a writ upon the treasurer compelling 
payment.  Wary of becoming entangled in the increasingly bitter conflict between the 
court and the legislature, the clerk returned several times to the judges in chambers to ask 
for instructions on his duty.  Justices Douglas, Faircloth, and Furches instructed the clerk 
to issue the writ, while Justices Clark and Montgomery instructed the clerk not to issue 
the writ.  The clerk issued the writ on October 17, but the struggle for White’s pay 
continued as the state auditor and treasurer now questioned whether they had a duty to 
comply.83  Shortly after receiving the court’s order, Treasurer Worth was visited by 
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Justice Clark who instructed Worth that “he would be held responsible when the 
Legislature met and there would be three vacancies on the Supreme Court bench.”84  In 
addition, Clark sent along a copy of his unofficial dissent to the state treasurer along with 
a letter instructing him not to issue the writ.85  Faced with a court order, the state treasurer 
relented in late October and dispersed the funds to Theophilus White.86          
 Calls for impeachment of Justices Douglas, Faircloth, and Furches began as early 
as December of 1899.  The News and Observer republished an Asheville Citizen editorial 
that brought up the potential for impeachment, stating “it is as important that justice be 
meted out to a Supreme court [sic] as to a chicken thief or burglar.”87  However, the 
increasing momentum toward impeachment was fueled not by the payment of a few 
hundred dollars to a shellfish inspector but to protect what Democrats referred to as “the 
amendment”—the disfranchisement amendment.88   
The new Democratic legislature had drawn up a constitutional amendment to 
disfranchise the state’s black voters.  With an amendment ready, Democratic politicians 
worried how their Republican and Populist opponents might undermine “the 
amendment.”  Editorials expressed worry that the Fusion majority planned to “defeat the 
                                                          
84 “‘Bynum Experts’ to Get Their Pay,” News and Observer, March 21, 1901.  
 
85 Evidence in the Impeachment Proceedings, General Assembly Session Records, Judiciary Committee, 
1901, SANC. 
 
86 Edmonds, The Negro and Fusion Politics, 211. 
 
87 “Impeachment?” News and Observer, December 20, 1899. 
 
88 Edmonds, The Negro and Fusion Politics, 211; “Southern Justice Wins,” Philadelphia Christian Recorder, 
April 4, 1901. 
 
202 
 
 
[disfranchisement] amendment by any means which they can command.”89  The 
judiciary, both state and federal, was the most readily available means to challenge the 
disfranchisement amendment given the power already exercised by the court in the 
officeholding cases.90  Despite infrequent calls for impeachment throughout 1900, it was 
not until February 1, 1901, that State Rep. Locke Craig introduced a resolution calling for 
the impeachment of Republican Justices Douglas and Furches for usurping the powers of 
the legislature by issuing a writ on the state treasurer.91  Justice Faircloth’s name, which 
was included in earlier calls for impeachment, was absent from the resolution because the 
Justice had passed away in December of 1900.  The next two months were taken up with 
arguments over various ways to punish the Judiciary—censure or impeachment—and 
collecting evidence against the Justices.  The rumblings over impeachment consumed 
much of the front page of the News and Observer from February through March.  The 
February 24, 1901, edition of the News and Observer carried news of the passage of the 
impeachment resolution “nearly 2 to 1” by the General Assembly and the full text of 
“four great speeches in the House for Impeachment.”92    
After the justices’ impeachment by the House, the focus of the political drama 
shifted to the Senate.  The prosecution would face a higher burden in the Senate, as 
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conviction required a two-thirds majority.  The Democratic prosecutors failed to garner 
even a simple majority of votes on four of the five articles of impeachment, as a large 
number of senators in the Democratic majority broke away and refused to indict the 
judges.  A handful of legislators who voted in the negative on impeachment explained 
their votes.  Consistently they appealed to insufficient grounds for the impeachment.93  
Although none explicitly said so, there is little doubt that by the end of the trial in the 
Senate the Supreme Court was sufficiently intimidated and posed significantly less of a 
threat to Democratic rule in the state.  There was little reason to add the infamy of a 
conviction to the state’s history with the prosecutors’ most important objective already 
obtained.94    
A Post-Massacre Murder & the Court 
 The entanglement of legal issues and politics was not limited to the officeholding 
cases.  In the politically charged environment after the White Supremacy Campaign the 
case of State v. Thomas Smith required the North Carolina Supreme Court to confront the 
fallout of the Wilmington Massacre as it impacted the residents of Johnston County.  On 
Christmas night in 1898 Thomas Smith killed Charles Cawthorne by slicing his jugular 
vein with a knife designed for butchering hogs.  Smith, a middle-aged farm hand, was 
described by witnesses as “a yellow man”—a light skinned African-American—and 
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Cawthorne was a local white teenager.95  The events that led to Cawthorne’s death and 
Smith’s conviction flowed directly from the Wilmington Massacre.  
 The town of Selma in Johnston County was especially active on Christmas day.  
Amid the busy movement of the small town a group of about 40 white youths wearing 
“dough face” masks shot off fire crackers and roman candles.  The revelry of the group 
turned malevolent later that afternoon as the group began firing roman candles toward 
several black men going about their business.  The former Mayor of Selma testified for 
the defense that “I saw some fighting and shooting, fire crackers…the white men were 
beating negroes; They were using roman candles; a white man beat a negro with a stick; 
One man shot a negro with a rifle.”96  Smith, on his way home from a church function 
passed three young white men on the road out of Selma after dusk—Lewis Cawthorne, 
Thomas Winfrey, and Graham Garner.  The men were wearing “dough face” masks, 
firing off fireworks and firearms, and drinking from a communal bottle of whiskey on the 
public road.  One was wearing a women’s skirt, while the other two were carrying, but 
not wearing, similar skirts.  Smith and his wife politely but cautiously passed them and 
returned to their home a couple miles outside of Selma.   
Later that night the same group of young men approached Smith’s home as they 
continued down the public road shooting off both fireworks and firearms and singing.  
Smith, aware of the events that transpired in Selma earlier that day and the Wilmington 
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Massacre the month before, began to worry for his family’s safety.  Smith testified that 
he was “scared” and “frightened” as he heard the gun shots not distant from his home.97  
Remembering that he had loaned his gun to a white neighbor Smith grabbed an eight inch 
long knife he intended to use to slaughter hogs the following day.  As Smith looked for a 
weapon the young men stopped in front of Smith’s house and began shooting roman 
candles in its direction.  Peering at the masked men through his window Smith “thought 
they had come to kill him.”98  When Smith came out to confront the young men he heard 
one member of the group say “shoot the damn dog.”  Smith, claiming to have seen a gun 
drawn, used his knife and “commenced to cut” the masked men.  His blade found the 
jugular of Cawthorne and likely killed him with one cut.  Smith then turned to Thomas 
Winfrey who received multiple stab wounds before finally running away to safety at a 
neighbor’s house.99 
 Smith was immediately aware of the potential trouble that could come from his 
actions.  Fearing a lynching Smith ran directly to Smithfield along the railroad tracks and 
sought out the Sheriff to turn himself in and explain what had transpired.  Unable to 
locate the sheriff Smith spent the night at an apartment above prominent black 
businessman Ashley Smith’s general store to await the Sheriff’s return. The sheriff’s 
arrival the next day was fortunate for Smith as local residents had been “organizing a 
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lynching bee.”  The News and Observer joined the white residents of Johnston County, 
lamenting that they had been “cheated…[out] of the pleasure of a necktie party.”100  
Smith was tried at the August term of the Johnston County superior court and found 
guilty of first degree murder.  His attorney appealed the ruling the state Supreme Court 
claiming the judge’s charge to the jury on premeditation was in err.101                           
On its face the primary issue in the case was the distinction between first and 
second degree murder and what constituted proof of premeditation by the defendant.   
However, the political aspects of the cases caused enough division within the court to 
inspire four different opinions by the court’s five justices.102  The Superior Court Judge’s 
instruction to the jury, excepted to by the prisoner, read, “If the assault was prompted by 
the occurrences of Wilmington, and the rioting at Selma, or either of them, this would be 
a circumstance from which the jury might infer premeditation on the part of the 
prisoner.”103  The Fusionist majority of the court found the instruction “so great an error” 
that they granted Smith a new trial.  The justices found that the totality of the evidence 
concerning the “riots” in Selma and Wilmington did not furnish evidence of “malice 
toward the white race,” but instead “directly established abject terror and fear…for [the 
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prisoner’s] personal safety.”  Moreover the court worried that “there was too much 
passion on the part of the prosecution for the state.” 104 
 Justice Furches’s concurrence dug deeper into the problem of premeditation for 
the state’s case against Thomas Smith. Asked during oral arguments by Furches to “point 
out the evidence upon which it relied to prove deliberation and premeditation” the state’s 
attorney referenced only “the fact there had been a riot in Wilmington last November, 
and…[that] the prisoner…had read about the Wilmington riot until he could not sleep.”105 
Furches’s questioning of the state’s attorney then took a more personal turn: 
 
Justice Furches: Have you read about the riot in Wilmington? 
 
Attorney-General: Yes, I have. 
 
Justice Furches: Suppose there had been a riot between negroes and 
whites in Lexington on December 26th, and you had been in Lexington at 
the time, but had nothing to do with it, and that at 10 or 11 o’clock at night 
three men had come to your house in the condition and manner that these 
three men went to the house of the prisoner, and a fight ensued between 
you and them, and one of them had been killed.  Do you think you ought 
to be convicted of murder in the first degree because you were in 
Lexington that evening or because you had read about the Wilmington 
riot?      
 
Attorney-General: No.  I don’t think so.106 
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Justice Furches’s introduction of a color-blind approach to the facts of the case attempted 
to expose the error, and bias, of the judge’s instructions at trial.  Upholding the case with 
such an error would mean “we should have one rule of law for the trial of a negro and 
another for the trial of a white man.  This we can not have.”107 
 Remembering that the Smith case was heard at the same term as several of the 
officeholding cases, Justice Furches’s concluding paragraph is especially enlightening.  
Regretting the “riots” at Selma and Wilmington, Furches stated (perhaps to the papers 
who he reasonably, and correctly, presumed would cover the case), “Let these riots be 
among the things of the past.  Let the dead bury their dead, but do not bring their ghosts 
into court to bury the living.”108  His statement can be interpreted on two levels.  First, it 
reads most directly as an attempt to appeal to those who would decide the fate of Thomas 
Smith in his next trial.  Second, it can be viewed as an appeal to Democrats to temper the 
harsh rhetoric of the White Supremacy Campaign and the Wilmington Massacre.   
 The last concurrence was written by Justice Douglas, who like Justice Furches, 
proclaimed a desire to see the law administered “without fear or favor.”109  In a similar 
manner Justice Douglas asked the same rhetorical question as had Justice Furches: “Let 
us reverse the case, for the sake of argument: Suppose that three negroes, disguised and 
armed, had come to a white man's house…what would he probably do? I fear it would 
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not require any premeditation for a ready weapon to meet a willing hand.”110  Justice 
Douglas then concluded his brief concurrence with an appeal to equality before the law: 
“No one is so rich and powerful as to be beyond the avenging arm of the law, and none so 
poor and humble as to be beneath its completest protection.”111 
 While the Fusion Justices’ opinions displayed a willingness to understand the role 
played by race in Smith’s conviction, Justice Clark’s dissent provides insight into some 
negative aspects of Clark’s progressive jurisprudence.  First, Clark’s fundamental belief 
in the process of democratic decision making—whether by the legislature or local 
juries—left African Americans exposed to the dangers of popular prejudice.  Second, 
Clark presumed that most North Carolinians shared his paternalistic racial views.  His 
errant assumption left him unable to grasp the potential bias inherent in Smith’s trial in 
the way that Justices Furches and Douglas had demonstrated in their questioning on the 
state’s attorney during oral arguments.   
 First, Clark saw little need for a new trial.  “The prisoner has had a fair trial 
before Judge and jury. It is to the verdicts of juries that the people must look for 
protection of their lives and property.”  Clark most likely, considering his avid reading of 
the News and Observer, had seen the news of the plan to lynch Smith on the day after the 
murder.  A jury drawn from the same population hardly seems best suited “to judge of the 
reasonableness of the apprehension” Smith felt that night as he confronted Cawthorne, 
Graham, and Winfrey.  However, Clark believed that “the sympathies of the jury and the 
                                                          
110 Ibid., 626. 
 
111 Ibid., 627. 
210 
 
 
judge are naturally with one charged with a capital offense.”112  Clark’s faith in 
democratic means justified this end.  And thus Clark’s crusade against the court’s 
interference in the unseating of Fusion officeholders reflected the same essential faith that 
would have denied Smith another trial.  The court had no place interfering with the 
actions of democratic majorities.     
 Clark’s dissent, in all four opinions, most clearly linked the murder with the 
prisoner’s race.  His dissent mentions the Wilmington Massacre over half a dozen 
times113  Clark spent considerable time discussing how the prisoner “brooded” over how 
he felt “his race maltreated,” or possessed a desire to “avenge his race,” while at the same 
time he described the actions of the three young white men as “harmless roisterer[s], or 
reveler[s], on a festive occasion.”114  Even the poignant questions asked by Justice 
Furches of the state’s attorney left Clark unmoved and elicited from Clark an 
uncharacteristically obtuse response: “The Attorney-General being a white man, it may 
be presumed, would not be so deeply impressed by occurrences not arousing feelings of 
either fear or revenge in his race, but which the prisoner said had not allowed him to 
sleep.”115  
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Perhaps Clark was unable to empathize with the plight of Thomas Smith because 
Clark failed to see past his own paternalism in order to understand the depth of racial 
animosity in eastern North Carolina.  Perhaps Clark grasped the antipathy of many 
eastern North Carolinians toward blacks and decided not to oppose the popular will.  Yet 
if the former is correct and his actions arose from his faith in juries as composed of 
reasonable and unbiased men sympathetic to the defendant, his assumptions could not be 
further from the reality faced by Thomas Smith a little over a month after the terror at 
Wilmington.  Smith’s second trial, moved to an adjoining county also resulted in a capital 
conviction.  If not for a last minute reprieve from Republican Governor Daniel Russell, 
the Wilmington Massacre might have claimed another life.  Instead, Smith served out the 
remainder of his natural life at the State Prison in Raleigh.116     
The Unequal Wages of Whiteness  
 Finally, at the end of the first decade of complete Democratic dominance of North 
Carolina politics, the Supreme Court would consider the subject of segregation.  The 
White Supremacy Campaign’s reliance on race baiting and the topic of “Negro 
domination” has overshadowed its anti-democratic intentions and the introduction of 
corporate domination that would seriously compromise efforts at reform within the 
state.117  The enactment of segregation in transportation by the Democratic legislature in 
                                                          
116 Smithfield Herald, October, 19, 1900. 
 
117 “Class, Race, and Power in the New South: Racial Violence and the Delusions of White Supremacy,” 
Michael Honey, in Democracy Betrayed: The Wilmington Race Riot of 1898 and Its Legacy, ed., David S. 
Cecelski and Timothy B. Tyson (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1998), 170. 
 
212 
 
 
1899 can be viewed as part of the “public and psychological wage” that Du Bois noted 
purchased the support of poor whites.  The historiography that has developed within labor 
history regarding the wages of whiteness accepts as fact that “the poorest illiterate white 
could claim a standing in society denied to the wealthiest and most intelligent and 
educated black.”118  The enactment of segregation in North Carolina is the sort of 
compromise whiteness scholars have catalogued.  The manner in which the legislature 
enacted segregation and the unwillingness of government and corporate authorities to 
follow through on enforcement left some poor whites contesting their accommodations 
and seeking the unpaid wages of their whiteness.   
 It was no secret that some of North Carolina’s wealthiest men—mill owners, 
railroad executives, etc.—were heavily involved, both personally and financially, with 
the White Supremacy Campaign.  Indeed, the Charlotte Observer noted shortly after the 
election that “the businessmen of the State are largely responsible for the victory.”119  
Their support came in numerous forms: shutting down mills for Democratic rallies, 
purchasing the foods and materials for White Supremacy barbeques and parades, and 
funding Democratic Party propaganda pamphlets and papers.  Justice Clark expressed 
concern to A.W. Graham that “the R.R.’s are packing the nominations & trying to elect a 
railroad legislature…and assum[e] untrammeled sovereignty of public affairs.”120  Clark 
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showed no indication that he was aware of Democratic Party Campaign Chairman 
Furnifold Simmons’s secret agreement with the state’s wealthy business leaders that 
promised no tax increases in exchange for their complete support in the campaign.   
 When the new Democratic legislature set about passing a bill to segregate the 
state’s railroads, business interests played an important role in determining how 
segregation would be enforced.  Consequently, the Democrats final bill—An act to 
promote the comfort of travelers on railroad trains—created a system of separate cars 
based upon race that offered few real mechanisms for enforcement.  Attempts to amend 
the bill to give the state’s new Corporation Commission the power to punish failures to 
segregate as misdemeanors failed due to the opposition of railroad lobbyists.  The bill 
however did include a provision that allowed “passengers on any …railroad…which is 
required by this act to furnish separate accommodations…who have been furnished 
accommodations….with a person of a different race” the right to recover $100 for each 
day in violation.121  This provision of the act created a limited mechanism for 
enforcement that placed responsibility not with the state’s Corporation Commission but 
instead on the shoulders of those individual whites (and in theory blacks) that had been 
discriminated against.    
W.M. Merritt’s case against the Atlantic Coastline Railroad, discussed in Chapter 
3, is useful to examining the commitment of White Supremacy Campaign leaders to 
enforcing segregation in a manner that benefitted common white men.  In Merritt the 
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plaintiff contested not only the railroad’s refusal to seat him in the white compartment of 
the train but also the corresponding humiliation of being seated in a Jim Crow car.122  A 
local jury in Sampson County agreed and rendered a $100 judgment in the plaintiff’s 
favor.123   
 However, the Supreme Court’s construction of the statute nullified the only real 
mechanism for enforcing segregation on the state’s railroads.  The court, stacked entirely 
with Democratic judges, held that the railroad had complied with the statute.  Since the 
railroad had furnished two separate cars for their black and white customers, it had met 
the requirements of the statute.  Even if the conductor erred in instructing white 
passengers to sit in the Jim Crow car, the railroad could not be held accountable for the 
improper conduct of its conductors in assigning passengers so long as it provided 
separate cars.124    
 Clark’s dissenting opinion began by noting that while the segregation statute 
made distinctions based upon race it made no distinctions based on class.  The four white 
laborers, possessed of twenty-five cent tickets, were entitled to separate accommodations 
under the statute.  Indeed, according to Clark, the segregation statute was enacted 
“for all white men, not for some white men.”125  It was there humble position in life that 
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mandated the court had to uphold the statute to protect them: “These were men in the 
humbler walks of life and laborers. But the statute is meant as much, if not more, for 
them than for others better dressed, perhaps, whom an arbitrary conductor would hardly 
dare, or might not be able, to force to ride with the colored people.”126  The failure to 
provide a right of action for “only one white man thus humiliated by being forced to ride, 
against his will, in the car ‘provided’ for the other race,” constituted a violation of the 
separate but equal statute.127  If the statute allowed the railroad to avoid liability for its 
violation by conductors, agents of the railroad, who assigned passengers to the wrong car 
then “the statute is a delusion…the company through its conductor, is supreme, and not 
the statute.”128     
 In another context, railroads had successfully avoided liability for injuries caused 
by fellow servants to their coworkers.  In this instance an agent of the railroad, the 
conductor, once more provided a shield from corporate liability.  The conductor’s 
authority over passengers, his role as the “Alter Ego of the company,” its “only visible 
and, indeed, sole representative” led Clark to argue that the railroad should bear the 
responsibility of such errors of judgment—and in this case discriminations against 
common white laborers.129  This was not a case of the conductor making an incorrect 
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judgment about the race of a passenger.  This was an example, Clark complained, of the 
conductor (and by extension the corporation) assuming the power to nullify a public 
statute.130  And with that undue power the railroad company had nullified the Democratic 
legislature’s attempt to establish segregation as a boon to the white masses whose only 
significant property amounted to the benefits of their position as white men in a 
segregated South.  
Conclusion 
For Clark, the conductor’s actions fit within the framework of democratic reforms 
opposed or compromised by railroad operatives.  In the officeholding cases Clark had 
feared the use of Hoke by a “powerful combination of capital” to control either the 
legislature or the court.131  In the Smith case Clark criticized elites on the court as anti-
democratic for second guessing the decisions of local juries in capital cases.  Lastly, in 
Merritt, the railroad’s actions (via the conductor) nullified a public law and displayed the 
railroad’s unwillingness to enforce segregation to benefit all white men.  All of Clark’s 
dissenting opinions rest on a fear of corporate influence and a desire to ensure white 
democratic rule.  Ironically, Clark’s progressive jurisprudence in the officeholding cases 
helped to ensure Democratic domination by a legislature that was heavily influenced by 
the same business interests Clark assailed in his opinions and editorials.  The segregation 
law crafted by the same legislature failed to effectively provide for a class-blind racial 
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segregation of the state’s railroads, and the Democratic court further limited the already 
ineffective private right to action contained in the statute.  
 Perhaps most conspicuous is that, despite Clark’s frequent recurrence to 
arguments rooted in democratic majoritarianism, he paid little heed to the Wilmington 
coup d’état.  He never spoke of it publicly and he did not write about it in any of his 
private letters.  Unlike Aycock, Craig, and other notable Democrats, he did not tour the 
state speaking on behalf of the White Supremacy Campaign—a task he could avoid by 
pleading judicial propriety.  When confronted with the legacy of the White Supremacy 
Campaign in the Smith case, he complained that the other justices’ opinions smacked of 
anti-democratic sentiment because they undid the outcome of the jury’s verdict.  Clark’s 
seeming silence and indifference exemplifies the familiar historiographical statement that 
southern progressivism was, like many public facilities after the Democratic victory in 
1898, for whites only.  
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CHAPTER VI 
“WITHOUT DISTINCTION OF SEX OR BIRTH”: WALTER CLARK AND 
WOMEN’S SUFFRAGE 
 
I am in favor of giving [women] equality of rights before the law and 
equality of opportunity—in short, I favor “an avenue open to merit, 
without distinction of sex or birth.”  
—Walter Clark.1   
 
 
 In the fall of 1918 Walter Clark walked down the broad sidewalk of Pennsylvania 
Avenue toward the White House.  Justice Clark was in Washington, D.C., serving as an 
umpire for the National War Labor Relations Board, appointed by President Wilson 
several months earlier.  Yet Clark walked with purpose that day as he strode toward a 
group of twenty National Woman’s Party pickets lined up against the iron fence that 
separated the sidewalk from the White House lawn.  He approached the “quiet and 
orderly” suffragettes whose banners waved in the autumn breeze and asked a “slender 
unassuming young lady” if she could point out their leader—Alice Paul.  While Clark 
had spent the last few years reading of the exploits of the pickets in Washington papers 
that he had delivered to his Raleigh home, this encounter was his first face-to-face 
meeting with the radical suffragists face-to-face.  After expressing his regrets at how the 
district’s courts had “persecuted” the pickets, Clark took off his hat to Ms. Paul and said, 
“If I have read history and the scriptures aright, on this spot where you have been
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mobbed and assaulted without cause, some day there shall stand a monument to you and 
those who have suffered with you.2  
 Clark later retold this story in a letter published by the North Carolina press.  
Some unknown editorialist had accused Justice Clark of giving too much credit to the 
radical methods of Alice Paul at the expense of the moderate efforts of Carrie Chapman 
Catt (president of the National American Woman Suffrage Association).  Indeed, on the 
day that the national legislature approved the Susan B. Anthony suffrage amendment, 
which would go on to become the Nineteenth Amendment, Clark telegraphed (with 
permission to republish) Alice Paul the following: 
 
Will you permit me to congratulate you upon the great triumph in which 
you have been so important a factor? Your place in history is assured. 
Some years ago when I first met you I predicted that your name would be 
written `on the dusty roll the ages keep.' There were politicians, and a 
large degree of public sentiment, which could only be won by the methods 
you adopted…It is certain that, but for your, success would have been 
delayed for many years to come.3 
 
Yet once again, this time in a public forum, Clark sang the praises of Alice Paul and her 
role in bringing about the ultimate success of the Nineteenth Amendment.  He even went 
as far as to analogize Alice Paul to Paul the Apostle, Joan of Arc, and the Oxford 
Martyrs—all were “victims of the intolerance of their age.”4   
                                                          
2 “Judge Clark Replies,” n.d., Miscellaneous Clippings, Walter Clark Papers, SANC.  
 
3 Walter Clark to Alice Paul, n.d., Correspondence, 1919-1922, Walter Clark Papers, SANC. 
 
4 Ibid. 
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Indeed, Clark’s published letters and addresses offer significant insight into how 
Chief Justice Clark became one of the earliest, loudest, and most active male proponents 
of women’s suffrage in North Carolina.  His support for suffrage in general, and the 
pickets specifically, emerged from a nexus of beliefs that can be described as progressive 
and southern.  Clark’s progressive arguments emphasized “the spirit of the age,” the 
Declaration of Independence, nefarious trusts, corrupt political machines, and a host of 
reforms whose implementation depended on women’s votes to pass (chief among these 
labor reforms).  Meanwhile, his southern arguments emphasized appeals to chivalry and 
gallantry, negative comparisons to slavery, women’s service throughout southern history 
to the causes of independence and Confederate memory, and the preservation of white 
supremacy.  Reduced to four fundamental issues, Clark’s arguments in support of 
women’s suffrage most often focused on issues of modernity, whiteness, Southernness, 
and support for the labor movement.  Clark’s description of his meeting with Alice Paul 
touches on all these issues.  The Chief Justice noted with horror the civil authority’s 
abuse of the suffragette.  Arrested, wrongfully in Clark’s opinion, on illegal anti-
picketing laws—created to suppress the labor movement—the female protestors were 
imprisoned in “cells with lewd negro women.”5   
  As was the case with Clark’s activist politics, and perhaps in the case of 
women’s rights more than any other, the Chief Justice blended appeals from both bench 
and platform to push for reforms.  Often Clark’s opinions overlapped with subsequent 
North Carolina legislation (some of which Clark wrote himself and passed along 
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confidentially) or public addresses Clark delivered at Women’s Suffrage conventions in 
North Carolina and Virginia.  His blending of judicial opinion and stump speech offers a 
rare insight into how the most conservative of governmental institutions, the courts, could 
become an important part of reform in Progressive Era North Carolina.   
As discussed in Chapter 3 Clark’s advocacy of women’s voting rights connected 
directly to his advocacy of progressive legal reforms.  His support for women’s suffrage 
grew over a decade after his first decision that criticized conservative legal doctrines that 
limited the legal rights and responsibilities of North Carolina’s married women.  His 
advocacy of women’s suffrage would build on earlier case law and his dissenting 
opinions.  It would also serve as an abrupt transition from seeking only reforms to 
common law and statutory law to a vocal campaign for suffrage.     
Walter Clark’s Endorses Suffrage 
 In 1923 the National American Woman Suffrage Association, fresh from electoral 
victory, published a six-volume History of Woman Suffrage.6  The sixth volume extended 
thanks to those who had supported women’s suffrage in North Carolina.  In North 
Carolina, by 1919, the state league’s communication could boast a letterhead that 
included such prominent names as three-time presidential nominee William Jennings 
Bryan, Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels, and Chief Justice Walter Clark.   Clark 
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Company, 1923).  
 
222 
 
 
was specifically thanked as one “who for years has been an unfailing champion of equal 
suffrage and real democracy.”7   
Yet Clark was not always a vocal supporter of women’s suffrage.  Clark’s first 
announcement of his support for women’s suffrage came during a summer 1911 
commencement address at Elon College in Greensboro, North Carolina.  In his “Gospel 
of Progress” speech Clark argued that “the qualifications for suffrage should be capacity 
and character.”  Clark believed that “mental capacity and moral character…are the 
exclusive property of neither sex.”  Nevertheless, Clark tempered his comments.  The 
vote would only come “whenever the women…in any considerable numbers shall really 
desire the suffrage.”  And while he acknowledged that government with suffrage was 
better than government without it, women’s suffrage “ha[d] not brought about the 
millennium.”8   
The significance, and limited commitment, of Clark’s comments is most likely 
explained by a new turn in his political career.  Just a few weeks earlier, he had 
announced his candidacy for the United States Senate.  Clark’s platform represented the 
major focus of his public political activism from the first decade of the twentieth 
century—the plutocracy.  Women Suffrage’s absence was conspicuous, especially to 
suffragists.  Anna Howard Shaw, president of the National American Woman Suffrage 
Association, sent a harsh rebuke to Clark for his “fall[ing] into the attitude of utter 
                                                          
7 Ibid., 494. 
 
8 “Bitter Factions War is Opening,” Asheville Gazette-News, July 18, 1911. 
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forgetfulness of women.” His suffragist views were already known to Shaw and to her 
the absence of suffrage from his published platform was “humiliation unspeakable.”9  Yet 
despite the rebuke Clark’s campaign literature continued to talk primarily about the 
danger of the plutocracy, the election of judges and postmasters, protections for labor, 
and confederate pensions.  In April of 1912, as the election neared, Clark had one 
hundred thousand pictures with the inscription, “The Man Whom the Tobacco Trust, the 
Lumber Trust, the Steel Trust and the Standard Oil Trust, do not wish to see in the U.S. 
Senate from North Carolina,” printed as campaign materials to be distributed throughout 
the state.  The issue of women’s suffrage was nowhere to be seen in his speeches or 
campaign materials for the remainder of the election.10     
 Clark lost the Senate race, and disappointingly so, receiving only 10 percent of 
the vote.  Worst of all for Clark he lost the race to Furnifold Simmons—a man he 
despised.  For Clark Simmons represented everything loathsome about politics; 
acceptance of plutocratic endorsements and cash, reactionary views on labor legislation, 
and North Carolina’s machine politics.  Three days after the race Clark wrote to his 
brother-in-law about Simmons campaign, clearly frustrated, “promises were freely used 
as well as whiskey and money.”11  Still smarting over the loss the following May, Clark 
wrote to Clarence Poe, editor of the Progressive Farmer, expressing his disappointment 
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that Poe, Daniels, and other prominent reformist editors had not publicly supported his 
campaign.  He claimed they “had an opportunity last year to send a [progressive] man to 
the U.S. Senate…yet did not give him their support.”12     
 While it is unclear why Justice Clark chose to de-emphasize his support for 
women’s suffrage during his Senate campaign, it is not unreasonable to assume that he 
thought it too controversial in a race where he already had enough enemies in the 
railroad, cigarette, and lumbers trusts.  Regardless of the reason, with the election decided 
Clark moved quickly to support women’s suffrage from the bench, the platform, and his 
writing desk.  Most likely, the reason for this change can be found in Clark’s senatorial 
campaign’s failure.  He had appealed to North Carolina’s male voters and they had 
rejected his calls for reform.  Perhaps North Carolina’s women would prove more 
amenable to progressive reform?  With the election over Clark’s attentions turned toward 
what Clark called “the emancipation of women.” 
Clark’s Oratory of Women’s Suffrage 
 Women’s suffrage in North Carolina has a comically sad history.  Republican 
legislator, Abraham Galloway, twice attempted, in 1868 and 1869, to amend the state’s 
constitution to include women’s suffrage.13  Then in the 1890s North Carolina State Sen. 
James L. Hyatt introduced a petition to enfranchise North Carolina’s women the State 
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Senate referred his bill to the Committee on Insane Asylums.  Then in 1920 North 
Carolina’s Senate, evenly divided on the issue of suffrage, staged one of the most bizarre 
scenes in the history of its legislature.  The Lt. Governor, O. Max Garner, expected to 
break a tie vote in favor of suffrage but the tie vote never happened because anti-suffrage 
forces had locked a single pro-suffrage senator in the restroom until the vote was 
concluded.14   Consequently North Carolina lost its chance to be the thirty-sixth state to 
ratify the amendment—that honor went to Tennessee—and ratification would lie dormant 
until 1971.15    
At the beginning of the 1910s, North Carolina’s newspapers were divided on the 
subject of suffrage, with most falling into the anti-suffrage camp.  Editorials dismissed 
suffrage with condescending flattery and comical references to overbearing women and 
henpecked men.  In 1910 the East Carolina News praised North Carolina’s women for 
not petitioning Congress for the vote.  Further down the same page an editorial ridiculed 
a women’s suffrage convention’s attendees as “women who desire to wear men’s 
clothes.” In an anti-suffrage article The Wilmington Morning Star condescendingly 
claimed, “Any time [women] take a notion to do so, they can force the men to let them 
vote if they want the right.”  Later that year the Morning Star ridiculed male voters in 
suffrage states in the West as “simply hacked.”   Even the papers that were more 
ambivalent about the suffrage issue expressed only conditional support.  The Charlotte 
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News editorialized that men would only give women the vote when they proved that they 
“really want to vote,” “will do something with it,” and can do so “without taking the 
bloom off womanhood.” 16 
Chief Justice Clark is lauded as the first prominent male North Carolinian to 
speak publicly in favor of women’s suffrage.17  That speech, given in July 1911, was the 
first in a series of speeches.  Each speech revolved around a combination of historical, 
moral, legal, political, and practical reasons that suffrage should be extended to women in 
municipal, state, and federal elections.  Often his speeches borrowed heavily from his 
recent judicial opinions, other times his opinions borrowed from his speeches.  And often 
women’s suffrage advocates borrowed his judicial opinions—in pamphlet form—to 
advocate for suffrage.  Eventually, Clark’s addresses and opinions reached a point where 
it became difficult to disentangle the forums of judge’s bench and speaker’s podium.  Yet 
taken together they provide an insight into how and why a southern jurist could, and did, 
come out in support of suffrage at a time it when it was politically unpopular.   
Unlike Clark’s attack on trusts, there was little to be gained politically from 
promoting women’s suffrage.  The laboring classes who grumbled about the railroads, the 
mill owners, and J.B. Duke took pleasure in Clark’s attacks on the plutocracy.  Yet when 
it came to women’s suffrage Clark’s friend Aubrey Brooks complained, “The country 
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Wilmington Morning Star, October 17, 1911; Charlotte News, December 18, 1910. 
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people so far are either opposed to it or indifferent.”18  Nevertheless, Chief Justice Clark 
threw himself into campaigning for suffrage with aplomb.  His embrace of women’s 
suffrage was rooted in a realization that did not leave Clark’s pen until after the 1912 
election.  It was after that election that the Chief Justice came to believe that suffrage was 
an essential part of advancing progressive measures to safeguard children and workers 
and reign in the trusts.   
Chief Justice Clark saw his old foes behind the anti-suffrage movement.  He told 
a crowd of suffragists in 1919 that the true source of opposition to enfranchisement: 
“Passing by the fictitious terrors of State’s Rights and negro supremacy, we should 
mention the real causes of the opposition…liquor interests…large employers of labor… 
[and] the [political] machine.”19  Not only did Clark associate his old enemies with the 
opposition but he tried to make suffrage agitation palatable to southern working men by 
linking the anti-labor and anti-suffrage movement.  Addressing an assembled, and no 
doubt predominantly male, crowd Clark asked, “Is not the Suffrage movement a wing of 
the Labor Army?” 
Clark most forcefully made this point in 1914.  Clark titled a speech, republished 
for a national audience shortly thereafter in Samuel Gomper’s American Federationist, 
“Suffrage a Labor Movement.”20  In Clark’s usual fashion he began the speech defining 
history (both ancient and American) as an attempt “by…one class, to exploit and the 
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20 Walter Clark, “Suffrage a Labor Movement,” American Federationist 26 (May 1919): 389-392. 
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other to prevent being exploited.”  He listed the litany of critiques of United States 
history that had become staples of Clark speeches since the turn of the century: the 
democratic Declaration of Independence, the reactionary United States Constitution, the 
usurpation of the courts in Marbury to protect the “slavery trust,” and how that 
usurpation subtly changed from protecting slavery to protecting aggregated wealth via the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  Then, as he had many times before, Clark addressed the 
increasing democratization of the state and federal governments.  Yet this process was 
incomplete.  Many pieces of labor legislation still sat in their embryonic phase because 
state legislatures refused to act on (or severely watered down) bills for equal pay for 
women, safety appliances, or an end to child labor.  The best solution to all these 
problems and others was to enfranchise women, “The women of the working class being 
far more numerous than the other, their votes will double the power of the working 
element at the ballot box…and will thus increase the power of that class to influence 
legislation.”  Enfranchised women would “be for temperance, and in favor of legislation 
to protect childhood, and sanitation; to procure better housing and against excessive 
hours of labor.”21   
Race, Whiteness, and Southernness, and Slavery 
Justice Clark talked about women’s suffrage as part of a history of emancipations 
that stretched from the Declaration of Independence to black voting rights, women’s 
property rights, child labor protections, and the legal protection of debtors.  Women’s 
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suffrage was the next step in this chain of emancipations.  It was the “logical outgrowth 
of this great democratic movement to place the Government in the hand of the people.”22  
Nevertheless, there was one link in the chain that Clark spoke about with far less 
enthusiasm from the podium—the confirmation of voting rights on freedmen.  Privately 
Clark admitted to preferring the repeal of the Fifteenth Amendment and joined with other 
Lost Cause orators in denouncing the horrors of Reconstruction.23  Yet in his advocacy of 
suffrage Justice Clark couldn’t ignore black enfranchisement.  After all, anti-suffrage 
forces routinely argued that the enfranchisement of women would mean all women—
black women too.  Yet Clark turned these arguments on their head to argue that the 
maintenance of white supremacy depended upon the enfranchisement of southern 
women.  
 Clark believed white supremacy was vulnerable to judicial and political attack in 
the 1910s.  As early as 1913 Clark foresaw the inevitability of the United States Supreme 
Court overturning the South’s grandfather clauses.  Such a circumstance would make 
white women’s votes “necessary to maintain white supremacy.”  White women could be 
expected to vote “solid as one woman… [for] the right of their children to control this 
society”; black women could continue to be excluded by literacy tests, poll taxes, and the 
like.  One year later Clark published “Ballots for Both” in pamphlet form.  The lead quote 
on the cover heralded the role of white women’s votes in preserving white supremacy: 
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“In North Carolina the white population is 70% and the negro 30%, hence there are 
50,000 more white women than all the negro men and negro women put together.  The 
admission of the women to the suffrage therefore could not possibly jeopardize White 
Supremacy, but would make it more secure.”24    
 By January of 1919 Clark worried that the number of black voters in North 
Carolina was destined to increase.  The Chief Justice wrote to anti-suffrage North 
Carolina Sen. Lee Overman about the impending 1920 election.  North Carolina sent 
eighty thousand troops off to war—twenty-five thousand of them black.  Clark warned 
Sen. Lee Overman, “We will either have to admit these men to…the ballot box, or when 
it is flashed thru the country that we are refusing to register men who fought for 
Democracy in France and have done this in violation of our oath to support the 
Constitution…[it will defeat] the Democratic Presidential electors throughout the North 
and West.”  With the potential growth of the black electorate, Clark saw “no other way to 
offset these votes than the votes of the white women of the state.”25  Senator Overman 
remained unmoved and Clark grew increasingly frustrated.  In front of a large crowd in 
Raleigh, the Chief Justice attacked those who resisted women’s suffrage with “the old cry 
always used to thwart any progressive measure in the South of ‘Nigger!’”26  Ironically, 
Clark expressed frustration at the success of anti-suffrage advocates in employing the 
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same strategy, even as he attempted to use the threat of black voting rights to gain the 
enfranchisement for women. 
Through Clark’s political career he benefitted from an unquestionably southern 
pedigree: son of a wealthy planter, slaveholder, Confederate officer, and Lost Cause 
devotee.  In his oratory Clark emphasized his confederate past and southern roots.  Before 
a crowd in Richmond, Virginia Justice Clark prefaced his support for suffrage by stating: 
 
I am a native born southerner.  I have spent my life beneath your sunny 
skies.  I can therefore speak frankly to my own people. We have boasted 
of our chivalrous regard for women, and there are none who more deserve 
it than those of the South; but in honest truth, as respects [women’s 
suffrage]…the South has been and still is a laggard.27     
  
His speeches were peppered with references to chivalry, gallantry, and womanhood in 
ways that undermined the traditional use of these words in the anti-suffrage vocabulary. 
 Another distinctly southern aspect of Clark’s pro-suffrage rhetoric featured a 
comparison between the status of slaves in the antebellum era and women in the 
postbellum era.  This rhetoric took two forms.  First, he used language that mirrored the 
free state-slave state divide of the antebellum era.  When Justice Clark wrote a letter to 
Jeanette Rankin—U.S. Representative from Montana—he expressed thankfulness that 
“the women of the free states [felt] an interest in this unemancipated part of the union.”28   
Several years earlier, addressing a pro-suffrage crowd in Richmond, Virginia, Clark 
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referenced Abraham Lincoln’s pre-war claim that the nation “could not live half slave 
and half free.”  A statement that was, according to Clark, “equally true” in 1914 as it had 
been in 1861.29 
Second, direct comparisons between the legal status of slaves and women before 
and after the Civil War were common in Clark’s oratory—as well as his judicial 
opinions.  In 1918 Clark wrote to his friend, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill 
historian, Kemp P. Battle.  Clark respectfully took issue with Kemp’s description of 
antebellum women as “practically in slavery.”30  Instead, Clark argued, their status was in 
one way worse than antebellum slavery—it lasted longer.  In his frequent discussions of 
the subject, Clark rooted the status of women as chattel property in “a barbarous age”—
Norman England—and extended elements of that “slavery” into the twentieth century.  
Whereas the master’s power to physically chastise a slave laborer ended in 1865, until 
1874, North Carolina court’s held that a husband “had a right to whip his wife with a 
switch no larger than his thumb.”31  While freedmen gained property rights even under 
the 1866 North Carolina Black Code, it was not until 1868 that the legal standard ceased 
to be that the “wife’s property became the property of her husband.”  Clark concluded 
“there was no legal difference between the power of the master over his negro slave” and 
the power of the husband over his wife.                   
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Conclusion: Blurred Lines between the Judicial and the Political 
 Suffrage advocates found quoting the Chief Justice of a southern Supreme Court 
helpful in deflecting claims of radicalism.  Consequently, Clark’s arguments show up in 
several instances in women’s suffrage pamphlets and magazines.  Clark’s face even 
graced the cover of the Woman’s Journal and Suffrage News, which declared him a 
“suffrage judge in Dixie.”32  In 1915, when the North Carolina Equal Suffrage 
Association met for their second annual meeting the president, Barbara Henderson, 
thanked Clark for his “usual great kindness and enthusiasm” in donating printed versions 
of his speeches for distribution.  Later that day the Legislative Committee of the 
Association noted that in a year when the organization had advanced three major bills to 
the legislature—Notary Public, age of consent, and an equal suffrage bill—that the state 
Supreme Court had overturned their notary public bill in a three-two decision.  The 
group’s chairman, Mary Henderson, called attention to Clark’s dissent in the Knight case 
and told attendees that his opinion was in pamphlet form and available to distribution on 
request.   
When Justice Clark spoke in Salisbury, North Carolina, on women’s suffrage 
State Representative Theodore F. Klutzz introduced Clark as a Chief Justice who had 
“never failed to speak out, from bench and forum and printed page, for…absolute 
equality before the law.”33 This combination of juridical and political made Clark a 
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valuable ally to the women’s suffrage movement and a unique judge within North 
Carolina.  From the end of Clark’s failed Senate campaign until the passage of the 
Nineteenth Amendment his speeches on suffrage, and his judicial opinions on women’s 
rights, became important literature used to advance the causes of women’s legal and 
political rights both in North Carolina and in the Nation.   
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CHAPTER VII 
CLARK V. DUKE: THE STRUGGLE FOR WATER RIGHTS1 
 
Democracy in government is almost impossible until we have a democracy 
in industrialism to the extent of public ownership of all the great agencies 
such as transportation by rail, water power, coal mines, and oil wells . . . 
Public ownership of these utilities will insure democracy in government.   
—Walter Clark2 
 
Leading North Carolinians, among them James B. Duke, the man with the fortune 
behind the American Tobacco and Southern Power companies, crowded into a Raleigh 
courtroom in November 1920.  The state’s Corporation Commission was considering the 
Southern Power Company’s application for a rate increase—the first application of its 
kind by a North Carolina public energy corporation, and the first decision by the 
Corporation Commission on electrical rates.  That North Carolina’s Corporation 
Commission would consider, and later exercise, regulatory control over the state’s largest 
power company—owned by the South’s wealthiest industrialist—would not have been 
possible less than a year earlier.3   
In the first quarter of the twentieth century, the state’s Democratic Party hindered 
numerous political reforms in North Carolina—from the enactment of women’s suffrage
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to the regulation of electrical rates charged by energy companies.  Nevertheless, during 
the second decade of the twentieth century, North Carolina saw significant reform to its 
public energy policy, as the state’s water power resources shifted from a laissez-faire 
public energy market to a corporate monopoly that was held in check—at least in 
theory—by the Corporation Commission.  In 1898, the Democratic Party’s White 
Supremacy Campaign crushed the half decade-long fusion of Populists and Republicans.  
With the Populists defeated, and many finding their way back into a conservative 
Democratic party, no significant grassroots movement stood in the way of the Southern 
Power Company’s bid for electrical control of electrical power.  Despite a 1913 grant of 
statutory authority to police regulatory rates, the state’s Corporation Commission 
cautiously avoided conflict, reluctant to use its authoritative power.  As a result, only the 
state’s court system could prevent the company’s dictation of the state’s public energy 
policy.  Clark had advocated for full public ownership of public resources in popular 
addresses and national journals. For Clark, mere regulatory control of a corporate 
monopoly of North Carolina’s water resources, and the energy acquired through their use, 
was an unnecessary compromise that fell short of the ideal.  To achieve his goals of 
public ownership, Clark pitted himself against Duke in editorials and courtrooms.                         
No Gas, No Soot, No Dirt 
As the electrification of North Carolina progressed in the early twentieth century, 
water was regarded as a valuable energy source—something that was cheap, abundant, 
and renewable.  Clark wrote on the potential of hydropower, “There will be no coal to go 
237 
in, no ashes to go out, no gas, no soot, no dirt.”4  Many local newspapers were similarly 
optimistic, reporting that electricity derived from hydropower would soon replace steam 
as the main energy source for railroads, mills, cities, and homes, and lauding water power 
investors.  But as Raleigh’s News and Observer lamented, the nineteenth century had 
lacked “men of business sense with the necessary capital to establish large plants and 
fully utilize the water power that has so long swept unused into the sea.”5  
Change seemed possible in 1899, when the North Carolina Department of 
Conservation and Development announced the results of the first large-scale analysis of 
the state’s ability to harness water power.  The effort had been undertaken, in large part, 
due to “numerous and urgent” inquiries by potential developers “for information 
concerning waterpower” in North Carolina.  Those inquirers were rewarded, as the state 
distributed copies of its geological survey, Bulletin No. 8, to “investors and those 
contemplating the development of water power in the near future.”6  Still, at the turn of 
the century, there was no clear plan in place for developing the state’s infrastructure for 
water power facilities.  Instead, investments were primarily limited to small mill 
operations or local projects that often did not follow through on seeking legislative 
approval to construct power generation facilities.  Securing riparian rights to properties 
along stretches of rivers and streams, which often were subdivided into small lots that 
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belonged to numerous owners, also proved challenging and expensive.  To ease this 
roadblock, North Carolina’s legislature granted electric railways, as well as telephone, 
telegraph, and power companies, the ability to use eminent domain to seize the property 
of reluctant owners.  In return, private corporations engaged in these industries acquired a 
valuable resource; the machinery of the state’s courts to compel holdouts to convey their 
property.7        
The situation changed considerably in 1904, when Dr. W. Gill Wylie, a New 
York surgeon and water power developer with South Carolina roots, had the good fortune 
to treat industrialist James B. Duke’s infected foot.  Given the undivided attention of the 
South’s wealthiest man, Dr. Wylie evangelized about the potential of hydropower to fuel 
the Carolinas’ industrial enterprises.  Duke was already familiar with Wylie’s ideas, 
particularly the proposal to invest in his corporation, the Catawba Power Company.8  The 
doctor had pitched the same idea to Ben Duke, J. B. Duke’s older brother, just five years 
earlier, shortly after performing an appendectomy on him.  Ben Duke was reluctant to 
invest more than $25,000 in Wylie’s energy company and remained cautious about future 
investments.9  But following the initial contribution, the Duke brothers established the 
American Development Company, Inc. to buy property bordering the Catawba River in 
North Carolina and even commissioned a map of potential water power sites in the 
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Carolinas.  Thus, when Dr. Wylie presented J. B. Duke with an opportunity to invest in 
the future of the Carolinas’ water industry, Duke responded positively, inviting the doctor 
and his head engineer William S. Lee to discuss the matter at his estate.  At that meeting, 
Lee presented “diagrams and preliminary plans . . . for extensive [water power] 
developments on the Catawba [River]” that would cost $8,000,000. Lee later reflected 
that the large dollar figure “seemed to attract” Duke.10   
In June 1905, the Dukes incorporated the Southern Power Company in New 
Jersey.  Soon after, the Southern Power Company purchased the Catawba Power 
Company’s outstanding stock, land, and water rights.  Duke’s power empire grew to 
include half of a dozen corporations with the ability to purchase water rights and 
property, to exercise eminent domain and build power stations, to supply electrical 
converters and machinery to textile mills, to retail generated electricity to customers in 
businesses and municipalities, and, through the Piedmont and Northern Railway 
Company, to provide electric rail service between Charlotte and Gastonia, North 
Carolina.  Through their various corporate identities, the Dukes developed “a fully 
integrated hydroelectric system on the Catawba-Wateree River” and throughout the 
Carolina Piedmont.  By 1920, their holdings in the Carolinas included half a dozen 
hydroelectric plants, which blanketed 335 miles of western South Carolina and central 
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North Carolina with electrical transmission lines.  Over 70 percent of the electricity that 
traveled those lines was generated by hydropower. 11                     
But Duke’s plans for power development were not universally well received.  The 
interlocking boards that controlled half a dozen corporate entities organized in New 
Jersey, North Carolina, or South Carolina, were all too familiar to North Carolinians who 
had spent the last decade protesting the Duke-owned American Tobacco Company’s 
monopoly on tobacco crops and cigarette production.  In addition, the Duke’s new 
investments in water power corresponded with their investments in an electric railway 
and textile mills.  In 1917, Josephus Daniels addressed this in the News and Observer, 
saying, “We are in danger of a power and lighting trust in North Carolina and it ought to 
be regulated before it has a chance to exploit the people.”12  Earlier in 1916, Clark 
referenced a government publication that noted that the Southern Power Company and 
the Carolina Power and Light Company owned “75% of the water powers” of North 
Carolina.  Clark lamented that the water trusts of the nation, including Duke’s Southern 
Power Company, were “taking into their control the most vital sources of heat, power, 
and light, the water powers of the country.”13      
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Across the South, private companies built an infrastructure of dams, reservoirs, 
and transmission wires to generate and transmit energy harnessed from water.  As they 
had in North Carolina, such companies consolidated their control over water resources 
and power generation.  Progressive reformers in the South objected to the development of 
water power trusts, but few offered viable alternatives to private development of public 
resources.  The primary response built upon a familiar reformist model: regulatory 
commissions. By 1914, states had established some form of government oversight of 
private energy companies.14  North Carolina was among them.  In 1913, the state granted 
its Corporation Commission the ability to regulate power companies upon a 
discretionary, not mandatory, basis.  But by 1914, the commission began asking public 
utility companies to annually provide a copy of their rate schedule and corporate records.  
While the Southern Power Company partially complied with the request for materials, 
Duke’s representative insisted that such compliance was “in deference to the request . . . 
[and] not because any legal obligation.”  As they saw it, rates were a matter of 
“reasonable rules and regulations of the company” and not a matter for state regulatory 
interference.  The commission acquiesced to this view for several years, soliciting annual 
reports but refraining from exercising power over electric rates.15  This arrangement 
lasted only until America’s entry into World War I. 
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Necessary Monopolies 
In 1917, faced with wartime inflation, the Southern Power Company set out to 
renegotiate rates with some of its customers, including the North Carolina Public Service 
Company.  Originally that firm had operated its own steam plants to generate power for 
businesses, homes, and street railways in Salisbury.  But in 1907, when the Southern 
Power Company offered hydropower electricity at a much cheaper price, the company 
discontinued its own ability to generate power and converted its facilities to receive and 
retail electricity from Southern Power.  According to their contract, Southern Power was 
to provide electricity at 1.1 cents per kilowatt hour.  But with their contract soon expiring 
Southern proposed an increased rate of 1.5 cents per kilowatt-hour for no less than five 
years. The Public Service Company refused the new terms.  In response, Southern Power 
provided one year’s notice for the termination of electrical service to Salisbury.  As Chief 
Justice Clark wrote in Salisbury & Spencer Railway Company, et al. v. Southern Power 
Company, that would mean that the residents of Salisbury would be left “without lights 
for their homes and places of business of their people, and without power for the 
operation of their industrial plants or any means of operating the street railway.”16  
Knowing such, the Public Service Company contested the raise, first with the 
Corporation Commission and then in the state’s courts.  They argued that as a public 
service corporation, Southern Power could not hand pick the rates they offered to various 
groups.17  
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While pleading the need to raise rates for the Public Service Corporation, 
Southern Power remained under contract to provide electricity at 1.1 cents per kilowatt 
hour to a subsidiary, the Southern Public Utilities Company, until 1944.  Unsurprisingly, 
the Public Service Company’s managers reasoned that a difference of almost 50 percent 
in rates was discriminatory and impermissible.  But North Carolina’s Corporation 
Commission rebuffed complaints, stating they had no power to regulate rates between 
power distributors.18  On the advice of counselor Aubrey L. Brooks, the Public Service 
Company met with Duke about a potential buyout, but J.B. Duke insisted the company’s 
stock was worthless.19  With no options left, the Public Service Company turned to the 
Guildford County Superior Court, seeking an order that would mandate Southern Power 
to continue to furnish power.  The Public Service Company was granted a mandamus, 
which Southern Power appealed to the North Carolina Supreme Court.20   
This development was less than fortuitous for Duke’s Southern Power Company.  
Clark and Duke had been involved in numerous personal and political conflicts since 
Clark’s attempt to prevent Trinity College from becoming increasingly entangled with 
financial contributions from the Duke family in the 1890s.  Afterward, Duke’s American 
Tobacco Company was a regular target of Clark’s criticism.  Clark took great pride in his 
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reputation as a “tribune of the people” and relished any and all attacks made upon him by 
corporate interests as confirmation of that title.21 
In a speech to the Virginia State Bar Association shortly after his election to Chief 
Justiceship in 1903, Clark criticized Duke’s American Tobacco Company for destroying 
the “opportunity of livelihood” to thousands of farmers through its tobacco trust.  Clark 
went on to state that should a planned boycott fail to break the trust, he would favor a 
government monopoly on tobacco sales as existed in France, Austria, and Italy at the 
time.  It was part of Clark’s larger call for “necessary monopolies” in “lighting, water, 
and street transportation” that should be “operated by the government only and in the 
interest of all.”22   
Clark became more fiery and outspoken by 1919, following a failed Senate run in 
1912, and being passed over twice for a U. S. Supreme Court nomination by President 
Woodrow Wilson.  These slights seemingly emboldened Clark’s rhetoric and increased 
his calls for radical reforms like public ownership.  Clark railed against trusts, private 
monopolies, and accumulations as a threat to the public and government, believing that 
oversized corporate salaries, lobbyists, and funding for legislative campaigns corrupted 
local, state, and federal government.  Clark saw the cure in public (democratic) 
ownership of monopolies, declaring, “Democracy in government is almost impossible 
until we have a democracy in industrialism to the extent of public ownership of all the 
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great agencies such as transportation by rail, water power, coal mines, and oil wells.”23 
The case between the Public Service Company and Southern Power provided an 
opportunity for Clark to establish a strong legal precedent for regulating power 
companies, while also lambasting Duke, his longtime adversary, who was synonymous 
with wealth and monopoly.  When the court split three-to-two over whether to uphold the 
Superior Court’s rule, Clark wrote the majority opinion in favor.24   
Clark’s opinion, widely circulated in newspapers, was called “one of the most 
important in the previous hundred years.”  Clark ruled that the public nature of the 
Southern Power Company, given the power of eminent domain by the state legislature, 
“subject[ed] [it] to public control not only in fixing and prescribing its rates, but . . . in the 
requirement that it shall furnish its facilities at the same rate to all receiving them under 
like conditions.” 25  Clark feared that the power to fix rates without regulatory control 
would result in rebates, price fixing, and manipulation—problems that railroad 
corporations had faced in the late nineteenth century.  He also argued that if the Southern 
Power Company was granted discriminatory rights, then the Dukes would work to 
monopolize the state’s water power in the same manner that Standard Oil and American 
Tobacco had monopolized their respective industries.  Clark described the situation, 
saying, “94 per cent of the water power of this State has been acquired by corporations 
which are either already owned or can soon be acquired by the Southern Power 
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Company, or made subsidiary by use of the same method of underbidding, and 
afterwards acquiring competitive plants.”26  He also predicted future monopolies, 
explaining that if Southern Power achieved a monopoly over the state’s water power and 
electrical service, then it could manipulate electrical rates to “acquire the ownership of all 
the other cotton mills and industrial plants in the State, and thus create a cotton monopoly 
where its [electrical] lines extend.” 27   
 Clark’s majority opinion envisioned a bleak future should Southern Power be 
given the right to charge discriminatory rates: 
 
If the profits, which it clearly appears are taken out of the public by the 
defendant and its subsidiary companies, are possible now, what will be the 
result if this enormous and steadily growing aggregation of wealth were 
permitted to charge its own rates… without supervision by governmental 
authority, and has full power to discriminate against those municipal and 
industrial plants and factories which it may desire to crush out and buy? 
There must be considered, too, that with the constantly decreasing 
competition from the coal supply, which must be conserved to prevent 
exhaustion, and which is so frequently interrupted by strikes, 
the power the defendant claims of unrestricted rates and of absolute right 
to discriminate between purchasers would make it a despotism beyond a 
parallel in history.28 
 
Eventually, Clark argued, Southern Power might become “a menace to government by 
the people and face dissolution by judicial decree.”  Clark’s opinion was meant to act as 
an initial check on the potential for economic despotism by ensuring that Southern Power 
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(or any other energy producer) could not discriminate in the rates it charged in order to 
manipulate the energy market.29   
Clark’s suspicion that Duke sought a power monopoly in North Carolina is 
supported by Aubrey Brooks, who was a close friend to Duke and served as counsel to 
the Public Service Company in its lawsuit against Southern Power.  Brooks recalled from 
his involvement in the case that Southern Power sought a franchise to distribute power in 
the Public Service Company’s territory (which was denied by popular vote) shortly after 
the Supreme Court’s ruling.  After Duke had insisted that the Public Service Company’s 
stock “had no value,” Barstow & Company of New York purchased the common stock of 
the Public Service Company for $75 a share.  Brooks was not surprised to hear that soon 
after the conclusion of the case, the Public Service Company appeared as an asset of the 
Southern Power Company.30        
The Beginning of a New Era 
After appeals to the federal district court and the United States Supreme Court 
upheld Clark’s ruling, the Southern Power Company was forced to yield to state 
regulation.  Progressive-minded men like Brooks lamented that “it should never have 
been necessary to institute the suit in the first instance, if the State Corporation 
Commission had possessed the courage and disposition to regulate the service and rates 
of this defiant monopoly.”  Even if this new power came reluctantly to the conservative 
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commission, nevertheless, disputes over power contracts had been shifted from the 
marketplace and the courts to the Corporation Commission’s offices in Raleigh.  The new 
importance of the commission was signified by Duke’s public appearance at the initial 
hearings over rate increases.31   
Duke also reluctantly embraced the importance of the state’s Corporation 
Commission.  Shortly after the U. S. Supreme Court’s ruling, Southern Power moved to 
raise its rates with permission from the commission.  As part of the new system of non-
discriminatory rates, Southern Power insisted it had to abrogate all preexisting legal 
contracts to provide power at a set rate.  Altogether, Southern Power would request 
several rate increases between 1920 and 1924.  Each instance ignited public uproar from 
mill owners and towns eager to protect the low rates they had previously contracted.32 
Duke and Clark continued their political battle as Duke pushed for rate increases, 
arguing, without them “I am through.”33  Fortunately for Duke, he had plenty of 
supporters in North Carolina’s newsrooms.  They dreaded the thought of Duke’s 
withdrawal from developing the state’s water power industry and lauded his initial 
accomplishments.  As article about Duke in the News and Observer stated: 
 
What business is it of the employes [sic] of 282 cotton mills, mills made 
possible because James Buchanan Duke has built the Southern Power 
                                                          
31 Aubrey L. Brooks, A Southern Lawyer, 117-118. 
 
32 “Legislature Should Act to Prevent Injustice,” News and Observer, March 5, 1921; Durden, Electrifying 
the Piedmont Carolinas, 47-52. 
 
33 “Old Issues Revived as Power Co. Comes Before State Commission,” News and Observer, November 18, 
1922; “Will Build $10,000,000 Hydro-Electric Plant if Power Rates Raised,” News and Observer, October 
12, 1923. 
 
249 
Company, whether he has grabbed all the water power in the State, and 
what business is it of theirs what he charges the cotton mills where they 
work for the power?  Did he not make it possible for them to have 
jobs?....Why should these people . . . hound him about water power.  Had 
not these streams tumbled down out of these mountains for centuries and 
none noticed them?  Had he not invested his money in them when men 
called him foolish?  They were here for hundreds of years before he 
bought them.34  
 
In response, Clark pushed harder to end Duke’s monopoly.  As he told Carl D. 
Thompson, president of the Public Ownership League, “The overwhelming combination 
managed by the water power company [Southern Power] controls to a large extent the 
press, the legislation and other officialdom. The people do not know the facts . . . [and] 
the effect upon themselves of political domination by this water power monopoly.”35  He 
then began to ardently and publicly advocate for public ownership of the state’s water 
power resources.  In July 1922, Clark privately responded to a letter from author and 
activist Upton Sinclair, writing, “The only possible solution that will work for permanent 
peace is Government Ownership of Rail Roads, Telegraphs, and Telephones, Coal Mines, 
Water Power and other Monopolies.”36  A year later Clark made similar arguments 
publicly in an editorial in the News and Observer that urged North Carolinians to follow 
the examples of California and South Dakota, which were voting on the issue of state 
financing for water power development, and Ontario, which, in Clark’s view, had 
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financed and created “the greatest hydro-electric development in the world.”  Clark 
extolled the virtues of cheap electricity “to light, cook, iron, wash and clean house” at a 
mere three cents per day.  Similarly, he estimated that for twenty-three cents a day, a 
farmer could “light his house and barn, operate an electric range, washing machine, flat 
iron, toaster and other conveniences in the house; and pumps, grinding machines and 
other power implements outside.”37     
Indeed, Clark believed North Carolinians were living “at the beginning of a new 
era,” declaring:  
 
Electricity at these rates will rapidly displace steam and oil in the 
industries and gas in the household especially in view of its greater 
efficiency, flexibility, and possibilities and cleanliness….At the touch of a 
child’s hand there will be at your service a delightful home. The dishes 
will be washed, the rugs cleaned, the floor swept, the clothes washed and 
ironed, the sewing machine operated, electric fans when you need them 
and a hundred burdens will be lifted from the shoulders of the housewife 
and the farmer and a thousand conveniences added to every home.38 
  
But the new era was heavily dependent upon Duke’s continued investment in building the 
state’s power infrastructure. When Ben MacNeill, a journalist from the News and 
Observer, interviewed J. B. Duke at his estate in Charlotte, Duke asked, “Do I look like a 
dangerous man to be let loose in the state?”  Most influential North Carolinians would 
have responded “No.”  Many either acquiesced in Duke’s control of the state’s energy 
resources or praised his generous investments.  And with the development of state 
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regulation of power rates, trusting that state commissioners would protect the interests of 
the public softened much of the existing resistance to Duke’s monopoly.39  
 Even Clark recognized the state’s dependence on Duke thus far.  In private 
correspondence, he expressed frustration to a colleague, admitting, “I do not know the 
best way to take over these properties.”  Clark suggested as a possibility purchasing water 
power and energy resources from Southern Power with one-hundred year, two-percent, 
non-transferable bonds subject to a graduated inheritance tax.  Future developments 
would be funded from “heavy graduated income and inheritance taxes.”40  Yet such a 
plan, and the tax burden that would accompany it, was unlikely to gain popular support.      
Perhaps most devastating to Clark’s call for government ownership was when the 
great commotion over rate increases precipitously died down.  The state commission 
approved a partial rate increase in 1924 and much of the heated debate faded away as 
North Carolina settled into non-discriminatory rate structure and regulation by 
commission.41  Clark died shortly thereafter in May 1924 at his desk in Raleigh.  Duke 
followed him in October 1925.42  With the leading advocate for public ownership in 
North Carolina gone, and the often-despised industrialist behind Southern Power lionized 
following his death, the cause of public ownership in North Carolina faded into obscurity.  
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Public Power Lost 
 Ultimately, Duke’s power company found greater acceptance among the public as 
the state’s Corporation Commission granted partial rate increases that provided additional 
profits for Southern Power while convincing many that the commission was protecting 
their interests.  The regulation that Duke had fought so vigorously against, and that Clark 
had fought so ardently for, became a bulwark of his power company. It shifted criticism 
of Southern Power’s rates and policies to the commissioners whose vote would decide 
the future of rate increases after 1920.43  As North Carolinians accepted the regulatory 
state’s control over Southern Power, Clark’s plans for public ownership appealed to an 
ever-smaller section of the public.  In an arrangement that allowed Duke’s company to 
earn a profit under the watchful eye of the commission, calls for public ownership 
seemed radical, and perhaps worse, entirely unnecessary.  Indeed, as Christopher J. 
Mangianello has argued, by 1924, Duke’s company was part of a “southeastern Super 
Power grid that relayed electric power over 3,000 miles of high voltage transmission lines 
and served some six million people in a 120,000-square-mile region encompassing a half 
dozen states.”44         
 The course of regulating public energy in North Carolina introduces a paradox.  
Liberal reformers often implemented, advocated, or enacted the same reforms that would 
undermine a significant portion of their own agenda.  Consequently, as Clark pushed for 
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public ownership, his own success in ending price discrimination and strengthening the 
North Carolina Corporation Commission undermined his more radical plans for public 
ownership.  The system of state regulation of private power corporations established by 
the legislature in 1913 and forced into action by the State Supreme Court’s decision in 
1919, and the foundation of the state’s energy system since, obscures alternatives such as 
public ownership that existed in the early twentieth century.  While North Carolina’s 
current regulatory system that actively polices pricing to ensure “just and reasonable 
rates” to the state’s energy consumers owes much to Clark, it falls far short of his vision 
of a state-controlled monopoly administered for the public welfare.45  And while Duke 
initially abhorred North Carolina’s current regulatory system, it helped to ensure the 
survival of his power company into the twenty-first century.  In July 2012, Duke Energy 
finalized a merger with Progress Energy that, while retaining the Duke name, created the 
nation’s biggest regulated utility, with 7.2 million electric customers in the Carolinas, 
Florida, Indiana, Ohio and Kentucky.46  The continued success of Duke Energy shows 
that J. B. Duke’s company has not only survived but thrived under the supervision of the 
regulatory state. 
                                                          
45 “Mission Statement,” North Carolina Utilities Commission, accessed April 28, 2014, 
http://www.ncuc.net/  
 
46 “About Us,” Duke Energy, accessed April 28, 2014, http://www.duke-energy.com/about-us. 
254 
CHAPTER VIII 
CONCLUSION: LEGACY OF A SOUTHERN PROGRESSIVE JURIST 
 
 
This study of Justice Clark’s life and jurisprudence intends to offer scholars a 
better understanding of the New South, southern progressivism, and American legal 
history.  First, Clark’s judicial and political career demonstrates how Southern courts 
could act as engines of progressive reform, not simply a rubber stamp of conservative 
rule.  Second, this study shows that the familiar notion of separation of powers, learned 
by every grade school student, does not accurately describe the judicial and political 
actions of judges like Walter Clark.  Third, this study has situated Clark’s opinions in a 
national, and at times international, context and shown that legal reforms in North 
Carolina or the South did not occur in a vacuum but were part of a larger movement of 
the times.  Fourth, Clark’s inability to fit neatly into familiar historical molds of 
progressive or populist brings into question the usefulness of such labels and the 
distinctions made between them by historians.   
While most historians are more familiar with courts as obstacles they could also 
act as engines of reform.  As leading legal scholar Lawrence Friedman noted, during the 
last half of the nineteenth century (and continuing into the next), as farmers, laborers, and 
businesses offered competing visions for America, “in the economic struggle, law was an
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essential weapon.”1  And judges were tasked with hearing cases built upon flesh and 
blood claims—injuries to life and limb—into legal doctrines that affected the lives of 
working-class Americans by influencing workplace safety, hiring practices, etc.  During 
his tenure on the North Carolina Supreme Court, Justice Clark moved to enact strict 
liability rules for injuries to railroad employees despite, or because of, the legislature’s 
failure to do the same.  In a similar fashion, Clark’s opinions in Ward v. Odell and 
Fitzgerald v. Furniture Company created strict liability for employers who hired workers 
twelve years old or younger, despite the inability of the legislature to pass child labor 
legislation the previous year.2  In both instances Clark’s opinions led to child labor 
legislation the following year that codified his opinions in the statutory law.     
Clark’s active career off the bench would cause concern for many current 
members of the judiciary.  Indeed, it led to a significant amount of criticism during his 
lifetime, although it never led to his losing an election or facing impeachment 
proceedings.  Yet Clark was as much a politician as a judge.  His campaign for the Chief 
Justiceship in 1902 played out as a drama that brought accusations against Clark tying 
him to Fusion rule, “ignorant” black voters, and the much-hated Republican Party.  
Sometimes his political pursuits were public (in articles, addresses, and editorials) and at 
other times they were private and secretive (hand-written bills forwarded along to state 
legislators in letters titled “CONFIDENTIAL”), but always Clark was pushing the veil of 
separation as he actively campaigned against railroad abuses, child labor, industrial 
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malfeasance, and in favor of women’s property rights while deciding similar cases before 
the court.   
Clark’s judicial career consistently displayed the interconnectedness of law and 
politics.  For example, during the 1902 campaign for the Chief Justiceship, an 
organization of North Carolinians organized to defeat Clark’s nomination.  One of the 
most prominent members of that group was cotton manufacturer J. M. Odell.3  Two years 
before Odell had been on the losing end of an appellate case before the North Carolina 
Supreme Court, in which Justice Clark’s opinion upheld a $1,000 jury award to a nine-
year-old child who lost an eye in a cotton mill accident.  Clark’s ruling set the stage for a 
subsequent opinion, also authored by Clark, which held the employment of children 
under twelve years of age to be per se negligence.4  The group was also rumored to have 
received financing from Western Union Telegraph Company, whose involvement was 
likely related to Clark’s earlier decision in Young v. Western Union (1890), in which 
Clark introduced recovery for mental anguish for negligent failure to deliver a telegram 
about a close relative’s impending death or burial.5  In a line of cases over the next 
decade, Clark pushed the court to expand the mental anguish remedy, a line of cases 
which no doubt earned him the enmity of Western Union.6  Clark speculated in a letter to 
                                                          
3 “The Anti-Clark Forces Effect an Organization,” Raleigh Morning Post, September 12, 1902. 
 
4 Ebbirt Ward v. Odell Manufacturing Company, 126 N.C. 946 (1900).  
 
5 J. T. Young v. Western Union Telegraph Company, 107 N.C. 370 (1890); Walter Clark to A.W. Graham, 
April 7, 1902, in PWC, Vol. II, 9-10. 
 
6 J. T. Young v. Western Union Telegraph Company, 107 N.C. 370 (1890); Meadows v. Western Union 
Telegraph Company, 132 N.C. 40 (1903). 
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his brother-in-law that the 1902 election was an attempt by Western Union to “secure a 
reversal (by changing the court) of the Mental Anguish cases, so as to leave the 
monopoly free of any obligations as to prompt delivery of urgent messages concerning 
sickness or death.”7     
Meanwhile, at the national level, Clark collaborated with senators, presidential 
candidates, and presidents to push national reforms to make the entire federal judiciary 
subject to election, to bring the telegraph and telephone under the authority of the federal 
government, to secure the rights of labor against federal injunctions, and even to push for 
a new constitutional convention to radically democratize the founding document for a 
new age.  All the while his position as the Chief Justice of North Carolina provided grist 
for the political mill of organized farmers and laborers to parry attacks that they were 
uneducated, radical, or outside of the mainstream.  An editorial in the Railroad Worker 
on “Labor and the Law,” reporting on testimony before the Federal Industrial Relations 
Commission in Washington, D.C., noted almost gleefully “The ‘rabble’ that led the  
‘attack on the courts’ this time included the Chief Justice of a State Supreme Court.”8  
Even Clark’s enemies acknowledged the importance of Clark’s position when combined 
with his advocacy of various democratic reforms. Rome Brown, a leading conservative 
defender of judicial review, assailed Clark at the North Carolina Bar Association Meeting 
in 1914.  Describing calls for judicial recall, a movement Justice Clark was actively and 
vocally involved in, Rome harangued the Justice: 
                                                          
7 Walter Clark to A.W. Graham, April 7, 1902, in PWC, Vol. II, 9. 
 
8 Walter Clark, “Labor and the Law,” The Railroad Worker 13 (August 1915): 29. 
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Consider the effect of such utterances, especially from such origin, upon 
masses of the people, untaught in science of government, many of whom 
are already incited to restlessness and even to open defiance of 
authority…Why thus feed the fire of unrest, of discontent and even of 
rebellion, which are even now threatening devastation?”9      
 
Clark’s position as the Chief Justice combined with his long tenure on the court provided 
gravitas to his arguments for reform.  And that influence extended to others groups 
seeking reform (women voting rights advocates, public ownership supporters, union 
members, tobacco farmers, and others) as they capitalized on his role as a southern jurist 
to deflect claims of radicalism, while his enemies used the judge’s position to establish 
his culpability for criticizing the social and legal order of American society.    
Clark’s opinions were a mixture of local, national, and international influences.  
Timothy Huebner’s Southern Judicial Tradition makes the case for a distinctly southern 
(sectional) judicial tradition embedded within a culture of legal nationalism.10  Yet the 
tension between sectionalism and nationalism described by Huebner was complicated in 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth century by the migration of European (primarily 
English, French, and German) legal theory and experience across the Atlantic—and Clark 
was quick to embrace both early in his judicial career.  Aubrey L. Brooks noted that 
Clark was inspired by German legal theorist Rudolf Von Jhering’s lectures, so much so 
that he “gave [copies] to a number of his legal friends.”11  Clark read into Jhering’s 
                                                          
9 Rome G. Brown, Addresses, Discussions, Etc.,(Minneapolis: Self-published, 1917), 17, accessed December 
21, 2014, https://books.google.com/books?id=WQ40AQAAMAAJ. 
 
10 Timothy Huebner, The Southern Judicial Tradition: State Judges and Sectional Distinctiveness, 1790-
1890 (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2008), 1-9.  
 
11 Brooks, Fighting Judge, 81.   
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philosophy the late nineteenth century struggle between labor and capital.  Even more 
importantly, Jhering’s perception of the law as “not mere theory, but living force,” likely 
appealed to Clark who saw the law as a weapon for promoting the common good. 12   
Jhering’s writings, according to Brooks, reified Clark’s decision “to challenge to 
mortal combat the god of the status quo”—the common law.  Clark did indeed challenge 
the legitimacy of the common law.  He stated before a congressional committee, “I don’t 
recognize the right of a man who lived four hundred years ago and who knows nothing of 
present conditions, to say how I should decide between A and B in this day and 
generation.”13  The common law was an obstacle to be overcome; an unnatural 
impediment in the way of progress.  For example, Clark’s opinion in Price v. Electric 
Company that contested the common law principal that a wife could only recover for an 
injury through her husband.  Although in Price the court’s majority upheld an award of 
damages to the injured woman, the court did not repudiate the common law precedent 
that barred recovery by a married woman suing alone.  Discontented that the majority’s 
opinion did not go far enough Clark concurred.  Clark vigorously disagreed in his 
concurrence: “Every age should have laws based upon its own intelligence and 
expressing its own ideas of right and wrong. Progress and betterment should not be 
denied us by the dead hand of the Past.”14  Clark’s repeated frustration with the common 
law led him to contemplate doing away with the common law system of legal precedent, 
                                                          
12 Ibid., 81-82. 
 
13 Walter Clark “Labor and the Law,” 29. 
 
14 Louisa Price and Husband, R.S. Price v. Charlotte Electric Railway Company, 160 N.C. 450, 457 (1912). 
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and—moving from German jurisprudence to French—speak of the majesties of the 
French Civil Code and its refusal to bow down to precedent.   
 Moreover, Clark’s opinions frequently included extra-legal materials: crime and 
labor statistics, corporate reports, and European legal trends.  For example, in State v. 
Cameron, Clark’s opinion lamented the slowness of American courts in comparison to 
German and English courts; cited English court statistics on appeals and convictions; 
compared demographic data for the United States and England; and compared official 
North Carolina statistics of homicides, executions, and lynchings.15  While the remaining 
justices on the court agreed with the outcome, they joined Justice Allen’s concurrence, 
which bemoaned, “I do not think that statistics, not relevant to the decision of the cause, 
and which are often misleading, have a place in judicial opinion.”16  The decision sparked 
a controversy in the state as the governor, Locke Craig, weighed in, and Justices Allen 
and Clark exchanged angry letters—some published in the state’s newspapers.17  In 
earlier cases involving railroad negligence, Clark cited Interstate Commerce Commission 
reports alongside those of the North Carolina Railroad Commission.18  And in Clark’s 
testimony before the Industrial Labor Relations Board, in response to Chairman Walsh’s 
question whether counsel should be allowed to present “economic and social bearings on 
judicial decisions in arguments before the court,” Clark replied, “Yes, sir: I think they 
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17 Brooks, PWC, Vol. II, 287-289. 
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should discuss them.”  Clark went on to note that in his opinion in Ward v. Odell that he 
had, without any suggestions from counsel, considered the social and economic 
ramifications of the case.19  Indeed, in Fitzgerald, a subsequent child labor case, Clark’s 
opinion was based upon reviewing the statutes of twenty-nine states and fifteen foreign 
nations or provinces thereof (from California to Russia and from Quebec to Southern 
Australia).20  Clark grounded his opinion not in statute but in the “consensus of opinion in 
nearly the entire civilized world.”21 
 Lastly, Justice Clark poses some problems for the traditional distinctions between 
populists and progressives.  Indeed, Clark’s contemporaries applied both labels to him 
with a frustrating level of irregularity.  While Populists are often associated with rural 
farmers, historians have long debated where to lay the wreath of praise for progressivism.  
In the decade immediately following World War II, Richard Hofstadter claimed that 
progressivism was an urban, middle-class phenomenon that resulted from fear over a loss 
in status to a rising industrial elite.22  Around the same time C. Vann Woodward’s 
Origins of the New South described southern progressives as a middle-class, urban 
movement that “lacked the agrarian cast and the radical edge” of the Populist 
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movement.23  Typically its leaders were city professionals and businessmen.”24  Even 
further removed from the agrarian Populist tradition, Gabriel Kolko’s The Triumph of 
Conservatism argued that many of the leading victories of progressivism were victories 
won by railroads (and other industries) who sought protection from state legislation and 
new competition.  Consequently, Kolko’s leading progressives were not so much 
progressives as conservatives acting to protect the interests of big business and private 
property.25  The confusion over whom and what defined progressivism led Peter Filene to 
pen “An Obituary for ‘The Progressive Movement’” in the American Quarterly.26  
According to Filene, the term progressive was so broad it had become useless and the 
people it described so divergent that progressives were hard to distinguish from their 
opponents.  Yet all was not lost, and progressivism survived its pallbearers.  More recent 
scholarship has focused on the role of black and white women in the progressive 
movement.27  Other scholars have shown a closer connection between rural farmers and 
urban reformers that survived the downfall of the People’s Party in the late 1890s.28   
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 Justice Clark does not fit neatly into any of the above described categories.  As an 
urban, middle-class professional, he does not fit the traditional Populist mold.  Yet Clark 
was a man of many talents and many occupations.  In addition to being a judge and 
activist, Clark was also a large property holder.  After the Civil War, Clark’s father 
passed along to Clark management of his two thousand plus acre Ventosa plantation, 
along with at least one other plantation.  The plantation more often proved a burden than 
a source of income, and Clark frequently encountered troubles with incompetent 
managers, disgruntled sharecroppers, and the negligence of the railroads.  Because of 
these issues, Clark frequently visited Ventosa throughout his life.  Consequently, his 
interests were both urban and rural, agricultural and professional.  Agricultural 
publications praised Justice Clark as someone who had “engaged in farming all his 
lifetime practically….He knows and feels the disadvantages under which farmers toil.”29   
Moreover, Clark brings us back to Hofstadter’s claim that progressivism arose from fear 
of loss of social and economic status within society.  Such an explanation takes on special 
significance when speaking of former Confederates after the war.  When Clark returned 
on horseback from High Point to his family’s Ventosa plantation, he found the ground 
covered in weeds, the enslaved laborers absent, and the family’s mansion burned to the 
ground.30  In addition, the family’s shipping business was lost, as both ships had been 
sold to the Confederate government early in the war and were subsequently confiscated 
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by the Union Army.31  His family’s social position, most of their wealth, their home, and 
even his father’s health, were lost by the conclusion of the war.   
 Yet Clark’s reformist beliefs were not so much forged from a new fear of losing 
social status.  Instead, the loss of his family’s wealth unbound Clark from the restrictions 
of plantation life and set him free to apply his Jeffersonian and Jacksonian beliefs about 
concentrations of power distant from the (white) voting public to a South that was 
profoundly changed.  Clark’s rhetoric, letters, and opinions fit well with Michael Kazin’s 
description of a “Populist persuasion.”32  Not so much an ideology as a worldview of a 
society divided between a virtuous, but exploited, class against “elite…self-serving and 
undemocratic” opponents.33     
With his status as a slaveholder stripped away by the Thirteenth Amendment, and 
his former enslaved workforce deserting him, Clark was free to argue against the error of 
slavery in the antebellum past, as well as attack the new class of industrial elites for their 
transgressions against the democratic order.  Clark equated the rising industrialists, and 
the courts that abetted their large fortunes and monopolies, with the slave power, and the 
courts that abetted their disproportionate political and economic power—both systems 
benefited the few at the expense of many common whites.34  Clark argued on many 
occasions that the odious power of judicial review was originally designed not to protect 
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corporations, insignificant in size and number in the early republic, but to protect the 
slavocracy by a leading member of the southern  slaveholding elite—Justice Marshall.  
Thus Clark intimately linked the antebellum undemocratic elites with the new class of 
industrial elites who were an equally undemocratic force in society.   
 What do we say to Walter Clark today?  Perhaps the question should be asked, 
what does Walter Clark have to say to us?  His legacy causes us to rethink connections 
between the antebellum era and the Progressive Era; the national and international 
connections of southern progressivism; the relative roles of the judicial and legislative 
branches and how distinctions between them could be considerably blurred; the distinctly 
southern aspects of progressivism in the South; and the degree to which a former 
Confederate officer blazed a trail of changes in the legal community that echoed those of 
the better remembered Holmes and Brandeis.  Lastly, Clark’s vision was not only 
progressive but optimistic.  Despite his frequent conflicts with the railroad, telegraph, and 
tobacco trusts; the repeated failures of his runs for non-judicial office; and his inability to 
overcome the Simmons political machine, Clark remained optimistic. 
 
We are travelling with increasing speed toward giving a greater and a 
more adequate share of the wealth they create to the labor that creates it.   
In the not distant future there will be no Rockefellers and Carnegies, no 
Kaisers or kings, but a higher standard of living and more enjoyment of 
life for those who ‘make all things that are made and without whom 
nothing is made that is made.’  Privilege will pass.  Equality of 
opportunity will prevail.  The miter and the musket will no longer have a 
controlling share in government when the hammer and the level, the brain 
and the hand shall ‘rule in the realm which they have made.’35 
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Justice Clark, and his progressive vision of law and politics, deserves a place in the 
American historical and judicial tradition. 
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